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ABSTRACT
INNOVATION SPILLOVERS, APPROPRIABILITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Douglas Hanley
Ufuk Akcigit

Innovation and technological change are important drivers of economic growth. There is
strong evidence that various types of innovation, whether they differ by source, goal, or
field, have differing implications for economic outcomes. These arise primarily because of
differences in the level of associated externalities (spillovers) and in the ability of innovators to internalize the public benefits from these activities (appropriability). In my research,
I focus on identifying the nature and magnitude of these spillovers. Additionally, building
on recent advances in the structural modeling of firm incentives, I quantify the extent of
appropriation by innovators, particularly as it varies across innovation types. This allows
one to provide a detailed accounting of misallocation in the economy and consider policies
which can alleviate this.
In the first chapter, entitled “Technological Interdependence”, I study theoretically and
empirically how the level of interdependence between new and old technology affects firm
dynamics and the incentives for innovation. In the second chapter, entitled “Back to Basics”
(joint work with Ufuk Akcigit and Nicolas Serrano-Velarde), we propose and utilize a novel
strategy for quantifying the spillovers associated with basic research as they differ from
applied research. Finally, in the third chapter, entitled “Transition to Clean Technology”
(joint work with Daron Acemoglu, Ufuk Akcigit, and William Kerr), we construct and
estimate a joint model of the climate-economy system and investigate the effects of various
carbon policies.
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Chapter 1
Technological Interdependence
1.1

Introduction

The innovation process is known to be highly cumulative. New ideas are created because
inventors “stand on the shoulders of giants” that preceded them. However, the extent to
which new technology is dependent upon old technology varies substantially from field to
field. In some areas, such as pharmaceuticals, new technologies often replace existing ones,
rendering them obsolete. Here creative destruction is a natural byproduct of innovation. In
other areas, such as computer software, new technologies complement existing ones and
are integrated with them into a final product. In this setting, technologies are generated
incrementally, potentially across multiple firms and over long periods of time, necessitating
some form of technology transfer between firms.
Motivated by this last consideration, I proxy the level of technological interdependence
in an industry by the rate of patent transfer between firms, which, following the literature,
I refer to as sequentiality. Using this index of sequentiality, I find that more sequential
industries have higher profitability, higher variance of firm growth, lower exit rates, and

1

lower rates of patent expiry1 . These trends may at first seem puzzling, but as I will show,
they in fact arise naturally from a model of firm-driven technological progress featuring
heterogeneity across industries in the level of sequentiality. By studying such a model and
constraining it with data, we can address a number of important questions. For instance,
how does the appropriability of the returns to innovation vary with sequentiality? Does
cross-industry heterogeneity in sequentiality produce substantial research misallocation?
And finally, what role can patent policy play in this setting?
Estimating this model using firm-level data on patenting and balance sheet information,
each of the trends noted above is matched qualitatively, and a large fraction of the variation
is accounted for quantitatively. I show theoretically that the larger the sequentiality in
a particular industry, the more severe the monopoly distortions induced by a particular
level of innovation. This leads to an overallocation of research inputs into more sequential
industries. In line with this result, I find that implementing an optimal industry dependent
patent policy, which features weaker patent protection in more sequential industries, can
remedy a substantial fraction of this misallocation, over and above an optimal uniform
patent policy.
This paper contributes to the existing body of literature along both empirical and theoretical dimensions. First, regarding theory, I construct a parsimonious, micro-founded
model of sequential innovation and endogenous technological change that formalizes the
process by which new ideas are generated, built upon, and subsequently transferred between firms or rendered obsolete. Sequential innovation has already been given treatment
in the literature on innovation and endogenous growth, notably in Green and Scotchmer
(1995) and Bessen and Maskin (2009), as well as Hopenhayn, Llobet, and Mitchell (2006),
who analyze the inherent trade-off present between rewarding incumbents and subsequent
innovators that will replace them. This model captures the same trade-off while incorporat1

Patent holders must pay maintenance fees at 4, 8, and 12 years after granting or face permanent expiry.

2

ing features of more empirically focused models of firm dynamics such as those of Klette
and Kortum (2004) and Lentz and Mortensen (2008).2 I characterize the innovation decisions of firms in a manner that provides intuition for the various economic forces at play
and solve for a variety of observable quantities.
In the model, new innovations have differing degrees of dependence on existing technology. High levels of dependence (sequential innovations) necessitate some form of patent
sales agreement between the owners of existing technology and new innovators.3 Conversely, low levels of dependence (independent innovations) necessitate little adjudication
of rights between firms as the new innovation simply renders the old one obsolete, leading
to the expiration of the original patent. Laitner and Stolyarov (2013) entertain a similar
distinction in a model of exogenous innovation. In my model, innovation is endogenously
determined and the frequency of sequential innovation varies from industry to industry.
As has been done in Akcigit and Kerr (2010) and Atkeson and Burstein (2010), firms
can engage in two types of innovation: external, where they innovate on product lines
owned by other firms, and internal, where they innovate on their own product lines. The
effect of sequentiality on the rate of external innovation is ex ante ambiguous due to the
presence of two countervailing forces. First, the value of owning an existing product line
is larger in more sequential industries as they feature lower rates of creative destruction
from competitors and larger streams of payments from subsequent sequential innovators
who buy their patents. However, because of the increased probability of sequential innovation, which necessitates a payout to the existing incumbent, the net effect on innovators
will be ambiguous. This stands in contrast to the model presented in Akcigit, Celik, and
Greenwood (2013), which features the positive effect of revenues from patent sales, but not
2

These in turn build upon foundational works such as Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), and
Grossman and Helpman (1991), as well as numerous other works produced in the interim. See Aghion,
Akcigit, and Howitt (2014) for a very recent survey.
3
I assume that firms always sell their patents rather than licensing them. In the model, this will always be
the optimal type of agreement due to monopolistic distortions.
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the inhibition of follow on innovation due to continuing patent protection. In the case of
internal innovation, the picture becomes clearer, as only the positive effect described above
remains.
Broadly speaking, the sequentiality dimension introduced here fills a gap between two
classes of models commonly studied in the endogenous growth literature. That is, most
models either feature firms that face no threat of replacement from other innovators at the
product line level, as in the expanding variety model of Romer (1990), or just the opposite,
that firms innovate solely on other firms’ product lines and can take over production at will
upon a successful innovation, as in Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman
(1991), or Klette and Kortum (2004). The model presented in this paper will act as a bridge
between the two extremes presented above. In the extreme of full sequentiality, much
of the gains from innovation will be internalized through repeated selling of patent rights
down the quality ladder, though distortions from bargaining will complicate this process
slightly. In contrast to the Romer model, however, this will come at the cost of a buildup
of monopoly power. In the extreme of no sequentiality, we find ourselves with a standard
model of creative destruction.
The second contribution of this paper is to enrich our understanding of the data on
patenting and innovation by firms. To study cross-industry differences in the sequentiality of innovation, I propose a method of classifying technology classes–an index of
sequentiality–based upon the fraction of patents that are transferred in their lifetime. Looking back to the introductory examples, patents in the major pharmaceutical patent classes
are transferred 15% of the time, while the same figure for telecommunications is twice as
large at 30%. Using this ordering, I document a variety of trends in both the patent data
and in linked firm-level data. One would naturally expect the level of sequentiality in a
particular industry to have an effect upon innovations dynamics in that industry. For instance, highly sequential industries should feature lower rates of patent obsolescence, as
4

patents are more likely to be built upon and integrated into a larger portfolio rather than
being replaced by a new type of technology. This buildup of larger patent portfolios should
in turn cause profits to rise, as leading firms will have a larger technological lead over their
nearest competitor.
In the data description section below, I document that these trends are in fact present
in the data, and I enumerate other trends observed in the cross-industry data, namely that
more sequential industries feature lower exit rates and higher variance in firm growth. The
former is a natural implication of the reduction in the rate of creative destruction in more sequential industries. The latter effect arises from interaction with firm heterogeneity. Higher
sequentiality and the concomitant patent transfers result in the agglomeration of more productive control into the hands of high quality firms. This magnifies the persistent growth
differences between firms of differing quality, resulting in more volatile firm growth overall, particularly over longer time periods.
In addition to cross-industry statistics, there are notable trends occurring at the firm and
patent level. There is a strong tendency for patents to flow from older and larger firms
to younger and smaller firms, with the age dimension showing a distinctly stronger trend
than the size dimension. This echoes the finding of Figueroa and Serrano (2013) that small
firms receive a disproportionate amount of patent transfers.4 These facts, in conjunction
with the cross-industry trend in firm growth volatility lend support to the notion that patent
transfers reflect an underlying process of reallocation amongst firms. This is particularly
compelling given the strong evidence that younger, smaller firms excel in many measures
of firm performance such as growth and profitability (both in the data presented here and
in other works such as Akcigit and Kerr (2010) and Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom, and Kerr
(2013)).
4
They use firm size information (greater or less than 500 employees) contained in patent renewal applications.
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The third contribution of this paper is to estimate the proposed model using data on
public firms and patents in the US, provide a detailed quantitative analysis of the results,
and study the implications for optimal patent policy. I use a Simulated Method of Moments
(SMM) estimator to match various features of the US data on patent grants, transfers, and
expiry and on firm level growth rates and profitability. The patent data comes from the
USPTO/Google database and includes data on filings, grants, expiry, and transfers. Data on
patent transfers in particular has not been utilized extensively in the literature, especially
in a structural setting. The patent data is aggregated to the firm level and matched to
Compustat balance sheet data using sophisticated name matching routines.
The estimated model is able to match the targeted moments quite well. In addition, the
model can match various non-targeted features of the data, including some of the major
trends noted above. The resulting eight-year patent expiration rate over all industries is
39%, compared to 34% in the data, while the standard deviation is 15% compared to 13%
in the data. Thus the model captures the proportional variation in the data, while slightly
overshooting the magnitude. Other cross-industry trends, such as the relationship between
transfer rates and profitability, firm growth variance, and exit rate are qualitatively captured,
and the model is able to quantitatively account for a large fraction of these tends.
As predicted by theory, the level of internal innovation rises with sequentiality, with a
52% increase moving from the least to most sequential industry. The level of external innovation, whose dependence on sequentiality was theoretically ambiguous, falls modestly
along this dimension, largely due to bargaining distortions that limit the appropriability of
back-loaded profit streams. To assess potential misallocation of production and research
labor, both within and between industries, I consider a constrained social planner who can
choose innovation rates but is still subject to monopoly distortions induced by patenting. I
show theoretically that the larger the sequentiality in a particular industry, the more severe
the monopoly distortions induced by an increase in innovation rates. Thus for either type
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of innovation, the planner optimally choses a profile that falls sharply with sequentiality–
in the case of external innovation, much more so than in the equilibrium–so as to limit
the monopoly distortions caused by the buildup of large, protected technological leads by
firms. The equilibrium yields a consumption equivalent welfare 2.5% lower than that of
the constrained social planner.
Finally, I investigate the implications of the model for patent policy. I consider both a
uniform patent policy and one that depends upon the sequentiality of the industry in question. For the purposes of implementation, the sequentiality of a particular industry can be
inferred using the monotonic relationship between sequentiality and the patent transfer rate
in the equilibrium of the estimated model. The above discussion of the social planner’s optimum leads one to suspect that the optimal patent policy would feature weaker protection
in more sequential industries. Indeed, I find that for certain very low levels of sequentiality, an infinite patent is called for. The optimal patent length then decreases from infinity
to a minimal value of 6 years in the most sequential industry. This policy results in welfare gains of 1.7% in consumption equivalent terms. For comparison, the optimal constant
patent policy calls for a mean patent length of 12 years and delivers welfare gains of only
0.9%.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: in Section 1.2, I describe the data set
used and enumerate the notable trends in the data; in Section 1.3, I construct a model capable of matching these facts and describe its equilibrium properties; in Section 1.4, I describe
the estimation procedure and results; in Section 1.5, I provide a detailed quantitative analysis of the estimated model with accompanying decompositions and policy experiments;
and finally in Section 1.6, I conclude the analysis.
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1.2

Empirical Findings

Data on patent grants, expirations, and transfers was acquired from the USPTO Bulk Download site (hosted by Google). Firm names are matched and aggregated into persistent entities based on a name matching algorithm described in Appendix A.1.5
For each patent transfer, the following information is provided: (1) the name of the
origin firm and destination firm (assignor and assignee), (2) the date that the patent was
legally transferred, (3) the date that the transfer was recorded by the patent office, and (4)
the purpose of the transfer, amongst other things. In particular, the information on the
purpose of the transfer (known as the conveyance text) is used to filter out mergers, licensing agreements, and collateralizations, leaving only simple patent sales, which account for
about 85% of the original data points.
The names of the origin and destination firm were matched to the set of entities produced from the patent grant data using the same name matching algorithms. In order to
focus on innovating firms and not firms that are simply acquiring patents for other reasons
(such as resale), I keep only transfers to firms that have already acquired patents through
filing and granting. This eliminates firms that act solely as patent brokers. Furthermore, to
exclude instances where conglomerates are transferring patents amongst their constituent
units, I eliminate transfers where the origin and destination firm names are sufficiently
close, using a more aggressive version of the original name matching algorithm (this is
also described in Appendix A.1).
To enrich the data on patent grants, I also use data on the payment of patent maintenance
fees. Firms must pay fees to the US patent office after 4, 8, and 12 years from the time of
granting. If these fees are not paid, the patent expires permanently. If a patent is maintained
through the initial 12 year period, it remains valid until 20 years from its filing date.6 This
5

Python code to parse, match, and aggregate the USPTO patent data (along with Compustat data) can be
found at https://github.com/iamlemec/patents.
6
Traditionally, the maximum patent length was 17 years from the grant date. The 1994 Uruguay Round
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data thus gives discretized information on the active lifespan of a patent. In total, 35% of
patents expire after 8 years, while 48% make it to the natural expiry date. Using the data
on patent expiration gives us fairly direct information on the rate of patent obsolescence
and hence a window into the level of product market competition faced by firms. Using
this in conjunction with the data on patent transfers helps us understand the importance of
sequential innovation and its impact on firm dynamics and the incentives to innovate.
To register a patent reassignment with the USPTO, a firm must pay a one-time $40 flat
fee. The bulk of the cost is likely to be found in simply filling out the paperwork. Firms
already incur legal fees to arrange the contracts for the transfer deals, so going the extra
step to register with the patent office is probably not a huge effort. Patent maintenance fees
are slightly higher but still not large compared to the common estimates of patent value in
the literature. Some studies, such as Pakes (1986), Pakes and Schankerman (1984), and
Bessen and Meurer (2008), have used patent renewal patterns to estimate the distribution
of patent valuations. A survey by Griliches (1990) reports that various studies found a
highly skewed distribution of patent valuations, with mean valuation estimates in the hundreds of thousands of current US dollars, and an obsolescence rate of between 10% and
20% per year. The fees required for renewal at 4, 8, and 12 years are $1600, $3600, and
$7200, respectively. These fees are cut in half for small entities (less than 500 employees), and halved again for “micro entities” (targeted towards individual inventors). This
self-reported size information provides useful data on the actual size of particular patenting
firms. Figueroa and Serrano (2013) utilize this to study the relationship between firm size
and patent transferring activity.
An important consideration is the possibility that firms license the patents of other firms
rather than buying them outright. Firms are required to register patent sales or transfers in
Agreements Act changed this to the above criterion. See Graham and Vishnubhakat (2013) for a review of
the relevant statutes.
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order to retain patent rights for a particular technology. However, there is no such requirement for patent licensing, which is regulated by state law in the US.7 Approximately 1% of
patent transfer entries list licensing as the documented activity, though this cannot be guaranteed to be a complete record. Looking across industries, there is no systematic variation
in this fraction of reported licensing activity.

1.2.1

Major Trends

Testing various cross-industry predictions necessitates dividing the sample of patents and
firms into particular industry level categories. For this exercise, I employ the level one
technology class utilized by the US patent office. There are 714 such classes represented
in the full patent grant dataset, with a median size of around one thousand patents. Using
the first-level classification provides sufficient granularity to capture the specific features of
various technological fields while being large enough to avoid excessive noise in aggregate
statistics due to small within-industry samples.
It is also possible to extend patent classification information to the firm level. By assigning to a firm the modal patent class amongst its portfolio of patents, we can look at how
various firm characteristics vary with technological field. Though most firms have patents
in multiple patent classes, the modal patent class accounts for an average of 50% of a firm’s
patents. This extension to firm characteristics will be important for analyzing trends in balance sheet data from Compustat. For patent data, much of the analysis can be done purely
on the patent level. However, I do analyze the patent data using firm-level class assignment
for robustness and find similar results.
Industry level regressions are done using weighted least squares. The weighting used is
simply the size of the particular technology class in terms of total patents granted. Data on
patenting is available from 1976 to the present. For the facts below, I look at the five-year
7

See Dykeman and Kopko (2004) for an overview of the relevant statutes and case law.
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period from 1995 to 2000. This allows sufficient lead time to have realistic values for firm
patent stocks, which is the count of patents that are unexpired at any given time. In a steady
state world, a lead in time equal to or greater than the patent length suffices. Additionally, it
allows sufficient lag time to analyze future transfer, maintenance, and citation activity. The
correlations presented below are also weighted by patent class size. In each of the figures
accompanying the following facts, the point size represents the total number of patents
granted (the weight) and the color represents the the numerical patent class, which ranges
from 1 (lightest) to 800 (darkest). Because patent classes have been added incrementally
over time, the patent class (color) also provides a very good proxy for how recently the
patent class was created.
Fact 1. There is a negative correlation between patent transfer rates and patent expiry
rates across industries.
F IGURE 1.1: T RANSFER –E XPIRY R ELATIONSHIP
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Relationship between patent transfer and expiry. Red line: WLS regression β
Correlation is ρ  0.34.
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 0.33.

The transfer rate is the fraction of patents granted in the data window that are transferred
in their lifetime, while the expiry rate is the fraction of patents granted in the data window
that are not renewed after the first eight-year window and hence expire. The extent of the
negative relationship is portrayed in Figure 1.1. This trend highlights a central feature of
the model proposed herein, namely that industries with innovation that is more sequential
in nature will see higher transfer rates due to higher levels of technological interdependence
and lower levels of creative destruction for the same reason.
Fact 2. There is a positive correlation between patent transfer rates and firm profitability
across industries.
F IGURE 1.2: T RANSFER –P ROFITABILITY R ELATIONSHIP

Median Profitability

1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

Sequentiality (Transfer Rate)

0.30

Relationship between patent transfer and median profitability. Red line: WLS regression
β  3.85. Correlation is ρ  0.40.

Here I calculate the firm-level profitability as the ratio of revenue to the cost of goods
sold, as given in the Compustat data. This excludes operating costs and allows us to look
purely at variable cost relationships, which are a primary variable of interest in quality
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ladder models. I then look at the median value within each industry. Intuitively speaking,
we would expect that industries with high transfer rates see more aggregation of monopoly
power and less reduction through creative destruction (from Fact 1). This then leads to
higher markups over cost being charged and higher profitability. This trend is portrayed in
Figure 1.2. Looking at the relationship between log return on sales and transfer rate yields
a similar trend, though with more noise on account of sales being in the denominator.
Fact 3. The variance of firm growth rates is positively correlated with patent transfer rates
across industries.
F IGURE 1.3: T RANSFER –G ROWTH VOLATILITY R ELATIONSHIP
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Relationship between patent transfer rate and growth volatility. Red line: WLS regression
β  0.21. Correlation is ρ  0.19.

Here the variance of firm growth is calculated using a number of common firm size
statistics, including patent stock, employment level, and earnings. Regardless of the metric
used, industries with higher transfer rates display higher variance in firm growth rates.
One mechanism that could generate this trend is that patent transfers allow higher quality
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firms to grow faster at the expense of lower quality firms. Furthermore, because of lower
levels of creative destruction present in industries with higher transfer rates, larger firms
are also more able to protect their market share, thus widening the gap further between the
performance of high and low quality firms. The fact that this gap is larger in industries
with higher transfer rates leads to a higher variance of firm growth in these industries. In
order to account for this potentially being driven by level differences, due to certain sectors
growing or shrinking in the aggregate, I look at the variance of log growth rates within
industry. Using this measure, changes in industry size will come out as a common additive
factor for each firm and thus will not affect the computed variance.
Fact 4. There is a negative correlation between firm exit rates and patent transfer rates
across industries.
F IGURE 1.4: T RANSFER –E XIT R ATE R ELATIONSHIP
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regression β  0.26. Correlation is ρ  0.16.

In line with Fact 1, interpreting lower expiry rates as indicating lower rates of creative
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destruction, one would also expect lower exit rates in industries with high transfer rates.
This is indeed born out in the data, where exiting from the sample of patenting firms is
taken to occur when a firm no longer displays any patenting activity.
Fact 5. Patent transfers are directed primarily toward young and small firms. Firms aged
less than 10 years account for only 14% of the patent stock, while receiving approximately
57% of patent transfers.

F IGURE 1.5: AGE /S IZE C UMULATIVE F RACTIONS
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Cumulative fractions of patenting activity by firm age and size (patent stock).

Small and young firms account for a disproportionate share of patent transfer receipts
relative to their size. The size distribution of firms is highly skewed. Therefore small
and young firms will invariably constitute a relatively small fraction of the patent stock.
The analogous numbers to those presented in the fact above for firms below the 80th size
percentile are that they account for 11% of the patent stock and 36% of patent receipts.
This figure is still disproportionate in terms of firm size but not nearly as much as that
for firm age. Looking at patent filings and patent transfer origination, we see similar but
less extreme trends. Young firms account for 30% of filings and 33% of originations. The
15

analogous figures for small firms are 19% of filings and 29% of originations.
Conventional wisdom dictates that small firms sell technologies to larger firms who
are in a better position to bring products to market or integrate them into existing production processes (for instance, see Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) for a theoretical discussion
of this dynamic). However, the data indicate a bulk flow towards small and, to a greater
extent, young firms. This is consistent with a model where firms are imbued with persistent (though mutable) types and patent reassignment is a mechanism by which production
control is transferred to higher quality firms.

1.2.2

Mechanism Evidence

In addition to the cross-industry trends presented above, I also provide more detailed evidence on the proposed mechanism. Of central importance is documenting that sequential
innovation, in the sense of direct technological dependence, is the primary driving force
behind the observed transfers of patent ownership. One might naturally expect citation
patterns to shed light on this issue.
As described above, I classify firms into various technological categories by using the
modal patent class in their portfolio. The average firm cites only 3% of the other firms in
its patent class. Relating this to the data on patent transfers, 52% of firm pairs that have
transfers between them also cite each other. Breaking this down by the direction of transfer,
the destination firm cites the origin firm in 50% of cases, while the reverse happens in only
23% of cases. Thus it is quite rare that the origin firm cites the destination firm without
the reverse also happening. Higher citation rates between firms that transfer patents, in of
itself, may merely indicate that these firms are closer together in a technological sense and
that such firms are more likely to cite one another. However, the asymmetry in citation
rates between the different directions of transfer lends further support to the notion that
transfer are acting as a mechanism for reallocation of production and research towards
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higher quality firms.
Fact 6. The internal citation rate is uncorrelated with transfer rates, while the external
citation rate is highly correlated with transfer rates across industries.

F IGURE 1.6: T RANSFER –E XTERNAL C ITATION R ELATIONSHIP
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β  44.1. Correlation is ρ  0.49.

The data on citations show that the average number of citations per patent is higher
in more sequential fields. Breaking these citations down into those that cite within firm
and those that cite other firms, we see that internal citations are not related to industry sequentiality, while external citations are strongly related. This is consistent with the notion
that technological dependency is the primary determinant of whether a new innovator must
purchase the rights to existing ideas in the field. I use two measures of internal/external
citations classification in this instance, both of which display the same trends across industries. First, I simply look at the aggregate number of internal and external citations
per patent by industry. Second, I follow Akcigit and Kerr (2010) in classifying a patent
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as internally oriented if more than 50% of its citations are self-directed. Regardless of the
measure used, I observe the trends noted above, as portrayed in Figure 1.6.
Fact 7. There is a positive correlation across industries between the fraction of patents
acquired by transfer and acquisition expenditures.
The mechanism presented in this paper operates at the patent and product line level
and firms are largely just collections of various product lines. However, it may be the case
that resolution of patenting rights occurs not simply through the direct buying and selling
of patents but at higher levels of aggregation such as the subsidiary of a conglomerate or
entire firms of varying size. Particularly in the case of small firms or entrants, whose value
is often encompassed in a single product line, this may be an important dynamic. And
indeed, looking at the data on acquisition activity, we see a positive relationship between
that and patent transfer rates. While it is certainly the case that there are other forces
that can drive M&A activity, this trend indicates that the technological landscape plays an
important role. Discussion of how this data may be mapped into the model is deferred until
the section on estimation.

1.3

Model

In this section, I present a continuous-time model of firm dynamics and endogenous technological growth. After specifying the various elements of the model, I characterize the
dynamic equilibrium. I then focus on the case of the steady state, with the objective of
producing predictions that map into the trends described in the previous section.
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1.3.1

Consumers

There is a unit mass of immortal consumer-workers in the economy. Each has one unit of
labor that they supply inelastically. Their utility is a function on the infinite flow stream of
consumption starting at time t  0. In particular, they discount the future at rate δ and have
an instantaneous utility function of upcq with constant relative risk aversion parameter σ.
Thus their utility function can be expressed as
U pcq 

»8
0



cptq1σ  1
exppδtqdt
1σ

where c is a consumption profile that specifies the level of consumption at each point in
time. All agents earn a wage w from employment. They also have access to a risk-free
bond paying interest r and having zero net supply in the aggregate. Let their bond holding
profile be the function a. Their budget equation is then given by
a9  w

c

ra

where time dependence is suppressed for notational convenience. There is a single final
good Y for consumption, which is normalized to have a unit price at each point in time.
Because all costs are purely in terms of labor, the final good resource constraint for the
economy is simply c  Y . The associated Euler equation for this problem the delivers the
result

 YY  cc  r σ δ
9

g

9

Letting the common growth rate of Y and c be denoted by g, we arrive at r

δ

σg.

Finally, each worker can choose to be a production worker or a research worker. Let
the respective masses of each type be LP and LR . The labor market clearing condition is
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then

LP

LR

1

Given the costless choice between being employed as a production worker and a research
worker, any equilibrium of the model will feature a common wage w for these two occupations.

1.3.2

Production

The final good is produced by combining a unit continuum of intermediate goods with the
well-known Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator with unit elasticity

Y

 exp

» 1
0

lnpyj q dj



This technology is operated competitively by a continuum of firms. Each buys up certain
quantities intermediate goods for respective prices pj , combines them into a final good, and
sells that for the normalized unit price. The objective of one such firm is then
"

Π  max exp
yj

Optimality dictates that Y

» 1
0

lnpyj q dj





*

»1

pj yj dj
0

 pj yj for all j. Constant returns to scale ensure that these firms

make zero profit in equilibrium.
Each intermediate good is in turn produced using a linear technology of the form yjf



qjf `jf , where the f subscript allows for the fact that different firms have different knowhow in producing each particular good. Now consider the firm with the most advanced
production technology and simply let qj
producer be qj



maxf tqjf u. Furthermore, let the next best

 qj {λj , where λj ¥ 1. The leading firm can then price the runner up out
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of the market by charging a price pj
employing `j

 w{qj  wλj {qj , thus selling yj  Y qj {pwλj q and

 Y {pwλj q labor. This leads to profits of
πj

 pj yj  w`j  p1  λj 1qY

Thus the labor utilization and profit of each product line are purely a function of the technological lead λj and the not the absolute productivity value qj . Using tilde to denote values
normalized by Y , the labor utilization and profit for a product line with technological lead
λ are given by
`pλq 

λ1
w
r

and

rpλq  1  λ1
π

Having fully characterized the production decisions of intermediate goods producing firms,
we can now use these production values to address the innovations decisions of firms.

1.3.3

Innovation

It was shown above that the only firm relevant variable for a particular product line is the
technological lead λj . Each firm in the economy can thus be characterized simply as a
portfolio of technological lead values for product lines in which it is the leading producer.
For a firm with n product lines, denote such a vector by
~λ  pλ1 , . . . , λn q
Following the model presented in Klette and Kortum (2004), the external innovation production technology specified here uses only labor as an input and scales up linearly with
firm size. In particular, a firm with n product lines can achieve a Poisson flow rate of
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innovation X by employing
C pn, X q  ncpX {nq
researchers. In other words, a firm must use cpxq researchers per product line to achieve an
innovation rate of x per product line, where x

 X {n. Firms can also undertake internal

innovation on one of their existing product lines. Here I allow the cost of internally oriented innovation to scale with a firm’s technological lead (λ). This is motivated partly by
tractability and partly through existing empirical evidence. Akcigit and Kerr (2010) find
that the intensity of internally oriented innovation does not scale strongly with firm size. In
order to generate such a result, we can use the form
dpλ, z q  λ1 dpz q
where z is the flow rate of internal innovation. This ensures that the internal innovation
rate will actually be constant across firms, regardless of their technological lead for a given
product line.
The functional forms given allow one to treat each firm simply as a collection of research labs, each associated with a particular product line. Denote the value of a research
lab with technological lead λ by V pλq. A firm with portfolio ~λ will then have value
V p~λq 

8̧


V pλi q

i 1

A research lab will accrue profits from production and generate innovations. Successful
innovations will garner new research labs with their associated production and innovation
capabilities. Now we can characterize all firm decisions by addressing the problem at a
product line level.
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When an external innovation occurs, the state-of-the-art productivity of a random product line is incremented by a random factor β. For internal innovations, the productivity in
the target product line is incremented by a factor drawn from the same distribution. Measuring and constructing systematic data on innovation sizes is difficult. However, in a limited
sample, Scherer (1965) finds evidence that a Pareto distribution is appropriate. Meanwhile,
Pakes and Schankerman (1984) are able to fit data on patent expiry in multiple countries
using a Pareto distributed innovation size distribution, while Kortum (1997) find a Pareto
distribution to be consistent with aggregate trends in research, growth, and patenting. Thus
I assume that, β is drawn from a Pareto distribution F pq with tail index 1{κ and having
cumulative density
F pβ q  1  β 1{κ
The inverted tail index is used as parameter so as to facilitate analogy to the step size
parameter typically present in endogenous growth models. It will be of use later to know
that the expected value of logpβ q is simply κ, meaning a variable receiving such increments
at Poisson rate x will have expected growth rate κx.
Upon the arrival of an internal innovation, with probability α the innovation is sequential and is dependent upon previous innovations. In this case, the innovating firm and the
incumbent firm initiate a bargaining process by which either the existing patents of the
incumbent are sold to the new innovator or the incumbent buys the new innovation and
incorporates it into its portfolio. Conversely, with probability 1  α, an innovation is independent. In this case, the new innovator assumes production responsibilities and the
incumbent is summarily displaced.
Firms also face the rate of incoming external innovations by other firms. Let these
events arrive at rate τ . Finally, all patents in a particular product line expire at rate b,
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meaning the technological lead goes to zero and production profits vanish. When this
happens, the firm retains its research capacity in that product line but is displaced upon any
subsequent innovation by another firm. Denote the present expected value of successful
innovation by Vs . Because both profits and labor costs scale up with output, I consider the
output-normalized value of a patent protected product line with technological lead λ
rpλq
δF V pλqV9 pλq  π

max
x

r pxq
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(

max
z

ατ ppEV pβλq  V pλqq
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 r  g is the effective discount rate used by the firm.
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line without patent protection is simply
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Notice that V p1q  V0 , as expired product lines still retain their research capacity. To know
the value of successful innovation, we must know the economy-wide distribution over λ.
For now, denote the cumulative density for this variable by µpq. Furthermore, let µ0 be the
mass of products whose patent has expired (meaning λ

 1) and µ pq be the cumulative

density over those products whose patents are not expired. The value of successful external
innovation is then given by
Vs

 rp1  αq

αµ0 qs EV pβ q

αp1  pq

»8
1

pErV pβλq  V pλqqdµ pλq

As discussed earlier, each product line has a production value and a research value. The
production value and internal research value will be a function of the technological lead,
while the external research value will be independent of that variable since future innova24

tions are undertaken on random external product lines. Thus it is useful to define the option
values
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Notice that because successful internal innovation in an expired product line results in
increased protection from external innovation, the incentive structure is slightly different.
The product line value function expressions can then be simplified to

pδ F p 1  α q τ q V pλ q  V pλ q  π pλ q Ω x
pδF τ qV0  V0  Ωx Ω0
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Having characterized the firm value functions and their dynamics, we must also address
the evolution of the state space, which in this case consists of the technological lead distributions. First, the respective masses of expired and unexpired product lines will satisfy the
flow equations

µ9 0

 bµ  pτ

z0 qµ0

µ9

and

Focusing on unexpired product lines (where λ

 pτ

z0 qµ0  bµ

¡ 0), the distribution will satisfy the flow

equation
µ9 pλq pb
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(1.1)
(1.2)
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The first two terms are what we would expect in the case without patent expiry. Independent
innovations arrive at rate p1  αqτ and reset the technological lead to some random value
β, and similarly for patent expiry b. Meanwhile, sequential and internal innovations arrive
at rate ατ

y and increment the technological lead by some random value β. The last term

simply deals with the fact that there are also product lines flowing into and out of expiry.

1.3.4

Equilibrium

Having described the optimization problems faced by consumers and firms, we can now
move on to characterizing their optimal behavior and setting forth conditions for aggregate
consistency given the equilibrium variables we have introduced. The aggregate information
needed by the firm to make decisions includes the rate of creative destruction τ , the wage
rate w, and the interest rate r. Finally, the firm needs to know the state space, namely the
distribution over technological leads, which is fully described by the respective masses of
expired and unexpired product lines µ0 and µ and the distribution of technological leads
over unexpired product lines µ
µ

pq. Eventually, it will be shown that the mean inverse over

pq
Γ



»8
0

λ1 dµ pλq

will suffice for the purposes of the firm and for aggregate consistency. Now posit a linearly
separable ansatz for the unexpired product line value function
V pλq  A  Bλ1
rpλq
Recall that π

 1  λ1. Inserting the above into the product line value function and

equating coefficients on the constant term and the λ1 terms yields the following charac-
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terization of the coefficients

pδF
pδF

b
b

p1  αqτ qA  A  1 Ωx bV0
p1  αqτ qB  B  1  Ωz  ατ pB {p1
9

9

κ1 q

Here Ωx is the option value of external innovation. Because of the concavity of the profit
function in the technological lead, the gross returns to internal innovation are decreasing.
However, since the the cost also decreases by the same proportion, the net returns also scale
down with the technological lead. Thus internal innovation shows up in the variable portion
of the value function as
r pz q
 max
wd
z

zB {p1

Ω0
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r pz0 q
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0

with Ωz pλq

(

κ1 q

Ωz

κq  V0 qu

 λ1Ωz . Using these expressions, the expected gain from innovation can be

simplified to
Vs

 pp1  αq
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The labor market clearing condition will include contributions from production, external
innovation (from incumbents and entrants) and internal innovation (on expired and unexpired product lines) as delineated below
1

Γ
r
w

p1

eqcpxq

µ0 dpz0 q

µ Γ dpz q

(1.3)

where Γ is the average inverse technological lead over all product lines and satisfies Γ
µ0



µ Γ . The flow equation for Γ is described in the next section and depends only on
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µ0 , µ , and Γ itself. Therefore, with regards to solving the equilibrium by determining
the evolution of the state space, Γ is a sufficient statistic for µ

pq.

In fact, just µ0 and

Γ would be a sufficient state space. However, the three variable specification proves to be
notationally cleaner.
Aggregate consistency of the rate of external innovation requires that τ

 p1

eqx.

Though it is not necessary for the equilibrium solution, the growth rate will naturally be
of interest as an implication of this model. Each innovation, regardless of whether it is
sequential or independent furthers the state of the art for a particular intermediate good by
a random factor β drawn from F . Because of the log-log aggregation in producing the final
good, output can be decomposed into

 QLP {∆

Y

where Q is the log aggregate productivity logpQq
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labor misallocation given by
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where the inequality above follows from Jensen’s inequality. It is straightforward to show
that the growth rate of the aggregated productivity will simply be

g

where z̄

 µ0z0

 κpτ

z̄ q

(1.4)

µ z is the aggregate rate of internal innovation. Outside of steady state

the quantities LP and ∆ can of course also change. So the overall growth rate of output
will be composed of contributions from these three factors. In steady state, however, the
28

growth rate of Y will simply be g.

1.3.5

Steady State

The above section fully characterized the dynamic equilibrium of the model. In principle,
this characterization could be used to describe the path of the economy starting from any
given point in the state space. The usefulness of this capability is dampened by the inherent
difficulty in simultaneously identifying the parameters of the model and the position in the
state space. Therefore, I focus on the case of steady state.
In steady state, all normalized figures, such as those comprising the value function, will
be constant. In addition, the position in the aggregate state space, as defined above, will be
invariant. Proceeding from this basis, the firm value function coefficients simplify to
A

1
δF

Ωx
b

bV0
p1  αqτ

B

and

δ

F

1  Ωz
pp1  αq αpκ{p1

b

κqqτ

(1.5)

The value of a product line where patent protection has expired becomes simply

V0

 Ωδx

F

Ω0
τ

(1.6)

These quantities, in conjunction with the state space position will determine the expected
present value from successful innovation, which will in turn determine innovation rates, the
growth rate, wages, and other observables of interest.
We now move on to the task of characterizing the steady distribution of technological

pq object given in Equation 1.1, I

leads. Imposing steady state on the flow equation for µ
find

pb p1  αqτ q rF pλq  µ pλqs  pατ
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For arbitrary F , the resulting distribution is intractable. However, given our assumption of
Pareto distributed step sizes, one can show that the steady state distribution will in fact be
Pareto as well.
Proposition 1. The distribution of technological leads for patent protected product lines is
Pareto with
µ pλq  1  λ1{m
where the tail index parameter satisfies
mκ



b
b

τ z
p1  αqτ



Proof. Recall that the cumulative density for β is simply F pβ q

(1.7)

 1  β 1{κ.

Now posit

a similar form for the technological lead distribution with shape parameter m. Plugging
this into the flow equation, one can verify that this shape parameter is given the above
expression.
Thus the expected value of logpλq, conditional on being strictly positive is simply m.
Here one can see that increasing either α and τ serves to attenuate the technological lead
distribution while increasing the patent length b draws it closer to unity. Furthermore, the
mean inverse technological lead for unexpired product lines can then be expressed as

Γ

1

1
m

Note. As an aside, I will note that the assumption of Pareto distributed step sizes is not
critical to the equilibrium solution, but is needed to ensure tractability of the technological
lead distribution, which simplifies notation in various places. For arbitrarily distributed β,
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one can write the flow equation for the quantity Γ as
9
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9

Γ

1

1
m

where

m  p1  Erβ 1 sq



b
b

τ z
p1  αqτ



though m can no longer be interpreted as the tail index of the distribution µ .
The only remaining elements of the state space to be solved for are the aggregate shares
of expired and unexpired product lines. Equating the flow equations for these quantities to
zero yields the simple solution

µ0

b

b
τ

z0

and

µ

bττ

z0
z0

Combining these with the results above, the inverse technological lead over all product
lines, expired or unexpired, is then
Γ  µ0

µ Γ

 b pτb

z0 q{p1
τ z0

mq

Existence A balanced growth path equilibrium of this model is characterized by a vecr g, A, B, V0 q consisting of the wage rate w
r satisfying Equation 1.3, the aggregate
tor pw,

growth rate g satisfying Equation 1.4, the unexpired product line value coefficients A and
B satisfying Equation 1.5, and the unexpired product line value V0 satisfying Equation 1.6.
Proposition 2. A balance growth path equilibrium for this economy exists.
Proof. See Appendix.
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1.3.6

Welfare

As discussed in the previous section, aggregate output can be decomposed into contributions from three components
logpY q 
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logpqj `j qdj

 logpQq

 logpQq

»8
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µpλq logp`pλqqdλ

logpLP q  logp∆q

The term logp∆q is a measure of labor usage heterogeneity, which leads to productive
misallocation. This implies that Q is the maximum possible output of the economy and
QLP is the maximal output given a certain amount of production labor LP . In steady state,
this takes on the value
logp∆q  logpΓq

µ m  log
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(1.8)

Notice that, holding innovation rates constant, this is decreasing in the patent length b and
increasing in sequentiality α, since m is also increasing in α. Welfare is given according to
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Without loss of generality, I can assume that Qp0q  1. Furthermore, we know that Q9 {Q 
g. Plugging in for Y and evaluating the integral then yields
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(1.9)

Thus welfare can be easily expressed purely as a function of τ , z, and z0 . One of the
main implications of this model is that the welfare effects of monopoly distortions are
more severe in more sequential industries. To see this, consider the effect of varying the
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aggregate innovation rates on the labor misallocation factor ∆.
Proposition 3. The effect of τ , z, and z0 on monopoly distortions is greater for more
sequential industries. That is, BB∆τ , BB∆z , and BBz∆0 are increasing in α. Furthermore, the latter
two derivatives are always positive, while the first is positive if αb ¡ p1  αqz.
Proof. See Appendix.
This is one of the major implications of the model presented here. Not only does more
innovation induce higher production labor misallocation in most cases, this effects is larger
for more sequential industries. Thus in considering patent policy, where the fundamental
trade-off is between incentivizing innovation at the cost of monopoly distortions, the benefit
is the same while the cost is larger in more sequential industries.

1.3.7

Social Optima

Before considering various policy interventions or changes, it is important to study this
model from a social planner’s prospective in order to gain insight into the types and levels
of inefficiency present in the decentralized equilibrium. Two types of social planners will be
considered. The first is a partially constrained social planner who can control the innovation
decisions of firms but is still subject to the outcome of the static product market equilibrium
with its associated monopoly distortions. In this case, the patent length is assumed to be
the same as in the decentralized equilibrium. Choosing external innovation rate τ , internal
unexpired innovation rate z, and internal expired innovation rate z0 allows one to determine
the growth rate g, the production labor utilization LP , and the labor misallocation factor ∆.
Using these, one can compute steady state welfare using Equation 1.9.
The second type is an unconstrained planner who makes both innovation and production
decisions for firms. This results in a simple closed form expressions for LP and g as
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functions of τ , z, and z0 . The unconstrained planner will optimally choose labor utilization
to be equal across product lines, meaning `j

1.3.8

 LP for all j and ∆  1.

Predictions

The only aggregate variables of interest in this setting are the wage w
r and the growth rate g.
The following predictions will not be functions of these variables. They will depend only
on the within industry variables, which are indexed by α. In general, both τ , z, and z0 will
be functions of α, however their dependence is suppressed here for the sake of brevity.

Transfer Rates

The direction of transfer is indeterminate in this model. Let the probabil-

ity that a transfer goes towards the innovator be q. Knowing this, what fraction of patents
can one expect to be transferred in their lifetime? Patents are born at rate τ

z̄. They die at

rate b and an rendered obsolete at rate p1  αqτ . Additionally, an external patent (fraction
τ {pτ

ȳ q) has a probability αp1  q q of being transferred immediately upon birth, implying
P p0q 



τ
τ

z̄

αp1  q q

Once born, patents of any type have a flow rate of transfer αqτ for their entire lifetime. The
probability of a particular patent surviving to age t and being transferred for the first time
is then


P ptq  1 





τ
τ

z̄

αp1  q q αqτ exp p pb

p1  αqτ

αqτ q tq

This exponential form is very close to what is seen in the data. A detailed evaluation of
the match is given in the quantitative section. Finding the probability that a patent is never
transferred is then a matter of evaluating the above expression in the limit as t
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Ñ 8. This

yields the expression

P

 P p0q p1  P p0qq
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Thus it is very closely related to the incidence of sequential innovation. Notice that the
lower bound decreases with the fraction of innovations that are within-firm, since these
innovations result in no transfers. Having only external innovation would result in implausibly high fractions of patents being transferred. Additionally, the lower bound decreases
with the rate of patent expiry, since innovation on an expired product line induce no transfers as well.

Patent Expiry Now consider the process of patent obsolescence. This occurs due to
patent expiry at rate b and due to technological replacement at the rate p1  αqτ . Therefore,
the distribution over the productive lifetime of a patent, E pq, is given by
E ptq  pb

p1  αqτ q expppb p1  αqτ qtq

which arises from the properties of continuous time Poisson processes. Therefore, when
looking across industries or patent classes, one would expect to see a negative relationship
between the fraction of patents that are not renewed after a given period of time and the
fraction of patents that are transferred at least once.
Another figure of interest the fraction of patents that become obsolete through creative
destruction, rather than patent expiry. This value can be shown to be

E

 b p1p1 αqατqτ

Interpreting the loss of a patent due to failure to pay maintenance fees as creative destruc-
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tion, this figure is roughly 1{2 in the data.
Markups and Profits We must also address the effect of α on markups over cost. Recall
that for a given product line, total revenues are always Y , while production labor costs are
to λ1 Y . Thus the markup for any one product line is simply λ and average markup at the
product line level is equal to
Λ̄  µ0



 b pτb

1

1m

µ

z0 q{p1  mq
τ z0

Unfortunately, this is not always well defined since we cannot guarantee that m

1. We

can however give a well-defined expression for the median markup at the product line level.
The complete cumulative density for markups is given by µpλq

 µ0

µ p1  λ1{m q.

Equating this to one half yields
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These cannot be directly observed in the Compustat data. However, one can look at total
sales over variable cost at the firm level and target that using simulations. Meanwhile, the
aggregate ratio of sales to cost over the entire economy (Λ) is simply the harmonic mean
of individual product line markups


Λ  µ0



µ

1

1
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τ z0
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This measure can be calculated directly from the Compustat data set or taken from existing
estimates. It can also be shown to be increasing in α. However, the endogenous response
of τ , z, and z0 will determine the net effect.
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Patent Portfolios

A closely related figure is the size of a firm’s patent portfolio. In this

case I will work with portfolios at the per-product line level, which can then be aggregated
to the firm level. Let the mean portfolio size in a given industry be denoted by n̄. The flow
equation for this quantity is given by
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n
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which leads to the solution
s
n

τ
b
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This can be used to calculate a number of pertinent values. For instance, assuming independent innovations make no citations, the average number of external citations per patent
will simply be

τ
τ z̄
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1.3.9

Industry and Firm Heterogeneity

In order to match the cross-industry variation in quantities such as transfer rates, expiry
rates, and profitability, I introduce the possibility of heterogeneity across industries in the
sequentiality of innovation. Industries are segmented in terms of innovation but share a
common pool of labor. Let there be M equal-mass segments in total. Each will have a
particular value for α and associated innovation rates τ pαq, z pαq, and z0 pαq and average
inverse technological lead Γpαq. The initial analysis then carries through unchanged at
the industry level and we need only be concerned with aggregate labor and bond market
clearing. The labor market clearing condition is given by
1  Eα



Γpαq
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µ pαqΓ pαqdpz pαqq

In practice, one can deal in the limit where M

Ñ 8, using a continuous distribution over

α. Each industry is then treated as an infinitesimally small segment of the overall spectrum
of products.
One potentially unsatisfying implication of the above model is that the direction of
transfer is indeterminate and is effectively decided by a weighted coin flip q between incumbent and challenger. By introducing firm level heterogeneity, either in production or
research capability, we can not only break this indeterminacy, we can investigate the potential allocative implications of the transferring of patent rights. This modification of the
model is motivated by the trends presented above as well. In particular, Fact 5 regarding
the predominance of patent flows towards younger and smaller firms leads one to believe
such a dynamic is an important determinant of trends in the transfer of patent rights.
A two-type extension of the model presented herein is exposited in detail in Appendix A.2.
This partially resolves the indeterminacy of patent transfer direction in the sense that interactions between firms of unlike types will result in final ownership being vested in the high
type firm. However, interactions of like type firms will still require the introduction of ad
hoc randomness. Firms differ in their cost of external innovation, while the cost of internal
innovation and production capacity remain identical across firms. As a result, there will be
differential firm-level external innovation rates xH and xL and expired internal innovation
rates z0H and z0L but a common unexpired internal innovation rate z. Entering firms are high
type with probability ζ and decay to low type at the Poisson flow rate ν. The associated
aggregate external innovation rate is τ

 pζe

µH qxH

pp1  ζ qe

µL qxL , where µi is

the mass of products owned by a type i firm, while the aggregate internal innovation rate is
z̄

 µH0 z0H

µL0 z0L

µ z.
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1.4

Estimation

In this section I bring the proposed model to the firm-level data. First, I provide a summary
of the challenges associated with identifying the key aspects of the model quantitatively.
Then I present the results of the estimation, assess the quality of the fit, and give some
interpretation to the resulting parameters values.

1.4.1

Identification

In the basic model, there are seven parameters that need to be identified. First, those associated with the innovation production process, namely the step size distribution tail index
κ and the cost parameters c and η. Additionally, there is the mass of entrants e and the
discount rate δ, which is set to 0.05. Finally, there are two parameters specific to the phenomenon studied in this paper, the probability of sequential innovation α and the bargaining
power of the incumbent p. Moving to the setting with own-product innovation will add an
additional cost parameter d, and the introducing industry level heterogeneity in α will add
in two distributional parameters. The specific form used will be the two parameter Beta
distribution, a flexible choice for random variables on the unit interval.
First, the the innovation production parameters can be jointly constrained using aggregate moments. Naturally, their exact values will dependent upon the estimated values of
other parameters in the model. However, this partitioning is still useful at a conceptual
level. The tail index parameter κ will be a strong determinant of profits in the economy.
The expression given in Equation 1.10 is calculated at the product line level. Aggregating
this to the firm level has no apparent analytical form, so simulation must be used. Meanwhile, the R&D production function parameters can be effectively constrained using the
aggregate growth rate and the share of R&D spending in the economy. Both these moments are readily available from BEA data. For the sake of consistency, analogues at the
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firm level, namely the incumbent innovation rate and R&D intensity, can be used as well.
Introducing the possibility of own-product innovation adds one additional cost scaling
parameter d, while the elasticity η is assumed to be common with the external innovation
cost function. This can be constrained in a straightforward manner by using self-citation
activity by firms. In particular, one can look at the fraction of citations that are internally
directed versus externally directed. Alternatively, one can classify patents as primarily internal or external and look at the composition thereof. In the US patent data, approximately
23% of patents cite other patents from their filing firm. Akcigit and Kerr (2010) study these
patterns extensively, finding that approximately 20% of patents are self-citing. They also
have access to analogous information at an R&D expenditure level (there termed product
versus process innovation) and find a similar fraction.
The mass of entrants parameter can readily be determined by looking at the fraction
of the patent stock owned by entrants over a five year period, for instance. Alternatively,
one can undertake a growth decomposition and target the standard number given by Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1998) of 1{3. As innovation and growth are one-to-one in this
framework, we would then simply set e

 1{2. However, due to selective exit of low type

firms early in the life cycle, targeting simulated numbers over a number of years is more
accurate.
Capturing information about α and the distribution over various industries proves not
to be too difficult. As shown above, the fraction of patents that are transferred in their
lifetime varies with α. This response is not provably one-to-one due to variability in the
endogenous response of innovation rates, but in practice it proves to be robustly monotone.
Thus we can effectively use the inverse of this function to relate data on patent transfer
rates to sequentiality measures α and the industry-level distribution thereof.
The most difficult parameter to estimate is the bargaining power parameter p. One possible stance is that, there being no difference ex ante between firms in terms of bargaining
40

position, symmetry dictates the value be set to 1{2. However, if one imagines a model in
which bargaining does not happen instantaneously, the incumbent might be more patient if
it thinks it can produce a workaround innovation. Alternatively, there may be asymmetries
in patent protection for incumbents and new innovators that lead to asymmetries that can
be captured by the bargaining power parameter. In the baseline case, I simply set p  1{2,
however, I also investigate the effects of changing this parameter on innovation rates and
aggregate outcomes.
To match the facts regarding patent flows to younger and smaller firms, I also introduce
firm-level heterogeneity in the cost of external innovation. This introduces three new parameters. First, there are now two cost factors for external innovation (cH and cL ) rather
than one. Additionally, there is the initial fraction of entrants that are high type (ζ) and the
rate at which high type firms decay into low type firms (ν). By looking at growth rate differentials between young and old firms, as well as the fraction of the patents stock owned
by young firms, we can constrain these various parameter values.

1.4.2

Results

As noted at the outset, the previous discussion is merely a conceptual overview of identification. Each of the parameters will affect each potential moment in varying degrees, as
determined by the model. In order to match all of these simultaneously and intelligently
trade off prediction errors in the case of a less-than-perfect match, I employ a simulated
method of moments (SMM) estimator. This has the additional advantage of allowing for
bootstrapping to determine parameter standard errors. See Bloom (2009) for further details
on the usage of SMM. The details of the equilibrium solver and simulation algorithm are
described in Appendix A.3.
The SMM objective function is simply quadratic form of the differences between the
data and model predictions for a certain vector of moments. The requirements for identi41

fication discussed above will largely determine which moments are used. However, there
are still some specific implementation details that should be explained.
First, the notion of entry employed here counts any previously unobserved firm that
files for a patent. As the primary focus is on the innovation process, this would seem to
be the most relevant statistic for our purposes. Additionally, it does not suffer from the
selection issues that using Compustat would entail. It is susceptible to misclassification
of firms in the sense that any novel name matching failure would show up as an entrant
rather than simply a filing from an existing firm. Including a measure of the patent stock
that recent entrants comprise could ease these concerns and potentially provide valuable
information about the type distribution of entrants (the parameter ζ).
To measure internal citations, one must take a stance on the exact mapping between the
model and the data in this regard. Independent innovations of course cannot be entirely
disparate from work that has come before. There is a sense in which general knowledge
informs innovations within and across fields. The extent to which citations reflect general
versus specific influence is not clear. Assuming that sequential and independent innovations
have roughly similar amounts of external citations, the internal citation ratio would simply
be z̄ {pτ

z̄ q. Note that here I assume that a new addition to a patent portfolio cites all of

the patents below it, or at least a fixed fraction thereof.
The transfer rate mean and variance statistics are calculated as the probability that a
patent in a particular industry filed for during the period in question is ever transferred
(including beyond the end of the period). The three year transfer rate is simply the same
probability but restricting to the transfer occurring within three years of filing. The analog
in the model is taken to be the probability of immediate transfer. The delay is chosen to
allow for the fact that this process will not be instantaneous in a real-world setting.
The remaining aggregate moments are fairly straightforward. The aggregate growth
figure is taken from the FRED data on output per person. The median profit is computed
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TABLE 1.1: M OMENT VALUES
Name
Aggregate Growth
Entrant Stock Frac
Transfer Prob Mean
Transfer Prob Std
Internal Cite Frac
Median Profit
3-year Transfer
Transfer To Younger
Transfer To Young
Young Stock Fraction
Young Filing Fraction
Average Filing Fraction
R&D Intensity

Data Model
0.034 0.034
0.085 0.081
0.180 0.187
0.105 0.104
0.229 0.268
0.164 0.175
0.365 0.356
0.699 0.621
0.573 0.546
0.139 0.143
0.197 0.198
0.166 0.182
0.092 0.051

using the sample of Compustat firms. The moment values at the optimum are given in Table
1.1. It is evident that the fit of the model to the data is quite close in many dimensions, but
misses the mark in some cases. The moments on aggregate growth, transfer statistics,
citations, profits, and R&D levels are all very closely matched.
The parameter estimates themselves are summarized in the Table 1.2. Of prime importance are the sequentiality distribution parameters, which indicate that in the average
industry, 35% of innovations are sequential as opposed to independent. Furthermore, looking across industries, this quantity has a standard deviation of 22%.
The R&D production function parameters are in line with those found in the existing
literature. In particular, the curvature implies an elasticity of 53%p 1{1.880q. This is
similar to the value of 0.61 found in Pakes and Griliches (1980). As documented by Kortum
(1993), estimates of this parameter generally lie between 0.1 and 0.6. External innovation
is more than twice as costly for low type firms compared to high type firms. Meanwhile, the
common cost of internal innovation is nearly twice as costly again as low type innovation.
The entrant mass of 0.19 is lower than what one might guess from directly calibrating

43

TABLE 1.2: E STIMATED PARAMETER VALUES
Name
Symbol Value
Discount Rate
δ
0.050
Bargaining Power
p
0.500
CRRA Parameter
σ
2.819
Step Distribution
κ
0.339
H
External R&D (High)
c
6.206
External R&D (Low)
cL
12.659
Internal R&D Cost
d
20.257
R&D Cost Curvature
η
1.880
Mean Sequentiality
Mean(α) 0.347
Std Sequentiality
Std(α)
0.216
Entrant Mass
e
0.161
Entry High Type
ζ
0.580
Type Decay Rate
ν
0.126
Transfer Direction
q
0.730
to a growth decomposition attributing 1{3 of growth to entrants. However, as noted in
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), the time horizon over which we measure entry
contributions will affect even annualized figures due to selective exit of recent entrants. The
firm selection dynamic present in the model induces a similar effect in simulated results.
The firm type dynamics parameters are consistent with previous structural studies. In
particular, Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom, and Kerr (2013), on whose model of reallocation
I build, estimate that the proportional variance in the cost faced by entrants is 1.21.8 The
analogous number using my estimates is 1.06. In their model, ignoring selection due to
exit, the average cost faced by incumbent firms rises by 5.5% over the course of one year,
while I find that quantity to be 5.3%.
8

The fraction of entrants that are high type is not directly comparable, as the respective R&D cost parameters also differ.
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1.5

Quantitative Analysis

With these estimates in hand, we can evaluate the ability of the model to match the crossindustry and firm-level trends outlined in the data section. Figure 1.7 documents the
model’s qualitative success in reproducing four of the the major cross-industry trends seen
in the data. In each pane, the variable of interest is plotted at the industry level against the
sequentiality for that industry, which is simply the fraction of patents that are transferred
in their lifetime. This measure is used so as to most closely match the facts presented
in the data section and varies monotonically with the underlying theoretical sequentiality
parameter α. The median profitability, firm growth, and exit rate figures are the result of
simulations and so have noise associated with each point, but the magnitude of this noise
is not enough to obscure the evident trends.
To get an idea of the quantitative match of the model with regards to these trends, the
average level of each variable over all industries in the data and in simulations is given in
Table 1.3. The expiry rate and firm growth volatility are both matched well, while the profitability and exit rate figures are both not matched entirely. The profitability figure, though
targeted at the economy-wide level, is grouped by industry and can thus be different due to
aggregation effects. The exit rate may reflect asymmetries between entry and exit that are
not present in the model, which features only entry of and exit by one-product firms. In the
data, though entering firms are generally quite small, large firms may exit or cease to exist
due to mergers. The framework used here implicitly categorizes innovations in to internal,
sequential, and independent types. By targeting patent transfers and internal citation rates,
the close alignment of the data here further supports the notion that sequential innovation
is reflected in patent transfers, while independent innovation is reflected in patent expiry.
Having analyzed the levels of each of the four variables of interest here, I now study
the variation across industries. To assess the amount of variation across industries in the
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F IGURE 1.7: C ROSS -I NDUSTRY P REDICTIONS
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various quantities, I perform a weighted least squares regression on sequentiality (the rate
of patent transfer) and look at the predicted effect of moving between the mean plus or
minus one standard deviation, as normalized by the mean value for that particular quantity.
Comparing the values given by this metric for both the data and the simulated model, I
can assess the predictive power of the model. It is important to note that though the variation in sequentiality was targeted, variation in the other quantities has not been, meaning
these implications come purely from the model structure. Using this metric, the model can
account for approximately 65% of the variation in profitability (return on sales), 26% of
the variation in firm growth volatility (employment), and 40% of the variation in exit rates.
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TABLE 1.3: AVERAGE I NDUSTRY-W IDE VALUES
Variable Name Data Model
Eight-year Expiry Rate 34%
39%
18%
Median Profitability 11%
Firm Growth Volatility 13%
12%
15%
Exit Rate 29%
Meanwhile, the level of variation in expiry rates is overpredicted by the model. In Figure
1.8, I plot the proportional variation for each quantity. Both the data and model generated
numbers are normalized by their respective mean values, as is the regression line for the
data.
F IGURE 1.8: C ROSS -I NDUSTRY VARIATION
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Figure 1.9 depicts a number of equilibrium variables of interest as they vary with in-
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dustry sequentiality. Of particular interest in this framework is the effect of industry sequentiality on the incentives to innovate and the resulting innovation rates. The effect on
external innovation is ex ante ambiguous due to the existence of two opposing forces on
the expected product line valuation. The results of the estimate indicate a negative effect
of sequentiality on the the rate of external innovation, with the effect being larger for high
type firms. To understand this result, consider the time profile of returns delivered by an
innovation. In non-sequential industries, the payoff is large early on but is cut off relatively
soon due to creative destruction. Meanwhile, in highly sequential industries, the initial
payoff is smaller, but there are ongoing payouts from future sequential innovations. Even
if the total payout is similar in these two cases, a firm only captures a fraction of this surplus through bargaining, thus back-loaded incentives in highly sequential industries result
in lower innovation rates.
As expected theoretically, internal innovation rates rise with sequentiality due to the
reduced threat of creative destruction in more sequential industries. The n-shaped dependence of the average firm type on sequentiality is somewhat unexpected. One would anticipate that high type firms would face the largest drops in product loss rates moving to more
sequential industries, which is indeed the case. However, this effect is eventually overwhelmed by the disproportionate drop in high type external innovation rates. Finally, the
level of monopoly distortion (∆) on a per-industry basis is shown. As would be expected,
this rises with sequentiality, as a result of the agglomeration of larger patent portfolios by
firms.
Now consider the aggregate trends in the economy. The following table summarizes
the growth contributions of entrants, external innovation, and internal innovation.
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F IGURE 1.9: C ROSS -I NDUSTRY E QUILIBRIUM VARIABLES
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E QUILIBRIUM D ECOMPOSITIONS (P ERCENTAGES )
Entrant
Growth 0.49 ( 14.3%)
Labor

1.37 ( 16.0%)

Inc. External

Inc. Internal

Total

2.02 ( 58.9%)

0.92 ( 26.8%)

3.43 (100.0%)

5.38 ( 62.8%)

1.81 ( 21.1%)

8.56 (100.0%)

External innovation by incumbents still plays a large role in innovation, followed by
incumbent internal innovation, then entrants. Additionally, internal innovation achieves
notable performance in terms of innovations per unit labor. Considering both the cost and
capacity are similar to that of external innovation, this is largely a sign that it is simply
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utilized less.
As noted previously, introducing firm types into such a model naturally allows us to
consider the potential effects of sequentiality on reallocation. Entering firms start out with
a particular fraction of high-type firms (ζ
at rate ν

 13%.

 58%).

Over time the surviving firms decay

High type firms have a higher survival probability, so the distribution

over type by firm age exceeds the simple case of exponential decay. The transfer direction
parameter dictates that when firms of like type transfer patents, the innovator becomes
the eventual owner in 73% of cases. Using the respective shares high type and low type
products, this implies that overall a high type innovator assumes final ownership in 96% of
cases, while the same number for low types is 61%, and the overall number is 76%.
F IGURE 1.10: E QUILIBRIUM D ISTRIBUTIONS
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Looking at Figure 1.10, we can see that the match between the predicted and observed
lag from patenting filing and time of first transfer is quite good. It should be noted, though,
that the model delivers an exponential form for this function by construction, and relative
mass at zero is indeed targeted for the purposes of estimating the direction of transfer
parameter (q). As for the profitability distribution, the match between data and model
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is less exact. The median profit is targeted as a moment, however, the model generated
clearly shows excess mass near zero. This could arise from compositional issues. Firm
level profitability data is available only for Compustat firms, which are larger than the
average firm, and hence the observed data could be “overaggregated”, leading to greater
weight in the middle of the distribution and less at the very bottom.

1.5.1

Mechanism Investigation

To better understand the means through which sequentiality affects the incentives for innovation, in this section I consider various modification to the estimated model. First, I
investigate the effects of varying the bargaining power parameter, which was previously set
to the symmetric value of 1{2. Because payoffs are back-loaded in more sequential industries and hence only partially delivered to the incumbent through the bargaining process,
this parameter will be an important determinant of the incentives for external innovation.
F IGURE 1.11: BARGAINING P ROCESS A LTERNATIVES
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In Figure 1.11, the baseline case, as well as the two extremes of giving all the bargaining
power to the innovator (p  0) and to the incumbent (p  1), are plotted. Here we see that
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though the rate of internal innovation is largely invariant to the bargaining parameter, the
decrease in external innovation with sequentiality is larger the more bargaining power is
vested with the incumbent. The intuition here is that when none of the incentives are
transferred intertemporally through bargaining, as is the case when the innovator has all
the bargaining power, the backloading of payoffs that comes with increased sequentiality
does not interact with the bargaining distortions, thus the profile is relatively flat.
A second modification I consider is simply eliminating sequential innovation across
the economy, that is, setting α



0. This provides insight into the aggregate effects of

sequentiality. Moving from the baseline case to the no sequential case, the growth rate
falls from 3.42% to 3.27%. Most of this comes from changes in internal innovation rates,
which fall from 2.7% to 2.2% annually. Distortion from production labor misallocation
(∆) fall substantially from 9.4% to 5.5%. Recall that because of patent expiry dynamics
and internal innovation, there will still be labor utilization heterogeneity, though it is much
smaller here.
The final model modification performed is the elimination of firms type. Consider an
economy where instead of having multiple firm types, there is a single firm type whose
cost is equal to the expected cost of a new entrant, that is C̄



ζcH

p1  ζ qcL.

By

studying the difference between our benchmark and this economy, we can illuminate the
effects of firm types. The primary motivation for introducing firm types was to capture
the disproportionate flow of patent transfers from older and larger firms to smaller and
younger firms. Moving to the homogeneous settings, the fraction of patents transfers that
are directed towards younger firms falls from 61% in the baseline to 39%. Thus firm types
are critical for producing the disproportionate flows we see towards younger firms, which
in either case constitute a small fraction of the overall patent stock (15% in the baseline and
9% in the homogeneous case).
There are also important effects on the firm size distribution. Moving from the homo52

geneous case to the heterogeneous case, we see mean firm size increase by 40%. However,
this effect is concentrated mostly amongst the smaller firms. The skewness of the firm distribution is actually much larger in the heterogeneous case, at 20.5 compared to only 3.2
in the homogeneous case. For comparison, this value is 26.0 when looking at the patent
stock data. Thus the baseline model captures nearly all the skewness in the data, and the
introduction of firm types is partially responsible for this. In particular, the fact that certain firms (high type firms) undergo sustained periods of abnormally high growth is an
important factor in generating realistic levels of variation in the firm size distribution.

1.5.2

Social Optima

As discussed previously, I consider both a constrained social planner, who can make innovation decisions but is still subject to patent policy and the resulting monopoly distortions,
and an unconstrained planner who can make both innovation and production decisions at
will. The constrained optimum yields innovations rates by type on a per-industry basis,
while the unconstrained optimum will feature uniform innovation rates across industry.
Note that the constrained planner is still also subject to firm type dynamics as in the decentralized case, while the unconstrained planner can reassign product lines to different
firms at will but is still subject to exogenous heterogeneity in entrant types. In the constrained setting, the share of labor allocated to research rises from 8.6% to 15.3%, while
the aggregate growth rate rises to 4.6%.
In Figure 1.12, both the internal and external innovation rates are plotted for the equilibrium and the constrained and unconstrained planner. Because monopoly distortions arising
from innovation are much more severe in sequential industries, the planner reduces innovation of both types in these industries. As a result the level of monopoly distortion in the
economy goes down by 0.50 percentage points. The net welfare gains from moving to the
constrained planner’s allocation are 2.5%. The aggregate growth and labor decompositions
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F IGURE 1.12: S OCIAL O PTIMUM I NNOVATION R ATES
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are show in the table below
C ONSTRAINED O PTIMUM D ECOMPOSITIONS
Entrant
Growth 0.64 ( 13.9%)
Labor

2.41 ( 15.8%)

Inc. External

Inc. Internal

Total

2.96 ( 64.0%)

1.02 ( 22.1%)

4.62 (100.0%)

10.54 ( 68.9%)

2.33 ( 15.3%)

15.29 (100.0%)

In the aggregate, in addition to the increase in the level of research labor overall, there
is a shift from internal to external innovation. This is consistent with the intuition presented
in Aghion and Howitt (1992) by which externally oriented innovation can be either under
or over-invested in, dependent on the step size.
In the unconstrained optimum, we actually see a partial reversal of the trends that occurred when going from the equilibrium to the constrained optimum. The external innovation rate is uniformly higher than in the equilibrium case. However, due to the shift to all
high type research, this is done using proportionately less labor. Meanwhile, the uniform
innovation rate of the unconstrained planner is quite close to the equilibrium rate seen in
highly sequential industries, where one would expect firms to internalize much of the social
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gains from innovation. The following table summarizes the overall allocation by research
type
U NCONSTRAINED O PTIMUM D ECOMPOSITIONS
Entrant
Growth 0.51 (8.9%)
Labor

1.47 (8.9%)

Inc. External

Inc. Internal

Total

4.14 (72.2%)

1.08 (18.8%)

5.72 (100.0%)

11.92 (72.2%)

3.11 (18.8%)

16.49 (100.0%)

Here we see a further shift towards external innovation, with accompanying gains due
to the increase in the quality of incumbent firms. The total amount of research labor rises
only slightly above the constrained planners case, while the growth rate rises considerably
to 5.72%. It is interesting to note the alignment of the share of growth and labor from each
source. This arises from the fact that from the perspective of the unconstrained planner,
each type of innovation has the same effect, namely increasing the overall productivity level
by a common factor in perpetuity, and there is a common cost elasticity across each type.
The consumption equivalent welfare gains associated with moving to the unconstrained
planner’s allocation are 16%. Much of this, however, comes from the total elimination of
monopoly distortions, while the rest is from growth related effects.

1.5.3

Policy Implications

The primary policy lever that will be considered here is the strength of patent protection,
as embodied in the rate of patent expiry b. This will not be directly analogous to the real
world notion of patent length, as patent expiry is stochastic in the model and fixed-length
in reality. However, we will map policies between the two based in the mean patent length.
In highly sequential industries, a greater fraction of the benefits from a particular innovation are internalized by the original inventor, in the form of payments for patent sales
to subsequent innovators. Additionally, these industries also feature a greater concentra55

tion of patent portfolios, leading to larger monopoly distortions. The fundamental trade-off
of patent policy, as articulated by Arrow (1962), is between increasing the incentives to
innovate so as to more closely align private and public returns to innovation and the deleterious effects of granting monopolies in production. Looked at through this lens, both of the
above mentioned features of sequential industries lead us to expect that an optimal policy
will include lower patent protection in more sequential industries. The first implies less of
a need for the realignment of incentives, while the second implies that the inherent costs
associated with granting patents are more severe in these industries.
Motivated by these considerations, I study both policies that are constant across industries and those that vary linearly with industry sequentiality. In terms of implementation,
though sequentiality cannot be directly observed, one can infer its value for each industry using the equilibrium relationship between sequentiality and the probability of patent
transfer (or any other observable that varies monotonically with sequentiality).
F IGURE 1.13: O PTIMAL L INEAR PATENT P OLICY
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The optimal constant policy calls for a patent expiry rate of 8.6% annually, implying a
mean patent length of 11.6 years. This causes the growth rate to fall to 2.94%. However,
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since the fraction of production labor rises to 93.4% and monopoly distortions fall to 6.0%,
there is a net welfare increase of 0.9%. The optimal linear patent length decreases sharply
with sequentiality. For industries with extremely low sequentiality, the policy calls for an
infinite patent. The patent policy eventually reaches a minimal mean length of 6 years in the
most sequential industries. The full path of the patent expiry rate is depicted in Figure 1.13.
It is interesting to note that the optimal patent length in the median industry (sequentiality
17%) is about 18 years, almost exactly what current law prescribes. The resulting growth
rate is 3.25% and the share of production labor is 91.9%, which are quite similar to the
equilibrium values. However, the monopoly distortions fall noticeably, having been curbed
in the most offending industries, to 6.7%, resulting in a net welfare increase of 1.7%.

1.6

Conclusion

In this paper, I propose a notion of sequentiality in innovation and argue that it is an important determinant of a firm’s incentives to innovate and of firm dynamics. Specifically,
though externally oriented innovation has generally been assumed to result in creative destruction (or new products), I emphasize the notion that patent protection applies not just
to contemporaneous imitators but to future cumulative innovators. The result is that innovating firms must in some cases come to an agreement with incumbent firms regarding
ownership of the underlying portfolio. This ultimately has strong effects upon firms overall
incentive to innovate. Not only that, these patent sales allows us to use data on the transfer
of patent ownership as a window into the nature of the innovation process.
When looking at the cross-industry trends in patenting, a number of notable trends
regarding transfer rates, expiry rates, profitability, and firm dynamics are apparent. Additionally, patent transfers flow disproportionately towards smaller and younger firms. To
capture these trends, I take the basic model of sequential innovation described above and
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introduce heterogeneity both across industries and across firms within industry. The resulting estimated model is able to match these trends qualitatively and account for a large
fraction of the cross-industry variation.
The quantitative estimates point to an underallocation in the quantity of labor devoted to
research. This result is not surprising given the existing theoretical and empirical literature.
However, even fixing the quantity of labor devoted to research, there is a misallocation of
research labor towards those industries with the highest sequentiality. I find that monopoly
distortions are quantitatively important in this setting. In highly sequential industries, firms
accumulate large patent portfolios, allowing them acquire a substantial technological lead
over their nearest legal competitor. To remedy these misallocations in both research and
production, I introduce both constant and industry dependent patent policies and evaluate
their welfare effects.
I find that a patent policy featuring weaker patent protection in more sequential industries can generate large welfare gains over both current policy and the optimal uniform
patent policy. The implications of this finding are not out of line with certain existing proposals by policymakers. In particular, there have been numerous calls by interest groups
to either eliminate or severely restrict patenting of software, an industry which I find to
be highly sequential. Other authors, such as Boldrin and Levine (2008), who advocate
the elimination of patents frequently cite the software industry as an example of patenting
gone wrong. Similarly, those concerned about “patent trolls” cite software as an industry
which has been hit particularly hard by costs associated with intellectual property litigation.9 Though I do not address these costs directly, reducing patent protection in these
industries would limit the potential damage that patent trolls could cause.
Though this paper takes a very detailed approach to modeling patenting dynamics and
the incentives to innovate, this setting is undoubtedly extremely complex, featuring a large
9

http://www.schumer.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=341612&
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quantity of heterogeneity both at the firm and industry level. There are many potential avenues of research that remain to explored. For instance, the notion of sequentiality may be
related to patent breadth, meaning there are patent policy levers in addition to length that
could be explored in this context. Additionally, not all innovation is necessarily protected
with patenting. Incorporating an endogenous decision to patent (as opposed to using secrecy, for instance) could have interesting implications, though observability is naturally
an issue.
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Chapter 2
Back to Basics
Joint work with Ufuk Akcigit (University of Pennsylvania and NBER) and Nicolas SerranoVelarde (Bocconi University and IGIER).

2.1

Introduction

Fostering economic growth is one of the primary objectives of economists and policymakers. The amount of resources invested in research is often at the heart of the debate
regarding how to best achieve this. The level of research investment plays an important
role in the pace of long-term technological progress and economic growth, and countries
allocate a significant share of their GDP to researching new products and technologies in
this spirit (see Figure 2.1). Less well known, however, is what role the composition of
this research plays in determining growth, particularly when considering the breakdown
between basic and applied research. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by studying the
differential effects of basic versus applied research on economic growth.
According to the NSF, basic research investment refers to a “systematic study to gain
more comprehensive knowledge or understanding of the subject under study without spe-
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cific applications in mind.” Conversely, applied research is defined as a “systematic study
to gain knowledge or understanding to meet a specific, recognized need.”1 This distinction
is empirically important since almost half of total research investment is allocated to basic
research in countries such as France and the US (see Figure 2.2).
TO
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Notes: Figure 2.1 plots the time series of total research spending as a fraction of GDP for the US and France. The data come from the
OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, volume 2009/1. Figure 2.2 plots the composition of total research spending for the
US and France. The data for the US come from the National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics (NSF/SRS),
while the data for France come from the French Ministry of Research.

The issue of investment in basic research also received fresh policy interest in a recent
report by the US Congress’s Joint Economic Committee, where it is argued that despite
its value to society as a whole, basic research is underfunded by private firms precisely
because it is performed with no specific commercial applications in mind. The report states
that the level of federal funding for basic research is “worrisome” and should be increased
((alias?)).
1

Although basic research may not have specific applications as its goal, it can be directed to fields
of current or potential interest. This focus is often the case when performed by industry or missiondriven federal agencies. In industry, applied research includes investigations to discover new scientific knowledge that has specific commercial objectives with respect to products, processes, or services.
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind10/c4/c4s.htm#sb2
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Despite clear empirical importance and considerable policy interest, the differential nature of the roles played by basic and applied research in the growth process is still relatively
unexplored, and many related questions remain to be answered: What are the key roles of
basic and applied research for productivity growth? What are the incentives of private firms
to do basic research? How does publicly funded basic research contribute to innovation and
productivity growth? How sizable are the spillovers from basic research? What are the potential inefficiencies in a competitive economy, and what are the appropriate government
policies to mitigate them and promote economic growth?
In order to understand the potential inefficiencies in research investment and to design
appropriate industrial policies to address them, it is necessary to adopt a structural framework that explicitly models the incentives for different types of research investments by
private firms. Our goal in this project is to take an important step toward developing this
theoretical framework, identify the potential spillovers, and study their macroeconomic
implications for innovation policy.
We follow the influential literature on basic science and consider the possibility that
basic research not only generates large spillovers within an industry, but it can also be
applicable to many different industries.2 The historical example of Du Pont de Nemours’
financing of William Carothers’ research serves as a fine showcase of these spillovers.
As Nelson (1959) describes it: “Carothers’ work in linear super-polymers began as an
unrestricted foray into the unknown, with no practical objective in mind. But the research
was in a new field in chemistry and Du Pont believed that any new chemical breakthrough
would likely be of value to the company. In the course of research Carothers obtained
some super-polymers that became viscous solids at high temperatures, and the observation
was made that filaments could be made from this material if a rod were dipped in the
2

Upstream technologies having multiple downstream applications have been mentioned by various important papers, such as Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995), Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2004), Nelson (1959),
Rosenberg (1990) and Dasgupta and David (1994).
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molten polymer and withdrawn. At this discovery the focus of the project shifted to these
filaments and Nylon was the result.” Nylon is now used in many industries such as textiles,
automobiles, and military hardware, three industries in which Du Pont had operations.
Ideally, in order to capture the full return from this new scientific knowledge in industries where it could have an application but in which the innovating firm is not present, the
innovator would first patent and then license or sell the innovation to other firms in those
industries. However, the applications of basic scientific advances are often not immediate
and firms are often only able to transform them into patentable applications in their own
industries. This is the well-known approprability problem of basic research that has been
discussed in a vast literature.3 Hence, firms operating in more industries will be able to
utilize more facets of a given basic innovation. As Nelson hypothesized it: “It is for this
reason that firms which support research toward the basic-science end of the spectrum are
firms that have fingers in many pies.” Note that the key concept that is being emphasized
here is not firm size per se, but the diversity of its operations. This interesting argument
(which we will refer to as Nelson’s hypothesis) will be the central building block of our
analysis in this paper.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. Using micro-level data on French firms, we first
document stylized facts on their investment in basic and applied research. Second, motivated by those empirical facts, we propose a general equilibrium, multi-industry framework
with private firms and a public research sector. Firms conduct both basic and applied research, whereas the public sector focuses exclusively on basic research. In our model,
basic research generates fundamental technological innovations and generates spillovers,
both within and across industries, that affect subsequent applied innovations.4 In line with
3

Among many others, see for instance Nelson (1959), Rosenberg (1990) and Dasgupta and David (1994).
By fundamental innovation, we mean the major technological improvements that generate larger than
average contributions to the aggregate knowledge stock of society. In addition, these will have long-lasting
spillover effects on the size of subsequent innovations within the same field.
4
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the “Ivory Tower” theory of academic research, basic research by private firms in our model
will turn into consumer products faster than that undertaken by public research labs. Applied research, on the other hand, will be done only by private firms and will generate
follow-on innovations building on the existing basic knowledge stock.
To highlight the key economic forces, we will first consider a benchmark economy with
tractable functional forms, characterize the dynamic equilibrium analytically, and discuss
the resulting dynamics and inefficiencies. Our ultimate goal in this paper is to undertake
a quantitative investigation of the impacts of various innovation policies on the aggregate
economy. As such, we then generalize our benchmark framework to allow for greater
quantitative flexibility and estimate the structural parameters.5 Finally, we use the estimated
model to assess the extent of inefficiencies in basic and applied research and to study the
implications of several important innovation policies.
Our main result is the quantification of the inefficiencies due to dynamic misallocation
in research. We find that 89% of spillovers from basic research across industries are not
internalized and that basic research makes applied innovation 60% more productive. As a
result, there is a dynamic misallocation of research efforts, which reduces welfare by 4.7
percentage points in consumption equivalent terms. One striking feature of the solution to
the social planner’s problem is that the fraction of resources devoted to research activities is
not substantially greater than in the decentralized equilibrium. Indeed, the dominant misallocation here is not that between production and research, as is common in this class of
models, but among the various types of research activities, in this case, applied and basic
innovation. Another striking feature is that in the case of applied innovation, there is actually an overinvestment in the decentralized economy due to the strategic complementarity
5

For instance, in his famous book Pasteur’s Quadrant (1997), Stokes (1997) describes how some pathbreaking innovations can emerge from applied research (as opposed to emerging only through basic research).
In the theoretical analysis, we will allow for the possibility of applied research generating radical innovations
as well.
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between basic research spillovers and the returns to applied research.
This raises an important question: to what extent can public policies address this inefficiency? The first policy we analyze is a uniform research subsidy to private firms. In this
environment, subsidizing overall private research is ineffective since this policy oversubsidizes applied research, which is already overinvested in due to competition. Therefore,
the welfare improvement from such a subsidy is limited unless the policymaker is able to
discriminate between types of research projects at the firm level. We thus consider a hypothetical type-dependent research subsidy and find that the optimal policy is to subsidize
basic research by 50% and applied research by 14%.
However, given that this type-dependent research subsidy is difficult to implement, we
analyze a further policy tool: the level of funding for public research labs. We show that due
to the Ivory Tower nature of public basic research, allocating more money to the academic
sector without giving property rights to the researchers is not necessarily a good idea. To
demonstrate this, we mimic a policy exercise similar to the Bayh-Dole Act enacted in
the US in 1980. We consider alternative scenarios in which public researchers have no
property rights, then 50% and 100% property rights. We find a complementarity between
the level of property rights and the optimal allocation of resources to academic research.
The optimal combination turns out to grant full property rights to the academic researcher
and allocating 3.7% of GDP to public research. This reduces the welfare gap from 4.7 to
1.7% in consumption equivalent terms.

Related Literature
Our paper contributes to a number of different branches of the literature. Our first contribution is to the growing literature on the role of industrial policies in productivity and
welfare (see, for instance, Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom, and Kerr (2013), Aghion, Blundell,
Griffith, Howitt, and Prantl (2004, 2009), Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt
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(2005), Cozzi and Impullitti (2010), Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2013), Hsieh and
Klenow (2009, 2012), Impullitti (2010), Peters (2013), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008),
Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011), among many others). We first evaluate the impact of innovation policies considered by policymakers in many OECD countries. Various
papers have empirically shown that R&D subsidy policies have been ineffective at boosting aggregate productivity.6 This result is theoretically puzzling, as standard endogenous
growth models typically predict that growth rises when private R&D is subsidized at the
expense of lower initial consumption.7 However, these models feature only a single type of
research. Once the distinction between basic and applied research is introduced, the results
can differ greatly, shedding light on the aformentioned puzzle.
Second, our paper contributes to the extensive literature on technology and R&D spillovers
(Griliches (1992), Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993), Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002),
Jones (2005), Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen, and Zilibotti (2007), König, Lorenz,
and Zilibotti (2012), Lucas and Moll (2013), Perla and Tonetti (2013), Benhabib, Perla, and
Tonetti (2013), Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013))8 Moreover, the reducedform analysis of our paper contributes to the empirical innovation literature by introducing
two new ways of identifying spillovers. First, we use the variation in the level of basic
research spending between firms operating in different numbers of industries to infer the
magnitude of cross-industry spillovers. Second, we use heterogeneous citation patterns
across public and private patents in order to identify within-industry spillovers.
Our third contribution is to the macro literature on endogenous technical change. Although the different characteristics of basic and applied research and public and private
research have been widely recognized to be of first-order importance by policymakers,
6

See, for instance, Romer (2001), Goolsbee (1998), and Wilson (2009).
See Aghion and Howitt (1998) p. 486 and Acemoglu (2008) p. 478 for more detailed discussions.
8
See also the earlier literature Griliches (1986), Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Anselin, Varga, and Acs
(1997).
7
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these issues have received insufficient attention from the economic growth literature. In
particular, models of endogenous technological change (see ? for a recent survey) mainly
considered a uniform type of (applied) research and ignored basic research investment in
the economy. A few exceptions, such as Aghion and Howitt (1996, 2009), Cozzi and Galli
(2009, 2014), Morales (2004), and Mansfield (1995), have considered theoretical models
with both basic and applied research investment. We contribute to this literature by building
a model with rich firm dynamics as in Klette and Kortum (2004) and Lentz and Mortensen
(2008) that is estimated with new firm-level micro data on firms’ research investment. In
addition to including the private investment in basic research, we enrich the analysis of the
distinct features of basic research by identifying within- and cross-industry spillovers.
Finally, our analysis contributes to the long-standing and highly influential empirical
literature on basic science (some of the earliest papers include Nelson (1959), Rosenberg
(1990), Dasgupta and David (1994))9 . In this paper, we take a macro approach and use
the micro evidence on basic science to discipline and guide the general equilibrium model.
This approach allows us to assess the very important effects of industrial policies on the
reallocation of resources across firms and industries. Considering these policies in a general
equilibrium framework is particularly helpful in understanding the potential inefficiencies
and their quantitative magnitudes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces some new empirical
facts on basic research spillovers to motivate our modeling approach. The discussion of our
theoretical framework consists of two parts: In Section 2.3 we provide a benchmark version
of the main model, characterize its dynamic equilibrium in an intuitive manner, and discuss
the main mechanisms. In Section 2.4 we describe a generalization of the benchmark model
that we bring to the data and estimate. Section 2.5 describes our quantitative analysis,
9

See also Griliches (1986), Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1998) Link (1981), Mansfield (1980,
1981), Murray, Aghion, Dewatripont, Kolev, and Stern (2009), Rosenberg and Nelson (1994), Trajtenberg,
Henderson, and Jaffe (1992).
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including the welfare properties of the estimated model. Section 2.6 provides a detailed
discussion of the welfare effects of various policies on the decentralized economy. Section 2.7 concludes. The Appendix contains omitted proofs and derivations (Appendix B.1),
the data description (Appendix B.2), further details on within-industry spillovers (B.3), robustness checks on the stylized facts (Appendix B.4), and further details on the quantitative
analysis, in particular, target moments and identification (Appendix B.5).

2.2

Empirical Facts

To understand firms’ incentives to invest in basic and applied research we use unique data
on the French economy combining information not only on product market and R&D investment characteristics of individual firms but also on plant and ownership information
for the period 2000-2006. The R&D information comes from an annual survey conducted
by the Ministry of Research that covers a large, representative cross-section of innovating firms. In this survey firms are asked to report their expenditures for basic and applied
research.10 Details regarding data sources and the policy environment are provided in Appendix B.2.
The next section presents the main empirical facts emerging from these data.

2.2.1

Basic Versus Applied Research

First, we document that private firms’ investment in basic research forms a non-negligible
fraction of both total private research spending and total basic research spending. Table 2.1
reports official statistics from the French Ministry of Research on public investment in basic
research and private investment in applied and basic research for the period 2000-2006.
10

The definition used by the French authorities for basic and applied research is based on the Frascati
manual. It is therefore similar to the NSF definition presented in the introduction.
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TABLE 2.1: E XPENDITURES O N BASIC R ESEARCH
Private

Public

Year

Basic

Applied

Basic

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

802
795
959
1092
1175
1227
1213

7005
7748
8899
8928
9482
9469
10278

6425
6786
7037
7133
7338
7331
7755

 Private

Basic
Applied
.11
.1
.11
.12
.12
.13
.12

 Basic

Private
Public
.13
.12
.14
.15
.16
.17
.16

Notes: Expenditures on basic and applied research in millions of euros for the period 2000-2006. Source: French Ministry
of Research.

Private spending on basic research amounted to an average of 1 billion euros per year
as opposed to 8.3 billion on applied research for the period 2000-2006. During the same
period, public expenditures on basic research represented an average of 7 billion euros per
year in France.11 This implies that more than 11% of private research is spent on basic
research. More important, almost 15% of total basic research in the economy is undertaken
by private entities.12
The picture that emerges therefore hints at a significant involvement of the private sector in undertaking basic scientific research. Thus, ignoring the private incentives behind
basic research might prevent economists and policymakers from designing more effective
policies for productivity growth.

2.2.2

Multi-Industry Distributions

Another stylized fact emerging from the data is the extent of the multi-industry presence of
firms. Figure 2.3 uses our micro-level data on companies between 2000 and 2006 in order
to plot their empirical distribution into multiple industries.
11

Public research has three major components: public research labs, universities, and the French National
Science Foundation (CNRS). Their relative shares within public research expenditures are around 20%, 40%
and 40%, respectively. To simplify the terminology we will refer to them as public research labs.
12
Similarly, Howitt (2000), using an NSF survey, finds that around 22% of all basic research in the US
during the period 1993-1997 was performed by private enterprises.
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To measure multi-industry presence, we count the number of distinct SIC codes in
which a firm is present. Our data allow us to identify a firm’s links to different industries
not only through product lines within the same firm but also through its majority ownership
links. To avoid misclassification of related industries, we consider as our benchmark case
the number of distinct 1-digit SIC codes (10 industries). The final sample is composed of
13,708 firm-year observations, for which we provide descriptive statistics in Table B.1 of
Appendix B.2.
OF

F IRMS

BY F IGURE
AND

2.4: BASIC R ESEARCH I NTENSITY
N UMBER OF I NDUSTRIES

.04

10

Percent
20

30

BASIC RESEARCH INTENSITY
.06
.08

40

.1

F IGURE 2.3: D ISTRIBUTION
N UMBER OF I NDUSTRIES
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NUMBER OF 1 DIGIT SIC INDUSTRIES
Average

8+
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Notes: Both panels use 13,708 firm-year observations from the pooled data for the period 2000-2006. The left panel plots the share
of firms as a function of the number of 1-Digit SIC industries, which is the number of distinct SIC codes in which a firm is present.
The right panel plots Basic Research Intensity as a function of Number of 1-Digit SIC Industries. For each firm-year observation Basic
Research Intensity is defined as the ratio of total firm investment in basic research divided by total firm investment in applied research.
Average is the average basic research intensity for firms conditional on the number of their 1-Digit SIC industries, while the red line
represents a linear fit of the firm-year observations.

On average firms are present in 2 distinct industries as defined by 1-digit SIC codes.
Although nearly 44% of the firms are operating in only one industry, the remaining firms
occupy a large spectrum of industries. The full distribution is plotted in Figure 2.3, and the
results are very similar when using more disaggregate SIC classifications (up to the 4-digit

70

SIC level) or when changing the definition of an industry link.13

2.2.3

Basic Research and Cross-Industry Spillovers

Next we discuss the link between multi-industry presence and the private incentives for
basic research. More specifically, we test Nelson’s hypothesis that the largest investors
in basic research should be those firms that have fingers in many pies. According to this
argument, as the range of a firm’s products and industries becomes more diversified, its
incentive for investing in basic research relative to applied research should increase due to
better appropriability of potential knowledge spillovers.
Figure 2.4 plots average basic research intensity against the total number of distinct
1-digit SIC codes in which the firm is present, together with a simple linear fit of the data.
Basic research intensity is defined as the ratio of total firm investment in basic research to
total firm investment in applied research. The figure suggests a positive and statistically
significant relationship between the two variables.
Table 2.2 provides further evidence about the relationship between multi-industry presence and basic research intensity. To account for zeros in the basic research intensity data,
we estimate a Tobit model. In all specifications basic research intensity is increasing in the
number of industries. According to the benchmark estimation, presence in an additional
industry increases a firm’s basic research intensity by 3 percentage points on average. In
terms of magnitude, this corresponds to a 50% increase in the average research intensity of
a single industry firm.
Table B.2 in Appendix B.4 of the Appendix provides a rich set of robustness checks in
terms of control variables, alternative measures of multi-industry presence, and estimation
methods. Most important, it exploits historical ownership structures and changes in gov13

Figures available upon request.
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ernment policies as instrumental variables. The IV estimates are larger in magnitude and
seem to suggest that the positive correlation is not driven by omitted variables.
TABLE 2.2: BASIC R ESEARCH I NTENSITY AND M ULTI -M ARKET ACTIVITY
Log # of Industries
Log Employment
Year & Organization Fixed Effects

1-Digit SIC

2-Digit SIC

3-Digit SIC

4-Digit SIC

0.032***
(0.01)
0.003**
(0.00)

0.027***
(0.00)
0.002
(0.00)

0.024***
(0.00)
0.001
(0.00)

0.021***
(0.00)
0.001
(0.00)

YES

YES

YES

YES

N
13708
13708
13708
13708
Notes: Pooled data for the period 2000-2006. Estimates are obtained using Tobit models and relate to the marginal effect of
the regressors at the sample mean. Basic Research Intensity is defined as the ratio of total firm investment in basic research
divided by total firm investment in applied research. Log # of Industries is the number of distinct SIC codes in which a
firm is present. Year FE denotes year fixed effects, and Organization FE denotes whether the firm operates its activity as a
conglomerate or as a business group. See the Appendix for the definition of variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the
firm level are in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance at the 5% level,
and three stars denote significance at the 1% level.

2.2.4

Basic Research and Within-Industry Spillovers

Basic research can also contribute to economic growth through its impact on subsequent
innovations within the same industry. This is because applied research can potentially
build on the latest technological knowledge in the product line. However, the returns from
building on the original breakthrough innovation diminish as more and more firms exploit
it.
To empirically capture these types of spillovers, we turn to patent data. The idea is to pin
down the age at which a patent derived from basic research cannot be distinguished from a
patent derived from applied research in terms of its importance for follow-up innovations.
Two empirical issues need to be addressed: piq distinguishing patents derived from basic
and applied research, and piiq capturing the idea of successively less original contributions.
We address the first point by distinguishing between patents applied for by corporations
from patents applied for by public institutions.14 We address the second point by computing
14

While this proxy is simple to measure in the data, it potentially misclassifies the contribution of private
basic patents. However, given that our interest lies in the relative difference between those two groups of
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a citation-based measure of the marginal contribution of citing patents over time.
To accomplish this, we use the NBER patent data set covering the period 1974-2006.15
The analysis of our final data set will focus exclusively on French patenters but the construction of the different variables uses information from the entire data set. For each patent
we first identify citing patents across time. The age of a patent is given by the difference
between the grant year of the patent and the current year. For each of the citing patents
we compute the cumulative 10-years-forward citations these citing patents receive. For
each originally cited patent we are then able to compute across age the mean of the citing
patents’ cumulative 10-years-forward citations. Our measure, Average Citations of Citing
Patents, captures the marginal importance of each successive citing patent. Appendix B.3
provides a more detailed explanation of the construction of this variable.
Figure 2.5 presents graphical evidence for the 15,383 French patents granted between
1975 and 1985, and follows their citation patterns until 2005. More specifically, it plots
Average Citations of Citing Patents for French public patents (blue line) and French private
patents (red line).
Patents citing private patents receive on average 1.6 citations within the first 10 years.
The relative importance of patents citing private patents remains stable and slightly increasing through the age of the private patent. Patents citing public patents receive on average
two citations within their first 10 years. The importance of citing patents is stable until
the original public patent is 8 years old, at which point there is a significant drop in citations of citing patents from 2.4 to 1.7. This is when the difference between private and
public, in terms of citings’ citations, becomes non-significant. Although public citations of
citing patents slightly increase again after this drop, the difference remains smaller and statistically non-significant, as indicated in Table 2.3. The results are similar when using the
patents across time, time invariant errors in the classification should not impact our conclusions.
15
The use of US patent data was linked to the availability for a long time horizon of publicly available data
on patents granted, depositor classification, and the associated citations.
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F IGURE 2.5: C ITATION PATTERNS FOR F RENCH P UBLIC AND P RIVATE PATENTS
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Notes: Panel plots Average Citations of Citing Patents for French public patents (blue line) and French private patents (red line) across
patent age. Average Citations of Citing Patents is computed as the 10-years-forward citations of the citing patents and is measured for
15,383 patents granted in the period 1975-1985.

Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Appendix Appendix B.3 provides further robustness checks
related to computation of the citations variable and public and private patent classification.
TABLE 2.3: C ITATION D IFFERENCES FOR F RENCH P UBLIC AND P RIVATE PATENTS
Age
Difference

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

.3**
(0.15)

.3**
(0.15)

.62***
(0.17)

.28**
(0.14)

.41**
(0.18)

.23
(0.17)

.71***
(0.25)

.08
(0.16)

.39
(0.25)

.14
(0.24)

Notes: Differences in citation patterns of 15383 patents granted by the USPTO to French private (92%) and public (8%)
depositors. The difference is computed in terms of Average Citations of Citing Patents across patent age. Average Citations
of Citing Patents is computed as the 10-years-forward citations of the citing patents and is measured for patents granted in
the period 1975-1985. Two sample t-test with unequal variances were used. One star denotes significance at the 10% level,
two stars denote significance at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level.

Our results are consistent with previous stylized facts related to citations of private and
academic patents. Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1998) and Trajtenberg, Henderson,
and Jaffe (1997) show that corporate patents tend to be cited less relative to academic
patents and are less general in terms of the technological fields that cite them subsequently.
Evidence on European patent data is more scarce, but Bacchiocchi and Montobbio (2009)
show that patents of universities and public research organizations are more highly cited
during the first five years but then become similar in terms of citations.
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2.3

Theory: Growth with Basic and Applied Research

We first discuss important choices in modeling before going into specific details. Our
theoretical framework will depart from standard endogenous growth models in a number
of ways. First, we will allow private firms to invest in both basic and applied research.
Second, firms will be able to operate in multiple industries. Third, our analysis relies on
the appropriation of spillovers from basic research by multi-industry firms. Hence there
will be cross-industry spillovers from basic research. Fourth, there will also be withinindustry spillovers from basic research. Finally, we will also introduce a public research
sector, which can be thought of as universities or publicly funded research labs.
The key distinction between private basic research and public basic research will be that
an outcome of the former will turn immediately into a consumer product of the innovating
firm, while the latter will contribute to the general pool of basic knowledge and will not
turn into a consumer product until a firm uses that knowledge. This will induce a delay
in the effect of public basic research, as argued in the introduction. The social trade-off
will be that while private firms are better at turning abstract basic research into consumer
products, they do not internalize all the spillovers associated with it. Hence, there will be
room for meaningful policy interventions, which we will investigate after our quantitative
analysis.
For ease of exposition and intuition, in this section, we will first outline a simplified
baseline framework with myopic (one-period-ahead maximizing) firms that highlights the
key elements of the main model. After deriving the theoretical results and discussing the
main economic forces at play, in Section 2.4 we will describe the generalizations we make
to the benchmark model.
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2.3.1

Baseline Model

We consider a representative household economy in continuous time. The household consists of a measure M of workers. Each worker has one unit of labor that is supplied inelastically in the labor market. There is a unique final good Z ptq. The economy is a closed
economy, there is no physical capital investment and all expenses are in terms of the labor
units. Therefore, Z ptq will also be equal to household consumption at time t.
Production
Production is divided into three major sectors: downstream, midstream, and upstream.
The upstream sector produces intermediate goods pyij q that are used to produce industry
aggregates pYi q in the midstream sector. Finally, the downstream sector combines these
industry aggregates into the final good pZ q. We will now describe them in detail.
Downstream Sector

The final good Z ptq is produced in the downstream sector by in-

finitely many competitive firms that combine inputs from M different industries according
to the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function
Z ptq 




γ 1
γ 1
1 ¸M
γ
Yi ptq
.
M i1
γ

(2.1)

In this production function, Yi ptq is the aggregate output from industry i P t1, ..., M u. The
economy consists of M

PZ

industries. In the context of firm-level data, each industry

i can be thought of as a different 1-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and
Z ptq is simply the aggregate GDP of the economy.16 We normalize the price of the final
good to 1 at every instant t without any loss of generality. For notational simplicity, time
16

Note that we introduce this multi-industry structure in order to model cross-industry spillovers. To avoid
any additional theoretical complications, we will focus on symmetric equilibria in which industry aggregates
assume a common value.
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subscripts will henceforth be suppressed.

Midstream Sector Each industry aggregate Yi is produced competitively, combining inputs from a continuum of product lines. Let yij denote the production of upstream good j
in industry i by the firm that has the best technology in that product line. Industry aggregate
i is produced according to the following CES production function

Yi
Upstream Sector



» 1



ε 1
ε

yij dj

 εε 1

.

(2.2)

0

In product line j, the firm that has the latest (and also the best) tech-

nology produces as a monopolist according to the following linear production technology
that takes only labor as an input
yij
where qij

 qij lij

(2.3)

¡ 0 is the labor productivity associated with product line j and lij is the number

of production workers employed. Let us denote the wage rate in the economy by w in
terms of the final good. The specification in Equation 2.3 implies that each product yij has
a constant marginal cost of production w{qij
industry i by
q̄i
Definition of a Firm



»

¡ 0.

We denote the productivity index of


1
ε 1

qijε1 dj

.

(2.4)

In this model, as in Klette and Kortum (2004), a firm is defined

as a collection of product lines in which it is the lead producer. These product lines can
come from multiple industries. In what follows, mf
industries in which the firm actively operates, nif

P t1, .., M u will denote the number of

PZ

will denote the number of product

lines firm f owns in a given industry i, and finally nf will stand for the total number of
product lines owned by the firm and will satisfy nf
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 °iPm nif . For notational tractability,

henceforth we will drop the firm index f , when it creates no confusion.
A firm’s payoff in a given product line j in industry i depends on its productivity level
qij . Therefore, the payoff-relevant state of a firm is denoted by
q  pq1 , q2 , . . . , qm q
where qi

 tqi,1, qi,2, . . . , qi,n u is a multi-set keeping track of all the productivity levels
i

of the firm in industry i where it has the best technology.17 Working with such a large and
complex state space proves burdensome in practice. Later on, we will impose sufficient
assumptions that allow us to use a much simpler equivalent representation for a firm’s
product portfolio.
Example 1. An example is helpful to summarize the description so far. Figure 2.6 illustrates an example of an economy that consists of M



3 industries. It also shows an

 2 industries (i  1 and i  3) and has n1  3
 2 product lines in i  3. This firm does not

example of a firm (f ) that operates in m

 1 and n3
currently operate in industry i  2.

product lines in industry i

F IGURE 2.6: E XAMPLE OF A FIRM
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Firm f (𝒏𝟏𝒇 = 𝟑, 𝒏𝟐𝒇 = 𝟎, 𝒏𝟑𝒇 = 𝟐, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒇 = 𝟐)

A firm’s portfolio of products will expand through successful innovation. Likewise, it
17

A multi-set is a generalization of a set that can contain more than one instances of the same member. For
instance, given j  j 1 , a multiset qif can contain qif pj q and qif pj 1 q regardless of whether qif pj q  qif pj 1 q.

78

will lose product lines when other firms or potential entrants successfully innovate on one
of its product lines (thus stealing it). These innovations will be the source of economic
growth in this economy. The next subsection will describe the details of the innovation
technology.

Innovation and Technological Progress
In this economy, there are two types of innovations (basic and applied) and two different
groups of agents (private and public sectors) generating productivity growth.
Firms invest in both basic and applied research, thus generating innovations that drive
productivity growth. As Nelson (1959) and Aghion and Howitt (1996) describe it, fundamental advances in technological knowledge come through basic innovation and open up
windows of opportunity for future research. Applied innovation builds on these existing
basic innovations, thus realizing these opportunities. That being said, innovations eventually run into diminishing returns. If the latest basic innovation in a product line becomes
outdated, applied innovations in that product line become less productive until a new basic
innovation introduces additional fundamental knowledge that can make the applied innovation more productive again. Therefore, there will be complementarity between the two
types of innovation at the aggregate level.
These innovations come from two sources: First, the private sector invests in both basic
and applied innovation with the goal of increasing their market share. Second, the government uses tax revenues to fund public research labs to produce basic innovations. In what
follows, we are going to describe firms’ research technology and the distinction between
basic and applied research. Then we will describe the public research technology.

Research by Private Firms Firms choose their flow rate of innovation and pay a labor
cost that is increasing and convex in this rate. Basic and applied research levels are chosen
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separately, and there is no complementarity between them in terms of research costs. For
the innovation production function, we will follow the literature (see Klette and Kortum
(2004), Lentz and Mortensen (2008), and Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom, and Kerr (2013)).
Firms undertake innovation by combining their existing, non-tradable intangible capital
with researchers (hired at wage rate w, as with production workers) in a Cobb-Douglas
production function. In our model, the intangible capital stock in a particular industry i is
proxied by the number of product lines ni that a firm owns in that industry. The production
function for applied and basic research then takes the following form

Ai

where Ωa , Ωb

 ni1

1
νa

1

Haiνa Ωa and Bi

 ni

 ν1b

1

1
ν

Hbib Ωb

¡ 0 are scale parameters, νa, νb ¡ 1 are the inverse of the innovation produc-

tion function elasticities with respect to researchers and Hai and Hbi denote the number of
researchers that firm f needs to hire in order to generate the Poisson flow rates for applied
(Ai ) and basic research (Bi ) in industry i.
The above specifications, which are standard in this class of models, capture the idea

 Ai{ni and
bi  Bi {ni as the applied and basic innovation intensities. Similarly, let ha pai q  Hai {ni
and hb pbi q  Hbi {ni be defined as the number of researchers per product line hired for
that a firm’s knowledge capital facilitates innovation.18 Let us define ai

applied and basic research. As a result, we can summarize the cost of doing applied and
basic research as
Ca pai | ni q  wni aνi a ξa and Cb pbi | ni q  wni bνi b ξb
where w is the wage rate, ξa



νa
Ω
a , and ξb



νb
Ω
b . Notice that total cost is directly

proportional to the number of product lines.
18

It also simplifies the analysis by making the problem proportional to the number of product lines.
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(2.5)

Similar to Klette and Kortum (2004), Lentz and Mortensen (2008), Acemoglu, Akcigit,
Hanley, and Kerr (2012), and Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom, and Kerr (2013), both applied
and basic research are directed toward particular industries but undirected within those
industries. In other words, once a firm chooses Ai and Bi , the realization of innovations
will take place on a random product within industry i.
Innovation through basic research introduces a new generation of fundamental technical knowledge. The utilization of this fundamental knowledge for production requires
what we call industry-specific working knowledge. This translates into our model one of
the main insights on basic research presented in the introduction. Although the knowledge
generated by basic research is often applicable to many industries, the ability to turn it into
patents and capture its full economic value critically depends on the spectrum of activities
and technologies operated by the firm. In the model, each firm has therefore some working
knowledge in the industries where it has undertaken production pmq. For now, we take the
joint distribution Γm,n over m and n as given but we will endogenize it in the generalized
model in Section 2.4.
Let qij ptq be the highest productivity technology for producing j in industry i. When a
firm that has working knowledge in i produces a basic innovation that has a direct application in industry i and product line j, the same firm uses this basic knowledge for production
and patents this new high-value technology. As a result, the firm improves qij ptq by η q̄i ptq
qij pt
where η

¡

∆tq  qij ptq

η q̄i ptq

(2.6)

0 is the step size, and q̄i is the productivity index defined in Equation 2.4.

When the firm produces this new innovation, it adds this product line with the productivity
improvement into its portfolio qpt
period profit of π pqij pt

∆tq

 qptq Y tqij pt

∆tqu, which generates per-

∆tqq. Going back to Example 1, firm f would increase its total
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number of product lines from 5 to 6 with this basic innovation.
Moreover, basic research features two potential spillovers:
• within-industry spillover (Section 2.2.4): Each new basic innovation changes the evolution of the product line by introducing a radically new technology. The introduction
of this new basic technology causes subsequent applied innovations to be larger until the latest basic technology becomes outdated through some random process. We
refer to product lines just hit by basic innovation as hot product lines, as opposed to
cold product lines, whose latest basic innovation has become outdated.
• cross-industry spillover (Section 2.2.3): Each new basic innovation has the potential for spillovers into other industries. With some probability a basic innovation
will generate an additional basic innovation in some other industry. If the firm has
working knowledge in this other industry, it can use the innovation for production.
Otherwise, the new technology contributes to the pool of existing basic knowledge
and will eventually contribute to a new consumer product made by some other producer.
These two types of spillovers lie at the heart of our analysis; therefore, we will now
discuss each in more detail.

Within-Industry Spillover from Basic Research

Applied research makes use of the

within-industry spillover from basic research and builds on the existing latest basic technological knowledge in a product line. The productivity of each applied innovation is a
function of how depreciated the latest basic technology is. If the latest basic knowledge in
j is undepreciated (i.e., still hot), a successful applied innovation will benefit from it and
improve the latest productivity qij ptq of that product line by η q̄i ptq, as in expression p2.6q:
qij pt ∆tq  qij ptq η q̄i ptq. If the latest basic technology of the product line is depreciated
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(i.e., cold), a successful applied innovation will improve the latest productivity only by a
magnitude proportional to λ

η so that
qij pt

∆tq  qij ptq

λq̄i ptq.

(2.7)

We assume that a new basic technology depreciates (innovations run into diminishing returns) at a Poisson rate ζ

¡ 0.

On the other hand, a new basic innovation reactivates the

product line until the next time it cools down again. Let us denote the arrival rate of basic
innovations to product lines by τb . Then during a small time interval ∆t, each product line
will be subject to the transition rates denoted in Table 2.4:
TABLE 2.4: T RANSITION MATRIX FOR WITHIN - INDUSTRY SPILLOVERS
hot
hot 1  ζ∆t
cold
τb ∆t

cold
ζ∆t
1  τb ∆t

Figure 2.7 illustrates the implications of within-industry spillovers. In every industry, at
any point in time, some product lines will be hot (red dotted lines) and some product lines
will be cold, in cases where the latest technology is outdated (black solid lines). We will
denote the share of hot product lines by αi

P r0, 1s. In a balanced-growth-path equilibrium,

the share of the hot product lines will be determined through the transition rates in Table 2.4
and will remain invariant. An applied innovation is more productive if the latest basic
knowledge in that product line is still “hot" and improves the productivity by η q̄i ; otherwise,
the contribution is only λq̄j where η

¡ λ.

This highlights the complementarity between

basic and applied research.
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cations in many industries other than the one for which it was originally intended. Therefore, we will assume that when a basic innovation occurs, it applies with probability one
to the target industry, and with probability p P p0, 1q, it generates an additional basic innovation in another industry determined by nature at random. Thus, p is our measure of the
intensity of cross-industry spillovers. Let 1i,i1 be an indicator function that takes a value of
one if a basic innovation in industry i has an application in industry i1 and zero otherwise.
Then the unconditional probabilities satisfy

Pr r1i,i1

$
'
'
&

 1s  '

p
M 1



'
% 1

if i1

i

if i1  i

.

(2.8)

The spillover innovation in industry i1 will be of step size η as well but will not generate
additional cross-industry spillovers. This new innovation will be used by the same firm f if
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it has working knowledge in i1 . Otherwise the production potential of this innovation will
be used by the next inventor in that product line.
This structure captures Nelson’s hypothesis. When a firm generates some basic knowledge, it can turn this into an immediate application only in the sectors in which it has
working knowledge. In order to capture the full return from new basic scientific knowledge in industries where a firm is not present but the knowledge could have an application,
the innovating firmIndustry
must1 first patent andIndustry
then 2license or sell theIndustry
innovation
to other firms
3
qualityscientific
level
quality level However, thequality
level
in those industries.
applications
of significant
advances are often
q

q

q

not immediate and firms can turn them into patentable applications mostly in their own
product

1

0

product
line j

product
line j

line j
industries due to their expertise
in the field.

1

0

1

0

Example 2. Cross-industry spillovers are depicted in Figure 2.8. Firm f from Example 1
Firm f (𝒏𝟏𝒇 = 𝟑, 𝒏𝟐𝒇 = 𝟎, 𝒏𝟑𝒇 = 𝟐, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒎𝒇 = 𝟐)

now produces a basic innovation in industry 3. This adds a new product line to the firm’s

 3. In
addition, this basic knowledge has a potential application in industries i  1 and i  2
Industry 1
Industry 2
Industry 3
with probability
p. The spillover inq industry i  1 is usedq by the firm since it has working
q
η.q
λ.q
knowledge there. However, the application in i  2 is not immediate to the firm due to lack
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1

Recall that m denotes the number of industries in which a firm has working knowledge.
Then the probability of a used spillover for the firm is

ρm

pm  1q P r0, 1q.
 pM
1

This highlights the well-known appropriability problem of basic research. There is a significant chance that the new basic knowledge will be relevant to multiple industries, but it is
not always clear that a firm will be in a position to exploit all of these avenues of production
and patenting. However, firms operating in more industries will have a greater probability
of being able to directly use all facets of a basic innovation. As Nelson puts it, firms that
have fingers in many pies have a higher probability of using the results of basic research.
A broad technological base increases the probability of benefiting from successful basic
research.

Public Basic Research In our model, the academic sector will be the other source of
basic knowledge creation. One of the main tasks of public research labs in an economy
is to produce the necessary basic scientific knowledge that will be part of the engine for
subsequent applied innovations and growth. We assume that the public research sector
consists of a measure U of research labs per industry. Each lab receives the same transfer
R̄ from the government to finance its research which results in an overall funding level of
R  R̄  U

 M.

We assume that each public research lab generates a flow rate of u by hiring hu researchers with the same basic research technology as a one-product firm in Equation 2.5,
so that u

 Ωbhu

1
νb

.19 This specification implies that the government can affect the basic

knowledge pool in the economy through the amount of funds R allocated to the academic
19

In reality, public research labs may have a different research technology than private labs. However,
obtaining data on both the inputs and outputs of individual public labs is difficult. The separate estimation of
public and private innovation production functions is left for future research.
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sector. The flow rate of basic innovation from the academic sector will satisfy
u  R̄{w



1
νB

Ωb

(2.9)

where u is the academic basic innovation flow per lab. In this economy, R is a policy
lever controlled by the policymaker. As with private firms, each basic innovation generated
by the academic sector applies to industry i and a random product line j and makes that
product line hot. However, this innovation by public labs will turn into output only upon
a subsequent private applied innovation. In addition to i, the same basic knowledge will
contribute to the basic knowledge pool in another industry i1
p

 i and line j 1 with probability

P p0, 1q . Note that the equilibrium fraction of hot product lines α will be determined by

the aggregate rates of public (u) and private (bm ) basic research as well as the cool-down
rate (ζ).
Remark It is important to note that we follow the empirical Ivory Tower nature of basic research and assume that innovation done by public labs is turned into consumer
products only upon subsequent innovation by private firms. The lag between the
creation of publicly funded innovations and actual goods production is empirically
shown in a large literature.20 This important issue is generally overlooked in the
theoretical growth literature. Inclusion of this feature generates some new and interesting dynamics, such as the importance of involvement of the private sector in basic
research.

Entry and Exit

The research technology for a single outside entrant is assumed to be the

same as that of applied innovation for a firm with a single product line. Thus if an outside
entrant hires he researchers, it produces a flow probability of entry of ae
20

 he

1
νa

Ωa .

Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1992), Rosenberg and Nelson (1994), Henderson, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (1998), and Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis (2004), among several others.
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There is a mass E of outside entrants per industry. Varying this parameter will control
the relative importance of outside entry in the economy. This will imply that creative
destruction arising from new entrants will be equal to E  ae .
In our model, there will be both endogenous and exogenous channels for firm exit.
First, a firm that loses all of its product lines to other competitors will have a value of zero
and thus will exit. Second, each firm has an exogenous death rate κ ¡ 0. When this occurs,
the firm sells all of its product lines to random firms at a “fire sale” price P.21 On the
flip side, firms will receive a buyout option with a probability that is proportional to their
number of products.

Labor Market

Labor is split between production pLp q and research labor. Research labor

can be further subdivided into that devoted to private basic pLb q, public basic pLu q, private
applied research pLa q and firm entry pLe q. Since the total labor supply is M workers, the
labor market clearing condition is given by

M

 Lp

Lb

La

Le

Lu .

The labor utilization from each component can be expressed in a more concise form when
we investigate the properties of the dynamic equilibrium in the next section.

Household Problem Finally, we close the model by describing the household problem
that determines the equilibrium interest rate in this model. The household consumes the
final good and maximizes the following lifetime utility

W0
21



»8
0

exp pδtq

C ptq1γ  1
dt
1γ

The exact value of this price will not play any role for the equilibrium determination.
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(2.10)

where C ptq is consumption at time t, γ is the constant relative risk aversion parameter, and
δ is the discount rate. The household owns all the firms in the economy, which generates a
risk-free flow return of r in aggregate. The household also supplies labor in the economy,
through which it earns wage rate w ptq. Finally, the household pays a lump-sum tax T ptq ¥
0 every instant. Thus, the household’s intertemporal maximization is simply to maximize
Equation 2.10 subject to the following budget constraint
C ptq

A9 ptq ¤ r ptq A ptq

M w ptq  T ptq

where A ptq is the asset holdings of the household.

2.3.2

Equilibrium

In this section, we characterize the dynamic equilibrium of our model. Our focus is on
a symmetric balanced-growth-path (SBGP) equilibrium where all industries start with the
same initial conditions at time t

 0 and all aggregate variables grow at the same endoge-

nous rate g.
In this model, three variables affect the payoff of the firm: the number of product lines
n, the number of industries m, and the relative productivity

qpij

 qij {q̄i

(2.11)

of its product lines, which is the absolute productivity in line j normalized by the productivity index q̄i in industry i. Thus, each incumbent firm is characterized by its state
k

 ppq, n, mq .

More specifically, given a government policy sequence rT ptqs8
t0 , an SBGP equilibrium

is composed of a sequence of intermediate good quantities, prices, the basic and applied
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innovation rates of private firms and entrants, the wage rate and interest rate, the joint distribution of multi-industry presence and product count, hot and cold product line productivity
distributions, the fraction of hot product lines, i.e., ryk ptq , pk ptq , bk ptq , ak ptq , ae ptq ,
w ptq , r ptq , Γm,n ptq , FH ptq , FL ptq , α ptqs8
t0 , such that all firms choose quantity and
price to maximize their profits, incumbent and entrant firms invest in research to maximize their firm value, the labor market clears, the household maximizes its discounted sum
of future utilities, and the distributions satisfy the relevant flow equations.

Solution of the Model

The standard monopoly profit maximization delivers the follow-

ing familiar equilibrium price and quantities (interested readers are referred to the Appendix B.1 for the detailed derivations)

yj

 qpjZ

and

pj

 M1qp .

(2.12)

j

Clearly, a monopolist’s quantity is increasing and price decreasing in the relative productivity qp of the product line. Finally, the equilibrium profits of the monopolist are again
increasing in its relative productivity qp and the average market size Z {M :
π pqpq 

qpε1 Z
.
ε M

(2.13)

Next, only in this section, we focus on myopic firms that maximize their one-period-ahead
returns (as opposed to forward-looking firms that maximize the discounted sum of future
profits). This will allow us to provide some useful analytical results and highlight the key
economic forces of our model. In our quantitative analysis (Section 2.5), we will generalize
this and focus on forward-looking firms.
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Myopic Firms

Consider now a firm that has n product lines in m industries. Moreover,

in an SBGP, an α fraction of product lines are hot. Then the maximization problem when
deciding for the amount of basic research can be written as
max nbm p1
bm

where V H
r
w



w
Z M

{



p
EH
qp π pq

ρm q V H

r ν ξb
 wnb
b

(

η q is the expected return to a successful basic innovation and

is the normalized wage rate. Several observations are in order. First, the ex-

pected return from basic research investment is increasing as the firm has fingers in more
pies as Nelson argued (higher ρm ). Second, the innovations are undirected within indusp
tries; therefore, the firm has to form an expectation for the expected profit EH
qp π pq

η q,

which means that we have to keep track of the invariant relative productivity distribution
to compute V H . Finally, both the returns and the costs are proportional to the number of
product lines n, which makes the problem much more tractable and the quantitative solution manageable. Now we can express the first-order condition as


p1
bm 

ρm q V H
r
νb ξb w

 ν 11
b

The most important result here is the fact that basic research investment is increasing in
the multi-industry presence of the firm. The strength of this positive relationship will be
mainly governed by the probability of the cross-industry spillover parameter p, which will
help us match Figure 2.4.
Fact 8. A firm’s basic research investment is increasing in its multi-industry presence.
Both private firms and public research labs are generating basic research in this economy. It is useful to break down total basic research into its embodied and disembodied
components. The distinction is based on whether the basic knowledge is immediately
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turned into a consumer product (embodied) or simply added to the stock of knowledge
available for future innovators (disembodied). We obtain the following aggregates

Embodied:

τbe

Disembodied: τbd
Total: τb





M
¸

µm p1



m 1
M
¸

ρm qbm

µm pp  ρm qbm



m 1
τbe

p1

pqu

(2.14)

τbd

where we define the mass of product lines owned by firms in m industries by µm , which can
be computed from the joint distribution using µm

 °8n1 n  Γm,n. Then τbe and τbd corre-

spond respectively to the embodied and disembodied components of basic research. Note
that the disembodied component includes both private spillovers that are unused and the
results of public basic innovation. Finally, τb is simply the overall flow of basic innovation,
including all spillovers.
Using this aggregate rate and the cool-down rate ζ, we can express the steady-state
flow equation: the number of product lines that become hot must be equal to the number of
product lines that cool down. In other words, we must have αζ

 p1  αqτb. As a result,

the steady-state fraction of hot product lines is
α

τb
ζ

τb

.

(2.15)

The share of hot product lines, those having basic knowledge that can be turned into better
consumer products (α), is increasing in the amount of basic research flow. This expression
highlights the role of public policy in affecting the knowledge stock. The more money is
allocated to public basic research, the higher will be the basic research flow from public
research labs (u), which will then increase the fraction of hot product lines through τb , as
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in Equation 2.14 and Equation 2.15.
However, a bigger α is meaningful only when there is subsequent applied research that
turns this existing basic knowledge stock into consumer products. Therefore, we now turn
to the applied research decision of the firms. Their maximization problem is simply


max na αV H
a



r ν ξa
p1  αqV C  wna
a

(

 EHqp π pqp ηq is the expected returns from hot product lines and V C 
λq is that from cold ones and w
r  Zw
{M is the normalized wage rate. When

where V H
p
EC
qp π pq

investing in applied research, firms form two types of expectations. The first one is due to
the undirected nature of research: firms have to form expectations over the relative productivity qp that they are going to land on. The second, and more important one, is due to the
complementarity between basic and applied research: firms take into account the fraction
of hot product lines. Firms invest in applied research according to
a



αV H

p1  αqV C 

r
νa ξa w



1
νa 1

.

The crucial observation here is the complementarity between basic and applied research.
In equilibrium V H

¡ V C since hot product lines are associated with a larger step size η.

Hence, if there are more hot product lines (a higher α), each firm increases its investment
in applied research.
Fact 9. Basic and applied research investments are complementary. In particular, higher
public basic research investment encourages firms to invest more in applied research.
However, the fraction of hot product lines α is not sufficient to determine the incentives
for applied research alone due to the correlation between this product state and productivity.
The incentives will be a function of the fraction of hot and cold product lines and the aver93

p
age qualities within those types. In particular, firms must know the values of EH
qp pq
p
and EC
qp pq

η qε1

λqε1 due to the exact form of the profit function in Equation 2.13. Therefore,

Theorem 4 describes the laws of motion for the type-specific productivity distributions.
Let us denote the aggregate rate of applied innovation by τa such that

τa



M
¸



µ m am

Eae .

(2.16)

m 1

Note that in the baseline model, am

 a for all m, but this will not necessarily be the case in

the general model in Section 2.4. Recall that τbe denotes the arrival rate of embodied basic
research, as defined in Equation 2.14. Now we can denote the aggregate rate of creative
destruction (the rate at which firms lose product lines to other firms) by τ :

τ

 τa

τbe .

(2.17)

Creative destruction is determined by the rate at which incumbents produce basic innovations which can be embodied into production immediately pτbe q, and by the rate at which
incumbents and entrants produce applied innovations pτa q. Now we are ready to state the
following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let FH p, tq and FC p, tq be the aggregate product cumulative measures by type
(hot or cold). The flow equations for these objects are, respectively,
F9 H pqpq  τ rFH pqpq  FH pqp  η qs

τbe FC pqp  η q  ζFH pqpq

F9 C pqpq  τa rFC pqpq  FC pqp  λqs  τb FC pqpq

ζFH pqpq

τbd FC pqpq

g qprB FH pqpq{B qps

g qprB FC pqpq{B qps

Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The labor market clearing condition can now be expressed in terms of the above endogenous variables. One additional relationship we will exploit is that between the mass
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of labor devoted to production and the normalized wage rate. This can be derived from the
goods production specification (see Appendix B.1 in the Appendix for its detailed derivation)
Lp



Z
w



ε1
ε

Using this and the symmetric nature of the equilibrium, we express the labor market clearing condition as an average over industries
1

1
r
w



ε1
ε



ξb

¸

µm bνmb

U u νb

ξa paνa

Eaνea q

(2.18)

m

This expression equates the labor supply per industry ( 1 since the total labor supply is
M ) to labor demand for production workers; private basic researchers, which is a function
of the multi-industry presence of the firms; public basic researchers, which is determined
by public policy; incumbent applied researchers; and entrant basic researchers.
Finally, plugging the equilibrium intermediate good quantity from Equation 2.12 into
the aggregate production functions from Equation 2.2 and Equation 2.1, we find that the
aggregate output is
Z

 q̄Lp{M

(2.19)

This expression simply says that the aggregate output is equal to the product of the number
of workers employed for production and the aggregate productivity index of the economy.
In an SBGP equilibrium, the labor allocated for production is constant. Therefore the
growth rate of aggregate output (and also output per worker) will be equal to the growth
rate of the productivity index q̄. The following proposition provides the exact growth rate
of the productivity index.
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Proposition 5. In an SBGP, the growth rate of the productivity index is

g





τa αEH
p
qp pq

η qε1



λqε1  1
ε1

p1  αqECqp pqp



τbe Eqp pqp



η qε1  1

(2.20)

Proof. See Appendix B.1
This growth expression shows that the engines of economic progress include both applied and basic innovation. More important, the basic knowledge stock in the economy,
represented by α, makes each applied innovation more valuable and contributes more to
growth (since η

¡ λ). This expression shows how public funding can contribute to growth

through its indirect impact on private research.

2.3.3

Discussion of the Model

In this section, we briefly discuss sources of inefficiency and what policy can achieve in
this model. First, as in standard quality ladder models, there are intertemporal spillovers
within each product line. Second, firms simply enjoy the expected duration of monopoly
power due to the competition channel of creative destruction. As a result, the private value
of innovation differs from the social value of innovation. It is also worth highlighting
that in this model, there could be either over- or underinvestment in R&D. In addition to
the standard channels, our model features additional spillovers due to basic research, both
within and across industries. Finally, there are additional static distortions due to monopoly
power. However, since we are primarily interested in the dynamic inefficiencies associated
with innovation and basic research, we will consider the case of a social planner who is still
subject to monopoly distortions on the production side.
All of these inefficiencies will generate room for innovation policy, and our estimated
model will govern whether there is over- or underinvestment in the various types of research
expenditures in the decentralized equilibrium. It will also provide a framework within
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which to evaluate the effects of these innovation policies.

2.4

Generalizations of the Model

The previous section introduced a simplified version of the main model to highlight the key
economic forces in analytical forms. Our ultimate goal in this paper is to bring this general
equilibrium framework to the data. Therefore, this section generalizes the baseline model to
provide richer and more realistic dynamics (with forward-looking firms and heterogeneous
innovation qualities, for instance) for the economy and its agents and to give the model
some more flexibility to match the data (e.g., introducing the fixed cost of doing basic
research). Those not interested in the technical details can skip directly to the quantitative
Section 2.5.

Stochastic Innovation Step Sizes Stokes (1997) argued that technological breakthroughs
do not necessarily derive from basic research. According to the “Pasteur Quadrant” hypothesis, applied research efforts can potentially also lead to important technological changes.
Our first generalization takes this possibility into account by introducing stochastic innovation step sizes into the model. We assume, as in Klette and Kortum (2004) and Lentz and
Mortensen (2008), that these step sizes are drawn from exponential distributions. For basic
research, the mean of the distribution is always η. For applied research, the distribution
mean is η if the product line is hot and λ if it is cold. It is important to note that we do not
take any stand on the comparison of the average step sizes (η

¡ λ or vice versa) and let

them be determined by the data.

Fixed Cost of Basic Research In our sample, some firms do not invest in basic research.
To capture this fact, we generalize the basic research technology by introducing a fixed cost
of doing basic research. At each instant, a firm with n product lines draws a fixed labor
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cost of doing basic research nφ

¥ 0, where φ is distributed according to the distribution

B pq. Then a firm that operates in n product lines and has a fixed cost of basic research φ
this period has the following cost function Cb pbm | n, φq

 ncbpbm | φq. This implies that

firms will follow a cutoff rule as a function of their multi-industry presence φm such that
they will not invest in basic research if φ ¡ φm . Otherwise, in addition to the variable cost,
they will also pay the fixed cost.

Industry Expansion (Start-up Buy-outs) In the baseline model, we took the working
knowledge of the firms (m) as exogenously given. We now endogenize m by introducing
the possibility of buy-out offers for new entrants. The economy features E

 ae flow of

entry at any instant. We will assume that a ς fraction of new entrants will meet a randomly
selected incumbent firm. Thus, an incumbent will have a flow rate of incoming buy-out
offers
x  ςEae {F.
where F is the equilibrium measure of firms. If n̄ denotes the average number of product

 1{n̄. Clearly this new company will be from a new industry with
probability p1  m{M q or from an industry that already exists in the incumbent’s portfolio
with probability m{M. Our goal is to keep the M&A margin as tractable as possible, and
lines per firm, then F

we will achieve this by assuming that the M&A price that the incumbent firm has to pay is
equal to the full surplus of the new merger. The resulting invariant joint distribution Γm,n
over multi-industry presence m and firm product count n is described in Appendix B.1.

Forward-Looking Firms For expositional purposes, in the previous section we described
the model with myopic firms that maximize their one-period-ahead returns. For the rest of
our analysis, we relax this assumption and consider firms that maximize the discounted
sum of future returns. The analysis of this new model is very similar to that of the previous
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model except that the returns to innovation take the form of a value function that takes into
account all future contingencies. The following proposition provides the exact forms of the
value of a firm that has a productivity portfolio p
q and operates in m industries.
Proposition 6. Let the value of a firm with a productivity portfolio p
q in m industries be
denoted by V pp
q, mq. This value is equal to
V pp
q, mq 
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(2.21)
The analogous production values are defined as V H

 EHqp,η V pqp ηq and V C  ECqp,λV pqp

λq.
Proof. See Appendix B.1
This important result has a number of implications. First, the value of a firm has a
tractable additive form across product lines. Moreover, the firm value has two major components: the first component is the production value V pqpq, which simply computes the sum
of the future discounted profits where the effective discount rate takes into account the rate
of creative destruction τ , the exogenous destruction rate κ, and the obsolescence of the relative productivity qp due to the growth of q̄. The second component is the R&D option value
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Vm , which is a direct function of the multi-industry presence due to the associated internalization of spillovers. Finally, because of the stochastic nature of step sizes, the expectations
now integrate over the productivity (which are type specific) and step size.

Welfare Finally, we close this section by describing the SBGP equilibrium welfare. In
an SBGP equilibrium that has an initial consumption C0 and a growth rate of g, welfare is
computed as
W pC0 , g qSBGP



»8
0

pC0e q
exp pδtq
1γ



gt 1 γ



dt 



1 γ

C0ε1

1  γ ρ  p1  γ q g
1

 ρ1

We will report our results in consumption-equivalent terms. In particular, when two
different public policies T1 and T2 generate different SBGP equilibrium welfare values as
W pC0T1 , g T1 q and W pC0T2 , g T2 q, we will report β such that
W pβC0T1 , g T1 q  W pC0T2 , g T2 q.
In other words, β constitutes the compensating differential in initial consumption that
equalizes the welfare of the two proposed policy environments. It therefore provides an intuitive measure for evaluating policy tools. This completes the description of the theoretical
environment. Now we are ready to move on to the quantitative analysis.

2.5

Quantitative Analysis

In this section we describe the estimation strategy used. We will assume that the fixed costs
are drawn from a lognormal distribution B pφq with mean φ̄ and variance σ 2 . As a result,
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the set of parameters of the model is

θ

 tδ, γ, ε, p, η, λ, E, U, ζ, νa, νb, ξa, ξb, κ, φ̄, σu P Θ.

During the period we consider, there was existing government support for R&D activities in France. Our data set contains information on the publicly funded portion of private
R&D. On average, 10% of private R&D was funded publicly. Therefore in our estimation,
we introduce a uniform subsidy to the total R&D spending of the firm ψ



0.10. The

government has a balanced budget every period, so that the sum of total subsidies pS q and
public research funding pRq must be equal to tax revenues, that is

T

S

Rψ



M
¸



µm CB pbm | φq



CA paq

U CB pu | φ̄q

m 1

where T is a lump-sum tax on consumers. In France, during 2000-2006, the fraction of
GDP devoted to public research labs and academic institutions was approximately 0.5%.
Therefore, we pick R{Z, which is the share of GDP devoted to public basic research, to be
0.5%.

2.5.1

Estimation Method

In our data set, for each firm f and each time period t, we have a vector of N observables
from the actual data yf t





yf1t . . . yfNt

1

 including the number of industries in which

N 1

the firm is present, sales, profits, and labor costs. Let the entire data set be denoted by y.
We use the simulated method of moments (SMM) for the estimation.22 Define Λ pyq
and Λpθq to be, respectively, the vectors of real data moments (generated from yq and equilibrium model moments (generated for some vector of parameters θq. Since certain mo22

See Bloom (2009) and Lentz and Mortensen (2008) for further description and usage information on
SMM.
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ments require knowledge of the joint distribution of firms over the number of products and
industries pm, nq and the portfolio of product qualities q, which has no apparent analytic
form, we simulate a large panel of firms to calculate Λpθq to a high degree of accuracy.23
Our proposed estimator minimizes a quadratic form of the difference between these two
vectors
θp  arg min rΛpθq  Λpyqs  W

P

θ Θ

 rΛpθq  Λpyqs

where W is the weighting matrix. We use a diagonal weighting matrix with entries equal
to the inverse square of the data moment value, or in notational terms Wii
Wij

 0 for i  j.

 1{Λipyq2 and

In our estimation, we use 26 moments. We pick moments that are

most informative for the unique features of our model. In particular, we target both the
intensive and extensive margins of basic research intensity as it varies with multi-industry
presence. Since multi-industry presence is one of the key determinants of innovation, we
target both the mean and the variance of that quantity. In addition, we include aggregate and conditional firm-level growth rates. Since our model is macro growth model and
household’s welfare (and accordingly the policy analysis) depends crucially on the level
of aggregate growth, hitting that moment is of particular importance. For that purpose,
we boost the weighting on the aggregate growth moment.24 To capture the within-industry
spillover, we target the spillover differentials described in Section 2.2.4. Finally, to further
inform the model parameters on firm dynamics, we include the mean return on sales, the
R&D/production labor ratio, the exit rate, and mean firm age by size. The details of the
moments and identification are described in Appendix Appendix B.5.
23

For our results, we simulate 32K firms with a burn-in time of 100 years and 100 time steps per year.
Increasing the weighthing factor to 3 was sufficient to align the aggregate growth rate in the data and the
model.
24
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2.5.2

Computer Algorithm Outline

An equilibrium of this model is described by a system of five equations in the five variables

pτa, τbe, τbd, w,
r g q. This system can be evaluated using the following procedure:
1. Calculate α and the distribution of qp using τa , τbe , τbd , and g according to Theorem 4
and Equation 2.15.
2. Calculate g using, τa , τb , and the distribution over qp with Equation 2.20.
4. Calculate V H

 EHqp,η V pqp

η q and V C

 ECqp,λV pqp

λq using the relevant step size

distribution and the type-specific productivity distributions.
r from Equation 2.21.
5. Find am and bm using first-order conditions with w

6. Impose an upper bound on n and find the steady state Γm,n using the flow rates in
Appendix B.1.
7. Compute the updated values of τa , τbe , and τbd using Equation 2.16 and Equation 2.14.
8. The difference between the conjectured and updated values of τa , τbe , τbd , and g in
conjunction with the labor market clearing differential from Equation 2.18 constitute
the five desired equations.
We use Powell’s (Powell (1970)) hybrid equation solver to solve this set of equations for
a given set of parameters. To minimize the SMM objective function, we perform a search
over the parameter space using a combination of a naive simulated annealing algorithm and
a Nelder-Mead simplex (Nelder and Mead (1965)) algorithm. See Zangwill and Garcia
(1981) for more information on solving systems of nonlinear equations.
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TABLE 2.5: PARAMETER E STIMATES
#

Description

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Discount Rate
CRRA Utility Parameter
Elasticity of Substitution
Cross-industry Spillover
Basic Step Size
Applied Step Size
Mass of Entrants
Mass of Academic Labs

Sym

Value

#

δ
γ
ε
p
η
λ
E
U

0.038
2.933
5.800
0.113
0.079
0.049
0.502
0.491

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

2.5.3

Description
Applied Cost Curvature
Basic Cost Curvature
Applied Cost Scale
Basic Cost Scale
Exogenous Exit Rate
Basic Fixed Mean
Basic Fixed Std. Dev.
Product Cooldown Rate

Sym

Value

νa
νb
ξa
ξb
κ
φ̄
σ
ζ

1.367
1.538
1.228
5.437
0.006
-4.761
0.327
0.116

Estimation Results

Table 2.5 reports the values of the estimated structural parameters. The estimated values of
the discount rate and CRRA utility parameters are within their standard macro ranges. The
elasticity of substitution parameter generates 17%p 1{εq gross profits, resulting in 7.9%
net profits after subtracting R&D expenses as a share of sales.
One of the most important parameters of our model is the cross-industry spillover parameter p



0.11, which measures the probability that a basic innovation will have an

additional immediate application. This estimate affects the extent to which basic innovations contribute to cross-sectional growth. In equilibrium, firms operate in two industries
out of 10 on average. Therefore, any given spillover is not embodied with probability
89%p 8{9q. Given that the probability of having a spillover is 11%, the probability of
having a disembodied spillover is 10%p 0.11  0.89q.
The estimated innovation size of basic research is η

 7.9% and the innovation size of

 4.9%. This implies that basic research (hot product
lines) makes applied innovation 60%p 7.9{4.9  1q more productive.
each new applied innovation is λ

Additionally, each basic innovation has a within-industry spillover. The cool-down rate

 0.12, which indicates that a basic innovation
affects the subsequent innovations in the same product line for almost 8.3p 1{0.12q years
of hot product lines is estimated to be ζ

on average.
The elasticity of applied innovation counts with respect to the research dollars spent is
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estimated to be 0.73 ( 1{νa ) and similarly the elasticity of basic innovation with respect
to the basic research investment is 0.65 ( 1{νb ). These values are close to the elasticity
estimates in the literature, which typically finds a value around 0.5 (Blundell, Griffith,
and Windmeijer (2002), Griliches (1990), Pakes and Griliches (1984) and Kortum (1992,
1993)).

2.5.4

Goodness of Fit

In this section, we will first focus on the moments that we targeted in our estimation and
then turn to the moments that we did not directly target but still find useful in understanding
the model’s performance.

Targeted Moments

Table 2.6 contains the moments from the actual data and our esti-

mated model.
TABLE 2.6: M OMENTS U SED IN E STIMATION
#
1-8
9-16
17
18
19
20

Description

Model

Data

#

Description

Model

Data

Basic Research Extensive
Basic Research Intensive
Mean Industries
Mean Square Industries
Return on Sales
Exit Rate

See Figure 2.10
See Figure 2.9
2.217
2.203
7.213
6.975
0.032
0.032
0.082
0.091

21
22
23
24
25
26

R&D/Labor
Employment Growth
Aggregate Growth
Spillover Differential
Age, Small Firms
Age, Large Firms

0.284
0.111
0.013
8.378
11.53
18.69

0.260
0.103
0.015
8.000
14.99
24.87

The results indicate that the model performs very well in generating firm and industry
dynamics similar to those in the data. As documented in Section 2.2.1, a significant fraction
of innovating firms invest in basic research. In particular, 29% of firms are investing in basic
research, which was 27% in the data. We also capture the positive relationship between the
extensive margin of basic research and multi-industry presence, as evidenced in Table 2.6
and Figure 2.9.
The positive correlation between multi-industry presence of a firm and its basic research
intensity was one of the primary motivations for introducing multi-industry presence into
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F IGURE 2.9: F RACTION P OSITIVE BASIC F IGURE 2.10: BASIC R ESEARCH I NTEN B Y # I NDUSTRIES
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4
6
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our model. As explained previously in the text, multi-industry presence plays an important
role in increasing basic research incentives, by allowing a greater potential to internalize the
positive spillovers from basic research. In our reduced-form analysis, we found a significant and positive correlation between multi-industry presence and basic research intensity.
This has been the key moment to identify the cross-industry spillover parameter. Our model
successfully generates this positive correlation.
In the data, firms operate on average in 2.2 industries, and the same is true in the model.
Furthermore, we find the mean squared in the model to be 7.2, compared to 7.0 observed
in the data.
The table above reports some additional moments that are not captured by the stylized
facts. For instance, the mean profitability is 3.2% in the model and in the data. The prime
determinants of profitability are the step sizes for basic and applied innovation. However,
these also affect the investment levels for both types of research, since this increases the
return to successful innovation. Therefore, the step size parameters are set to be a compromise between hitting the profitability moment and the research investment and growth
moments.
We are targeting additional moments regarding research investments. The first is the
average ratio of total research labor to production labor by incumbent firms. The model
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comes very close to hitting this ratio exactly (28.4% vs 26.0%), largely in order to hit the
aggregate growth and return on sales.
All of these components of the economy determine the aggregate growth rate. Our
model matches the observed growth rate closely. Our model economy grows at a rate of
1.3%, while the French economy grew at an average rate of 1.5% during the period studied
(2000-2006).

Untargeted Moments In this part, we discuss our model’s prediction about some of the
moments that we did not directly target.
Interestingly in the data the correlation between profitability and basic research intensity is not significantly different from zero. The same implication emerges from our model.
In the baseline model, the correlation between profitability and basic research intensity is
only 0.04. This result emerges because basic research investment is determined through
the multi-industry presence of the firms, whereas profitability is determined by the share
of hot and cold product lines, type of research investment, and the productivity distribution
F pqpq in the economy.
Our model naturally generates a positive correlation between multi-industry presence
and firm size, which is also empirically true in the data. This arises since both of these
moments are strongly correlated with firm survival. In the model, we find a correlation of
0.52 between the log employment and multi-industry presence. In the data, this value is
0.76.
Another stylized fact in our data is that the firm size distribution is highly skewed.
This is a well-known feature that is documented extensively in the literature. For detailed
references, see ?. In our model, we capture this fact with a skewness of the firm size
distribution of 4.12. This value is 3.07 in the data.
Our estimates indicate that entrants play an important direct role in overall growth.
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The innovation rate from entrants is 0.43%, whereas that number is 0.92% for incumbents.
That implies that entrants account for 32% of growth. Though our number is for the French
economy, our number is in line with Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) who find that
25% of productivity growth in the US comes from new entry.
We will now focus on the details of the equilibrium and the social planner’s problem to
study the efficiency properties of this economy. Then we will turn to various policies that
could address this inefficiency.

2.5.5

Endogenous Variables of the Baseline Economy

The following table provides equilibrium values for some of the important variables in the
model:
TABLE 2.7: D ECENTRALIZED E CONOMY: E NDOGENOUS VARIABLES ( IN
AGES )

PERCENT-

ψ

τa

τbe

τbd

Lp

Lb

Lu

Le

La

α

g

β

10

22.0

0.58

0.28

85.6

0.53

0.52

4.5

8.9

6.9

1.34

95.3

In this table, τa denotes the aggregate rate of applied innovation by incumbents and
entrants, whereas τbe and τbd denote the aggregate rates of embodied and disembodied basic
innovation, respectively. The next five columns report the labor allocations into production,
private basic, public basic, entry, and applied research. The remaining columns report the
fraction of hot product lines α, the ratio of consumption to that for the social planner’s
economy, the growth rate g, and the welfare in consumption equivalent terms β.
The model highlights the dynamic misallocation of research effort and its welfare consequences. In our benchmark economy, 85.6% of labor is used for production, and 14.4%
is employed for innovation activities. Among researchers, roughly 7% are engaged in basic
research activities. Note that this composition within innovation activities will be the cen108

tral focus of the policy analysis, since uninternalized spillovers are one of the main sources
of inefficiency. As a consequence, the arrival rate of basic innovation in our baseline economy is significantly smaller (25 times) than that of applied innovation. This translates into
significant welfare losses, with the economy achieving only 95.3% of welfare with respect
to the social planner’s optimum, which we will analyze next.

2.5.6

Quantifying the Social Planner’s Optimum

In this section, we are going to provide the solution to the social planner’s problem under
two scenarios. In the first, the planner, as in the Ivory Tower approach of the baseline case,
cannot appropriate public basic research returns. This is illustrated in Panel A. In the second, the planner can appropriate and use new basic inventions for production immediately.
This case is reported in Panel B. We will set the welfare to 100% in this case and report
the remaining welfare numbers relative to this baseline. Finally, recall that we are considering a planner who controls firm’s research labs but not their production decisions. The
following table summarizes these results.
TABLE 2.8: S OCIAL P LANNER ’ S O PTIMUM ( IN PERCENTAGES )
τaSP

τbe,SP

τbd,SP

LSP
p

LSP
b

LSP
u

LSP
e

LSP
a

α

g

β

31.1

1.80

98.7

35.8

1.93

100

A. N ON - APPROPRIATED P UBLIC R ESEARCH
19.1

5.1

0.2

82.9

5.6

0.5

3.7

7.3

B. A PPROPRIATED P UBLIC R ESEARCH
18.5

6.5

0.0

82.6

4.6

2.3

3.5

7.0

One striking feature of the solution to the social planner’s problem under both scenarios
is that the fraction of labor devoted to research activities is not substantially greater than in
the decentralized equilibrium. In particular, in Panel A the total labor allocated to research
activities was 14% in the decentralized economy, while it is only 17% when set by the
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social planner.
Indeed, the dominant misallocation here is not that between production and research,
as is common in this class of models, but among the various types of research activities, in
this case, applied and basic innovation. In the decentralized economy, only 1.05% of the
total labor force is devoted to basic research, whereas in the social planner’s economy, this
number rises to 6.1%. In other words, the social planner devotes 36% of research labor
to basic research, whereas this fraction was only 7% in the decentralized economy. This
happens on both the intensive and the extensive margins of basic research. In fact, the
planner finds it optimal to employ nearly all private research labs, regardless of their fixed
cost draw.
Another interesting and important finding is that in the case of applied innovation, there
is actually an overinvestment in the baseline economy. The applied research labor utilization (including entrants) is 13.6% in the decentralized case. This figure drops to 11% in
the social planner’s solution. This is in spite of the fact that the fraction of hot product
lines rises from 7% to 31%, meaning the average step size of an applied innovation rises
by almost a third.
The net result of the above changes is that growth rises to 1.8% from 1.34%. Overall,
the decentralized economy’s welfare corresponds to a decrease of 3.4%p 1  95.3{98.7q
in consumption-equivalent terms from the social planner’s optimum. The following policy
experiments will try to bridge this gap.
Panel B reports these numbers for the case of appropriated public research. The main
difference is the sizable increase in the labor devoted to public basic research, which rises
to 2.3% relative to 0.5% in both the decentralized economy and Panel A. When public basic
research turns into production immediately, this contributes to aggregate growth by an additional 0.13 percentage point and increases welfare by an additional 1.3 percentage points
in consumption equivalent terms. Policies such as the Bayh-Dole Act allow academic re110

searchers to appropriate their innovations through patenting. In our setting, this would
correspond to an increase in the rate of appropriation of innovation by public researchers.
We will consider this as a policy tool in Section 2.6.3.

2.6

Policy Analysis

In this section, we analyze the impact of different types of research subsidies. Given our
distinction between basic and applied research, it seems natural to propose different subsidy
policies for different types of research spending. However, this could potentially generate a
moral hazard problem, since firms would have an incentive to misreport the type of research
they undertake, which is very difficult for a policymaker to verify. However, it is still useful
to consider this hypothetical case to form a benchmark.
This section is organized as follows: Section 2.6.1 starts with this hypothetical case,
Section 2.6.2 considers a uniform research subsidy as in the real world, Section 2.6.3 considers only optimal funding of public research labs, and finally Section 2.6.4 combines both
uniform subsidy and public research funding using feasible policy tools.

2.6.1

Type-Dependent Research Subsidy

Assume first that the policymaker can distinguish between different types of research efforts and accordingly provide differentiated subsidy rates. Let ψa and ψb denote the applied
research and basic research subsidy rates, respectively. The share of GDP allocated to public research (R{Z) is kept constant by the policymaker. Note that an increase in the subsidy
rate (ψa or ψb q reduces research costs for the firm and leads to an increase in research effort
as a result. The following table reports the optimal subsidy rates and resulting equilibrium
variables.
Since the underinvestment is mainly in basic research, the optimal type-dependent sub111

TABLE 2.9: T YPE -D EPENDENT R ESEARCH S UBSIDY ( IN PERCENTAGES )
ψaT D

ψbT D

τaT D

τbe,T D

τbd,T D

LTp D

LTb D

LTu D

LTe D

LTa D

αT D

gT D

βT D

14

50

19.3

4.50

0.38

83.1

5.3

0.50

3.7

7.5

29.6

1.75

98.2

sidy dictates a much larger subsidy rate for it, namely, ψb

 50% and ψa  14%.

Here,

the major component of policy is a fivefold increase in the subsidy rate for basic research,
whereas the subsidy rate on applied innovation remains roughly the same.
The large value for the basic research subsidy is straightforward to understand. There
are spillovers associated with basic innovation that are not internalized by firms. By subsidizing this type of innovation, we can mitigate this effect. This policy can almost achieve
the level of welfare seen in the relevant social planner’s case in Panel A of Table 2.8 (98.2%
vs 98.7%).
As discussed above, this policy is hard to implement in the real world due to the moral
hazard problem. Therefore, we focus on a policy providing a uniform subsidy across the
economy.

2.6.2

Uniform Private Research Subsidy

With this policy, the government subsidizes a fraction ψ of each firm’s total research investment, keeping the share of funds allocated to academic research constant. Note that
such a policy subsidizes not only basic research but also applied research. The following
table summarizes the results of the optimal uniform subsidy rate.
TABLE 2.10: U NIFORM R ESEARCH S UBSIDY ( IN PERCENTAGES )
ψU P

τaU P

τbe,U P

τbd,U P

P
LU
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P
LU
b

P
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u

P
LU
e

P
LU
a

αU P

gU P

βU P

31

25.4

1.52

0.26

81.8

1.54

0.49

5.41

10.8

13.2

1.70

96.1

Our analysis of the baseline economy and the planner’s economy documented a slight
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underinvestment in research overall and a large misallocation between the different types
of research. A uniform subsidy is therefore ill suited to address these issues as it cannot
directly affect the allocation between research types, and any attempt to subsidize basic
research will only worsen the overinvestment in applied research. Although the optimal
type-dependent basic subsidy is 50%, the optimal uniform subsidy is only 31%, due to
cross-subsidization of applied research whose optimal level was 14%.
Under this policy, we are allocating a larger fraction of the labor force to research relative to the social planner’s economy. Overall, the researcher’s share goes up to 18% from
14%. As a result, we have too few workers devoted to production of the consumption
good (81.8%) relative to the social planner’s allocation (82.9%), which reduces the initial
consumption of the baseline economy. Even though we have more labor working for research, the economy grows at a lower rate (1.7%) than the social planner’s (1.8%). This
interesting result emerges due to the misallocation of researchers between basic and applied innovation. The welfare gain from this policy is 0.8 percentage points, which is only
28%p 0.8{2.9q as large as that for the type-dependent policy.
Although the underinvestment in basic research is sizable, the uniform policy partially
makes up for this at the cost of worsening the overinvestment in applied research. The main
lesson to be drawn from this is that a uniform research subsidy should take into account its
negative welfare consequences through its oversubsidization of applied research. Finding a
feasible method to differentiate basic and applied research is essential for better innovation
policies.

2.6.3

Optimal Academic Fraction of GDP

In this section we will look for the optimal public funding level for academic research as a
fraction of GDP pR{Z q keeping the baseline subsidies fixed. This is particularly important
because the rate of academic innovation is a major factor in determining the share of hot
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product lines, which determines the effectiveness of applied innovation.
TABLE 2.11: O PTIMAL ACADEMIC F UNDING ( IN PERCENTAGES )
ψ

R{Z

τa

τbe

τbd

Lp

Lb

Lu

Le

La

α

g

β

10

0.8

22.0

0.54

0.76

85.4

0.50

0.80

4.5

8.9

10.0

1.37

95.4

The results indicate that welfare can be improved by allocating a larger fraction of
GDP to academic research. In particular, when we consider only this as the policy tool,
the optimal funding rate is 0.8% of GDP. This figure is only 0.5% in France (and in the
benchmark case). Such a policy increases the fraction of hot product lines from 6.9% to
10%. However, this policy makes a limited contribution to growth and welfare due to the
Ivory Tower nature of academic research.
So far we have assumed that public innovations have no immediate effect on productivity in a particular product line. However, one can argue that policies such as the Bayh-Dole
Act, which was adopted in the US in 1980, enhance the applicability of academic innovations by allowing universities to retain ownership of inventions made using federal funds.
This is an interesting policy question, which we can analyze in our setting. We will study
this appropriability problem by considering a scenario where academic research is focused
on immediately applicable innovations half of the time (Panel A), and one where all innovations are immediately applicable (Panel B). In the latter extreme, academic research
functions much like private corporate research. It should be noted that academic research,
as we have all experienced, has a much wider set of objectives than purely generating consumer products (such as education, to say the least). Our analysis will abstract from those
considerations.
Table 12 summarizes the results of the optimal academic policy.
Under these alternative cases, the optimal level of academic funding is increasing in
the applicability of academic research. While the optimal fraction is 1.9% when half of the
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TABLE 2.12: ACADEMIC F UNDING
PERCENTAGES )

WITH

A LTERNATIVE BAYH -D OLE S CENARIOS ( IN

PANEL A: BAYH -D OLE =50%
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τbe
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τbd
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La

α
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1.9

4.4

8.7

16.4

1.49

96.3

PANEL B: BAYH -D OLE =100%

ψ

R{Z

τa

τbe

τbd

Lp

Lb

Lu

Le

La

α

g

β

10

3.7

20.8

3.4

0.01

83.7

0.24

3.7

4.1

8.2

22.7

1.69

98.1

innovations are immediately applicable, this number rises to 3.7% when all innovations are
immediately applicable.
These optimal allocations bring with them large welfare gains, between 2 and 3 percentage points. Some of this is simply due to the increase in the Bayh-Dole factor, while
the rest can be attributed to the optimal allocation of academic funding. The growth rate
rises as well, attaining levels seen in the social planner’s optimum in the last case.
Our results highlight the special role of academic research in overall growth and show
the complementarities present between public and private research. Allocating resources
to academic research has not only a direct effect on growth but also an indirect effect by
making private research more productive. However, one should also note that this particular
policy alone cannot make up for the underinvestment in research on the part of the private
sector. Therefore, the next policy experiment is of particular importance.

2.6.4

Optimal Feasible Policy: Uniform Subsidy and Academic
Budget

Our final policy experiment combines both of the feasible policies that have been considered thus far individually. We will allow both the uniform subsidy rate and the academic
funding rate to be chosen by the policymaker. The advantage of considering both types of
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policies is to introduce more freedom to control the incentives for both types of research in
a largely separate way. In particular, ψ and R{Z are going to be the choice variables in this
exercise. The following table contains the results of this experiment
TABLE 2.13: O PTIMAL ACADEMIC A ND U NIFORM P OLICY ( IN PERCENTAGES )
ψ

R{Z

τa

τbe

τbd

Lp

Lb

Lu

Le

La

α

g

β

31

0.7

25.4

1.5

0.6

81.6

1.5

0.7

5.4

10.8

15.5

1.72

96.1

When considered jointly, the optimal uniform R&D subsidy is 31% and the optimal
fraction of GDP allocated for public research is 0.7%. This combination generates a limited improvement, however. The growth rate increases 0.02 percentage points relative to
the optimal uniform policy of Table 2.10 and 0.35 percentage point relative to the optimal
public funding of Table 2.11. These improvements are mitigated by the limited applicability of the academic research. Next, we consider both uniform policy and academic funding
jointly under the scenario where academic innovations have immediate applications for
production.
TABLE 2.14: ACADEMIC A ND U NIFORM P OLICY
PERCENTAGES )

WITH

100% A PPLICABILITY ( IN

ψ

R{Z
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α

g

β
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3.3

23.5

3.8

0.0
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0.9

3.3

4.9

9.7

24.7
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98.3

When academic innovations are geared toward consumer needs (i.e., have immediate
application for production), the share of academic funding becomes much more effective.
In this case, the optimal fraction of GDP allocated for academic research is 3.3%. Under this policy, the growth rate increases to 1.92% and achieves the highest welfare result
among all policies considered. By using the level of academic funding to reach the proper
share of researchers, the policymaker is able to lower the uniform subsidy, thus reducing
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needless cross-subsidization of applied research. Under the current policy 19% of the labor
force is allocated to research, an increase over that of the baseline case. This time around,
the composition of workers between applied and basic research is closer to the social optimum.
To summarize our findings, we first considered the most widely discussed policy, which
is a uniform subsidy. Using this tool optimally yielded limited improvement in welfare due
to oversubsidization of applied research since the policy could not distinguish between the
research types with different spillover and productivity implications. Considering a policy
combination that governs both private and academic research in which the researchers can
appropriate the returns to their innovations could generate a significant improvement. The
first main conclusion to be drawn for innovation policy is the importance of recognizing
different types of innovations and the impact of policies on these types of research. The
second is that it is important to take into account both the direct and indirect effects of
academic research on productivity growth and the role of researchers’ appropriability of
their outcomes when considering growth and innovation policies.

2.7

Conclusion

In this paper, we distinguished between basic and applied research and identified spillovers
associated with each. Our quantitative analysis highlighted the importance of this distinction. Indeed, in the competitive equilibrium, applied research is overinvested and basic
research is underinvested. As a result, imposing a uniform research subsidy does not generate the expected welfare improvement due to inefficient cross-subsidization of applied
research. An increase in the uniform subsidy improves the underinvestment in basic research by worsening the overinvestment in applied research.
The key message of our paper is that standard R&D policies can accentuate the dynamic
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misallocation in the economy. Our findings point to the need for policies that target basic
research more directly. One method of achieving this is by increasing the intellectual property rights granted to academic researchers. Alternatively, one can reward collaboration
between universities and the private sector, which would encourage focusing on research
that can more directly lead to tangible gains in production technologies.
Our paper took a first step in trying to quantify the inefficiencies regarding different
types of research and innovation efforts. There are still important open questions awaiting
further study. In particular, the effect of university licensing and collaboration opportunities
between universities and the private sector are two examples. We hope further structural
work will be undertaken to enhance our understanding of the aforementioned issues, which
can then guide the relevant innovation policies.
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Chapter 3
Transition to Clean Technology
Joint work with Daron Acemoglu (MIT), Ufuk Akcigit (University of Pennsylvania and
NBER), and William Kerr (Harvard Business School)

3.1

Introduction

Recent economic research has recognized the importance of transition to clean technology
in controlling and reducing fossil fuel emissions and potentially limiting climate change.1
Recent empirical work has also shown that innovation may switch away from dirty to clean
1

On climate change, see, e.g., Stott, Peter, D.A. Stone, and M.R. Allen (2004) on the contribution of human activity to the European heatwave of 2003, Emanuel, Kerry (2005) and Landsea, Christopher (2005) on
the increased impact and destructiveness of tropical cyclones and Atlantic hurricanes over the last decades;
and Nicholls, Robert, and Jason Lowe (2006) on sea-level rise. On economic costs of climate change, see
Mendelsohn, Robert, William Nordhaus, and Daigee Shaw (1994), Pizer, William (1999), and Weitzman,
Martin (2009). On economic analyses of climate change, see, e.g., Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler, Per
Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2011), Hassler, John, and Per Krusell (2012), Krusell, Per, and Anthony Smith
(2009), MacCracken, Christopher, James Edmonds, Son Kim, and Ronald Sands (1999), Nordhaus, William
(1994), Nordhaus, William, and Joseph Boyer (2000), Nordhaus, William (2008), and Stern, Nicholas (2007).
On endogenous technology and climate change, see, Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hemous (2012), Bovenberg, Lans, and Sjak Smulders (1995), Bovenberg, Lans, and Sjak
Smulders (1996), Goulder, Lawrence, and Koshy Mathai (2000), Goulder, Lawrence, and Stephen Schneider
(1999), Grimaud, Andre, Gilles Lafforgue, and Bertrand Magné (2011), Hartley, Peter, Kenneth Medlock,
Ted Temzelides, and Xinya Zhang (2011), Hassler, John, Per Krusell, and Conny Olovsson (2011), Popp,
David (2002), Popp, David (2004), and Van der Zwaan, Robert, Reyer Gerlagh, G. Klaassen, and L. Schrattenholzer (2002).
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technologies in response to changes in prices and policies. For example, Newell, Richard,
Adam Jaffe, and Robert Stavins (1999) show that following the oil price hikes, innovation in air-conditioners turned towards producing more energy-efficient units compared to
the previous focus on price reduction; Popp, David (2002) finds that higher energy prices
are associated with a significant increase in energy-saving innovations; Hassler, John, Per
Krusell, and Conny Olovsson (2011) estimate a trend break in factor productivities in the
energy-saving direction following the era of higher oil prices; and Aghion, Philippe, Antoin
Dechezlepretre, David Hemous, Ralf Martin, and John Van Reenen (2012) find a significant impact of carbon taxes on the direction of innovation in the automobile industry and
further provide evidence that clean innovation has a self-perpetuating nature feeding on its
own past success. Based on this type of evidence, Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion,
Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hemous (2012) suggest that a combination of (temporary)
research subsidies and carbon taxes can successfully redirect technological change towards
cleaner technologies. Several conceptual and quantitative questions remain, however. The
first is whether, in the context of a micro-founded quantitative model, reasonable policies
can secure a transition to clean technology. The second is whether, in the presence of carbon taxes, there is still any role for significant research subsidies. The third concerns how
rapidly the transition to clean technology should take place under optimal policy.
A systematic investigation of these questions necessitates a micro model of innovation and production where clean and dirty technologies can compete given the prevailing
policies and research incentives (and the direction of technological change) are also endogenously determined as a function of these policies.2 It also necessitates a combination
of micro data for the modeling of competition in production and innovation, and a quantitative model flexible enough to represent realistic dynamics of carbon emissions and potential
2

Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hemous (2012) assume that clean
and dirty inputs are combined with a constant elasticity of substitution, which allows for limited form of
competition between clean and dirty technologies.
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climate change. This paper is an attempt in this direction.
Our first contribution is to develop a tractable and parsimonious microeconomic model
for this purpose. In our model, which we view as an abstract representation of the energy
production and delivery sectors, each one of a continuum of intermediate goods can be
produced either using a dirty or clean technology, each of which has a knowledge stock
represented by a (separate) quality ladder. Given production taxes (which are differential
by type of technology), profit-maximizing final good producers choose which technology
to utilize. Profit-maximizing firms also decide whether to conduct research to improve
clean or dirty technologies. Clean research, for example, leads to an improvement over
an existing clean technology, though there is also a small probability of a breakthrough
which will build on and surpass the dirty technology when the dirty technology is the
frontier in the relevant product line. Research and innovation decisions are impacted both
by policies and the current state of technology in the two sectors. For example, when clean
technology is far behind, most research directed to that sector will generate incremental
innovations that cannot be profitably produced (unless there are very high levels of carbon
taxes). However, if clean research can be successfully maintained for a while, it slowly
becomes self-sustaining as the range of clean technologies that can compete with dirty
ones expands as a result of a series of incremental innovations.
Our second contribution is to estimate parameters of this model using microdata on
R&D expenditures, patents, sales, employment and firm entry and exit from a sample of US
firms in the energy sector. The data we use for this exercise are from the Census Bureau’s
Longitudinal Business Database and Economic Censuses, the National Science Foundation’s Survey of Industrial Research and Development, and the NBER Patent Database.
We design our sample around innovative firms in the energy sector that are in operation
during the 1975-2004 period. We use our sample to directly estimate some key parameters
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of the model and the initial distributions of dirty- and clean-energy product lines.3 In particular, we estimate two of the key parameters of the model with regression analysis using
R&D and patents. We also estimate the initial distribution of productivity gaps between
clean and dirty technologies in the economy by allocating the patent stocks of firms innovating in these technology areas across the three-digit industries in which the firms are
operating. The remaining four crucial parameters are estimated using simulated method of
moments (we impose the discount rate and the fraction of scientists in the labor force from
the data rather than estimating these from the model). We show that, despite its parsimony,
the fit of the model to a rich and diverse set of moments not targeted in the estimation is
fairly good.
We then combine this structure with a parsimonious model of the carbon cycle. Our
modeling of the carbon cycle follows Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh
Tsyvinski (2011) and is fairly flexible despite its simplicity. Our final contribution is to use
this estimated quantitative model for the analysis of optimal policy, in particular optimal
carbon taxes and research subsidies,4 and a range of counterfactual policy experiments.
Our main results are as follows. Though it is intuitive to expect that carbon taxes should
do most of the work in the optimal allocation—because they both reduce current emissions
and encourage R&D directed to clean technologies—quantitatively we find a major role for
research subsidies. For example, with an annual discount rate of 1% (similar to the number
favored by Nordhaus, William (2007)) and focusing on constant policies, the optimal research subsidy is 61% (meaning that the government pays for 61 cents out of every dollar
of R&D expenditure for clean technology) while the carbon tax is 16%. The numbers are
more extreme with a discount rate of 0.1% for the social planner (similar to the number
favored by Stern, Nicholas (2007)) but with a similarly major role for research subsidies: a
3

See Popp, David (2006) and Jaffe, Adam, David Popp, and Richard Newell (2010) for background on
technology, R&D and innovation in the energy sector.
4
We do not allow additional tax instruments to remove the monopoly distortions in the economy.
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research subsidy of 95% and a carbon tax of 44%. When we allow time-varying policies,
the overall pattern is broadly similar and still heavily relies on research subsidies, but with
some notable differences: first, the research subsidy is initially slightly more aggressive
and then declines somewhat over time; second, with a discount rate of 1%, carbon taxes
are backloaded (low, in fact zero, for an extended period of time and then high); and third,
with a discount rate of 0.1%, carbon taxes are frontloaded (starting out higher and declining
over time).5 Despite the differences between the models, the reason for the major role for
research subsidies is related to the one emphasized in Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion,
Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hemous (2012).

6

Research subsidies are powerful in redi-

recting technological change, and given this, it is not worth distorting the initial production
too much by introducing heavy carbon taxes. It is important to emphasize that research
subsidies are not being used just because there is a market failure (and an uninternalized
externality) in research. In fact, in our model, in the absence of externalities from carbon,
or in the special case in which there is only a dirty or a clean sector, the social planner
would have no reason to use research subsidies—because a scarce factor, skilled labor, is
being used for research and no other purpose, and thus the social planner cannot increase
the growth rate by subsidizing research. The reason why the social planner heavily uses research subsidies is because when carbon creates negative externalities, inducing a transition
to clean technology is an effective way of reducing future carbon emissions by changing
5

Our time-varying optimal policy results need to be interpreted with caution, since the resulting optimal
policy sequence is not time consistent.
6
Major differences between the models include: (1) here the damage from atmospheric carbon is modeled
as impacting production along the lines of previous literature rather than directly utility; (2) here there is no
“environmental disaster” threshold, making it possible for us to calibrate the parameters more closely to data
and without taking a position on carbon emissions in the rest of the world; (3) in contrast to the constant
elasticity of substitution formulation, dirty and clean sectors are not complements in our model, but explicitly
compete in each product line. This last one is the most important distinction, enabling us to use microdata
on innovation and production. It also implies a different pattern of production distortions from carbon taxes.
In Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hemous (2012), carbon taxes are
particularly distortionary when the dirty sector is behind (and thus its relative prices high because of the
imperfect substitutability). In contrast, in our model the carbon tax is least distortionary when the clean
technology has already taken over or is about to take over almost all product lines.
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the path of technological progress.
Another useful comparison is to current US policies. We estimate the effective research
subsidy from the differential between clean and dirty firms in our sample in the use of
federally funded R&D expenditure. Utilizing this estimate and different values of effective
carbon tax at the moment and its likely values in the future, our estimated optimal policies
are quite different from their US counterparts, and we show that under US policies, climate
change dynamics will be significantly different (and worse).
In terms of counterfactual policies, we investigate the welfare costs of just relying on
carbon taxes and delaying intervention. The most notable result here is that the welfare
costs of delaying the optimal policy by 50 years (laissez faire) is very significant. With
a discount rate of 1%, delaying optimal policy by 50 years has a welfare cost equivalent
to a permanent 8% drop in consumption. With a discount rate of 0.1%, the consumptionequivalent welfare cost is 16.6%. The costs of relying just on carbon tax (without any
research subsidy) are more modest but still significant, 4.2% and 3.4%, with the same two
discount rates, respectively.
We also consider several variations and robustness checks to show which aspects of
the model are important for our main theoretical and quantitative results. In particular,
we investigate the implications of using different discount rates and estimates of the damage of carbon concentration on economic activity, allowing different degrees of distortions
from research subsidies, different estimates of the microeconomic elasticities in the R&D
technology, and different distributions of productivity gaps between clean and dirty technologies. Overall, most of the main qualitative and quantitative features of optimal policy
appear to be fairly robust to a range of plausible variations.
Our model combines elements from four different lines of research (and is thus related
to each of these four lines). First, we build on the growing literature on quantitative general equilibrium models of climate change, such as Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler, Per
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Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2011), Hassler, John, and Per Krusell (2012), Krusell, Per,
and Anthony Smith (2009), Nordhaus, William (1994), Nordhaus, William, and Joseph
Boyer (2000), Nordhaus, William (2008), and Stern, Nicholas (2007). We follow these
papers in introducing a simple model of the carbon cycle and the economic costs of carbon
emissions in a general equilibrium model, and then characterizing optimal policy. Second,
we introduce endogenous and directed technological change along the lines of Acemoglu,
Daron (1998) and Acemoglu, Daron (2002) in a model where producers have a choice between clean and dirty production methods. In combining these two first lines of research,
we are following Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hemous (2012) as well as several other papers listed in footnote 1 above. Third, we develop
a tractable but rich model of competition between dirty and clean technologies building
on the literature on step-by-step competition as in Harris, Christopher, and John Vickers
(1995), Aghion, Philippe, Christopher Harris, Peter Howitt, and John Vickers (2001), and
Acemoglu, Daron and Ufuk Akcigit (2012). Fourth, we model the microeconomics of innovation, employment and output dynamics building on Klette and Kortum (2004), where
each firm consists of a number of products and technologies (different from other applications, technologies here are different from products because of the competition between
clean and dirty sectors).
In estimating a general equilibrium model of firm-level innovation and employment dynamics, we follow Lentz and Mortensen (2008) and Acemoglu, Daron, Ufuk Akcigit, Nick
Bloom, and William Kerr (2012). We differ from existing work in this area in three important respects, however. First, we combine this type of estimation strategy with a model
of clean and dirty technologies and estimate some of the parameters of the R&D technology directly from microdata. Second, rather than focusing on steady-state comparisons, we
study non-steady-state dynamics, which is crucial for the question of transitioning to clean
technology. Third, we characterize optimal policies in such a framework.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces our model
and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3.3 describes the dataset we will use for estimation and quantitative evaluation, outlines the different components of our estimation
strategy, and presents the estimates of some of the parameters we obtain from our micro
data. Section 3.4 presents the simulated method of moments estimates of our parameters
and discusses the fit of the model. Section 3.5 quantitatively characterizes the structure of
optimal environmental policy. In this section, we also conduct a range of counterfactual
exercises. Section 3.6 discusses a range of robustness exercises intended to convey which
sorts of assumptions and parameters are important for the qualitative and quantitative results of the paper. Section 3.7 concludes.

3.2

Model

In this section, we present our baseline model. This is a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, where final output combines intermediates produced either using a clean or
dirty technology. The productivity of the dirty and clean technology for each intermediate
is represented by a quality ladder. Production is also subject to taxes, so profit-maximizing
final good producers choose whether to use clean or dirty intermediates as a function of
the productivity gap between the two and taxes. Research is directed towards clean or dirty
technology, and progresses both with incremental research increasing productivity by one
rung on the quality ladder and with occasional breakthrough research which enables the
firm to surpass the current frontier technology. Research is conducted both by entrants and
incumbent firms which already hold a portfolio of products and technologies. Finally, dirty
technology contributes to carbon emissions, which create potential economic damage. We
next describe each module of the model in turn.
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3.2.1

Preferences and Endowments

We model an infinite-horizon closed economy in continuous time. Since the consumer side
is not our focus, we simplify the discussion by modeling it with a representative household
with a logarithmic instantaneous utility function. The lifetime utility is then

U0



»8

eρt ln Ct dt,

(3.1)

0

where Ct is the household’s consumption at time t and ρ

¡

0 is the discount rate. We

assume that the representative household consists of mass one of production workers and
mass Ls of “scientists” who will be employed in R&D activities. All workers supply one
unit of labor inelastically. The representative household owns all the firms in the economy,
so its problem will be to maximize Equation 3.1 subject to the following budget constraint

wtu

wts Ls

Πt

¥ Ct ,

and the usual no Ponzi-game condition. Here Πt is the total sum of corporate profits net of
R&D expenses, wtu and wts are the wage rates (and thus wage incomes) of the production
and R&D workers.
Since the economy is closed, there is no physical capital, and intermediates and the
R&D sector use labor, aggregate consumption is equal to the production of the final good:

Ct

3.2.2

 Yt .

Final Good Technology, Intermediate Production and Pricing

The final good is produced by combining a measure one of intermediates with an elasticity
of substitution equal to one. In addition, its production is negatively affected by the amount
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of atmospheric carbon concentration, which we denote by St . We follow the formulation
suggested by Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2011),
which builds on earlier work by Mendelsohn, Robert, William Nordhaus, and Daigee Shaw
(1994), Nordhaus, William (1994), and Nordhaus, William (2008), and assume

ln Yt

 γ

St  S̄



»1

ln yi,t di,

(3.2)

0

¡ 0 is the pre-industrial level of the atmospheric carbon concentration, γ ¥ 0 is
a scale parameter, and yi,t is the quantity of intermediate good i. When γ  0, Equation
where S̄

3.2 gives the standard (unitary elasticity of substitution) production function for combining
intermediates to produce a final good. When γ

¡ 0, levels of atmospheric carbon con-

centration above the pre-industrial level reduce productivity with elasticity γ, for reasons
discussed in Mendelsohn, Robert, William Nordhaus, and Daigee Shaw (1994), Nordhaus,
William (1994), Nordhaus, William (2008), and Stern, Nicholas (2007).
A feature of Equation 3.2, which will play a central role in our quantitative exercise, is
worth noting: the proportional cost of a unit increase in atmospheric carbon concentration is
independent of its current level. Though nonlinearities, or even major threshold effects, are
likely to be present in the impact of atmospheric concentration on economic activity, this
functional form is not only in line with assumptions made by other economic approaches
to climate change (e.g., Nordhaus, William (1994), Nordhaus, William (2007), Nordhaus,
William, and Joseph Boyer (2000), Stern, Nicholas (2007), Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler,
Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2011), but also enables us to study the implications of
carbon emissions from our economy, with parameters estimated from the US and calibrated
to US aggregates, without taking a position on the path of carbon emissions on the rest
of the world. Without this assumption, the marginal cost of carbon emissions, and thus
optimal policy, would strongly depend on assumptions on the evolution of emissions from
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other countries.
Each intermediate i

P r0, 1s can be produced with either a dirty or a clean technology,

d
c
). We
(yi,t
and when it is produced with the clean (dirty) technology we denote it by yi,t

will sometimes refer to clean and dirty technologies as clean and dirty “sectors,” and we
also use the terms “intermediaries” and “product lines” interchangeably.
Firm f can produce intermediate i with either a clean or dirty technology (j

P tc, du)

 qi,tj pf q li,tj pf q, where li,tj pf q is the emj
pf q is the labor productivity of the
ployment of (production workers) by this firm and qi,t

j
pf q
with the following production function yi,t

technology that this firm has access to for producing with clean or dirty technology j in
product line i. In equilibrium, only firms with the highest technology either in the clean or
dirty sector will produce, so we simplify this equation by suppressing firm indices and with
the implicit convention that the labor productivity q always refers to the most advanced
clean or dirty technology, thus writing:

j
yi,t

 qi,tj li,tj .

Though only firms with the most advanced technology for intermediate i within the
clean or dirty sector can ever produce it, because of taxes it is not necessarily the most
advanced technology between these two sectors that will always be active. In particular,
there is a tax at the rate τtj on sector (technology) j at time t, which implies that the marginal
cost of production is

j
M Ci,t



1



τtj wtu
j
qi,t

, j

P tc, du and i P r0, 1s ,

where wtu is the wage rate of production workers. We define tax-adjusted labor productivity
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as
j
qri,t



j
qi,t

τtj

1

.

In equilibrium, only the technology with the lower marginal cost (inclusive of taxes)—or
equivalently the one with the higher tax-adjusted labor productivity—will produce. Summarizing this, we have

j
produce intermediate i with technology j if qri,t

¡ qri,tj where j  j P tc, du .

We assume that if clean and dirty technologies have equal tax-adjusted labor productivities, each produces with probability 50% at any point in time.7 Thus, the tax-adjusted
technology level use in the production of intermediate i at time t can be written as

q̄i,t

$
'
& qrd
i,t

'

c
% qri,t

d
if qri,t

¥ qri,tc

.

otherwise

 0, for each leading technology of
j
j
quality qi,0
, there also exists an intermediate good of quality qi,0
{λ, which ensures that
Finally, we also assume that at the initial date t

markups in the initial date will not exceed λ (this will be guaranteed endogenously in
subsequent dates).

3.2.3

Innovation, the Quality Ladder and Dynamics

Labor productivity for each intermediate (for each technology) evolves as a result of innovation. Research is directed towards clean or dirty technologies. A successful innovation
leads to one of two types of innovation. The first is an incremental innovation, which takes
7

In other models of this type, e.g., Acemoglu, Daron and Ufuk Akcigit (2012), which of two firms produces is immaterial. But here, since one of them uses the dirty technology and thus will contribute to carbon
emissions, we need to specify exactly who produces in this case.
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place with probability 1  α; and the second is a breakthrough innovation, which takes
place with probability α (independently of all other events).
If research directed to sector j

P tc, du leads to an incremental innovation, then the

innovator improves over the sector j technology of a randomly chosen intermediate. This
is incremental innovation in the sense that it enables the innovator to go up by one rung in
the quality ladder over producing technology, and we assume that each rung corresponds to
an improvement of λ ¡ 1. Consequently, labor productivity of technology j in intermediate
i at time t can be written as
j
qi,t

where nji,t

PZ

 λn

j
i,t

,

is the effective number of steps that this technology has taken since time

j
t  0 (when all technologies are, by assumption, normalized to qi,0

 1).

Relative productivity of dirty to clean technology in intermediate i at time t can be
written as
d
qi,t
c
qi,t

 λn

i,t

where
ni,t

 ndi,t  nci,t P Z

is defined as the technology gap between dirty and clean sectors in product line i at time t.
In what follows we will need to keep track of the share of intermediates with technology
gap n P Z, and we denote this by µn,t

P r0, 1s at time t.

Breakthrough innovations, on the other hand, enable the successful innovator to improve by one rung over the frontier technology, even if this frontier is set by the alternative
technology—i.e., a breakthrough clean innovation will improve over the dirty technology
even if the latter is far ahead of the clean sector, thus allowing the clean sector to leapfrog
the dirty one.
Therefore, conditional on an innovation in technology j for intermediate i between
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times t and t

j
qi,t

j
∆t, the evolution of qi,t
can be written as

$
'
j
'
λqi,t
'
'
&

∆t

'

j
λqi,t

'
'
'
% λq j
i,t

j
if qi,t

1

with probability

with probability 1  α
α

with probability

¥ qi,tj

(incremental)

j
if qi,t

j
qi,t

(incremental)

j
if qi,t

j
qi,t

(breakthrough)

.

Let ztj denote the aggregate innovation rate which is the sum of incumbents’ and entrants’ innovation rates in technology j. The law of motion for the technology gap ni,t can
then be expressed as follows:
$
'
'
ni,t 1
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
ni,t 1
'
'
'
'
'
'
1
'
'
&



ni,t

∆t

'


ni,t  1

'
'
'
'
1
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
ni,t 1
'
'
'
'
'
% n
i,t

with probability

p1  αq ztc∆t
p1  αq ztd∆t

with probability

αztc ∆t

with probability

αztc ∆t

with probability

αztd ∆t

with probability

αztd ∆t

with probability

@ni,t
@ni,t
if ni,t ¡ 0
if ni,t ¤ 0
if ni,t ¤ 0
if ni,t ¡ 0

otherwise

Note that innovations here have a creative destruction element (e.g., Aghion, Philippe,
and Peter Howitt (1992), Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman (1991)) because, by
improving over an existing product typically operated by another firm, they transfer the
leading-edge technology to the current innovator.
In what follows, for notational and computational tractability, we assume that the gross
tax rates are multiples of λ such that 1

τtj

 λm . Since taxes are chosen by the social
j
t

planner, especially when λ is not too large, this is without much loss of generality. Given
this assumption, we can write
1
1

τtd
τtc

 λm ,
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t

where
mt

 mdt  mct,

and thus tax-adjusted technologies can be written as
d
qri,t
c
qri,t

1

d
qi,t
1 τtc
τtd qitc

 λn

i,t

m t .

We will say that dirty is the leading (tax-adjusted) technology if ni,t
nologies are neck and neck if ni,t

3.2.4

¡ mt; the two tech-

 mt; and clean is the leading technology otherwise.

Firms, R&D and Free Entry

Following ?, we define a firm as a collection of leading-edge technologies. Let ujf denote
the number of intermediates where firm f has the leading-edge technologies in sector j

P

tc, du (but these are not necessarily more advanced than the technologies available in the
other sector j). Again following ?, we assume that ujf captures the stock of knowledge
of the firm for further innovations with technology j P tc, du. In particular, we assume
that firms combine their knowledge stock ujf with scientists (R&D workers) H j in order to
generate a Poisson flow rate of X j new innovations (in continuous time) according to the
following production function

Xj

where η

θ

Hj

η

uj

1η

,

P p0, 1q is the R&D elasticity with respect to scientists and θ ¡

(3.3)

0 is a scale

1
1
parameter. Thus the variable cost of generating a flow rate of X j is simply wts u pxj q η θ η

where xj

 X j {uj is the innovation intensity per product line and wts is the wage rate of

scientists. In addition, R&D activities also require each firm to hire a number of scientists
per product line (as fixed cost). We assume that, per product line, firm f will need to hire
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P rp1  ξ q FI , p1 ξ q FI s is an iid (across firms and over time)
draw with mean FI and ξ P p0, 1q.8 Hence, the total cost of R&D for firm i performing
R&D directed at technology j P tc, du at time t is
FI,i u scientists where FI,i,t

Ct u, xj

where hj






wts u hj
wts u



FI,i,t

xj

1
η



θ η

1

FI,i,t ,

 H j {u is the average scientists hired per product line and the cost function is

indexed by time because of the wage rate of scientists.
Entrants can also undertake R&D directed to either sector. We assume that to do this
they need to hire FE

¥ FI scientists, and this will lead to a flow rate of innovation equal to

one. We denote the endogenously determined mass of entrants performing R&D directed
to technology j at time t by Etj .
On the policy side, incumbents performing R&D for sector j receive a proportional

P r0, 1s, and entrants performing R&D for sector j
receive a subsidy at the rate sjE,t P r0, 1s.

government subsidy at the rate sjI,t

3.2.5

The Carbon Cycle

c
d
While clean intermediate production yi,t
creates no carbon emission, dirty production yi,t

emits κ units of carbon per intermediate output. This implies that total amount of carbon
emission at time t is
Kt

κ

»1
d
yi,t
di.

(3.4)

0

8

This heterogeneity in fixed costs is necessary to make the dynamics (computationally) well behaved.
Because of “creative destruction” in these types of models, equilibrium path in which some types of firms
stop doing R&D (as clean firms will do without policy and dirty firms under our optimal policy), there
will be a discontinuous behavior shortly before this point because creative destruction is expected to cease.
Heterogeneity in fixed costs smooths this transition.
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We follow Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2011) in
assuming that the atmospheric carbon concentration St is determined as follows

St



» tT
0

p1  dl q Ktl dl,

(3.5)

where t  T is the first date when emission started and
dl



 p1  ϕP q 1  ϕ0eϕl



P
p0, 1q is the share of emission that remains permanently in the atmosphere, p1  ϕP q ϕ0 P
p0, 1q is the fraction of the transitory component that remains in the first period, and
ϕ P p0, 1q is the rate of decay of carbon concentration over time. As explained in Golosov,
is the amount of carbon emitted l years ago still left in the atmosphere. In addition, ϕP

Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2011), this is a flexible specification that approximates the more complex dynamics of carbon concentration in the atmosphere used by Nordhaus, William (2008). Though considerably simpler, this specification
fairly closely approximates the observed dynamics of atmospheric carbon concentration as
we show below.

3.2.6

Equilibrium

In this section, we characterize certain properties of the equilibrium path of this economy.

 0 is characterized by a distribution of technology gaps between clean and dirty sectors µn,0 for n P Z, and the equilibrium path will be defined for
The economy at time t

a given sequence of taxes and subsidies. Then a dynamic equilibrium path is a sequence
of intermediate outputs, prices, innovation rates by incumbents and entrants, skilled and
unskilled wages, measures of entrants, growth rate of aggregate output, interest rate, and
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8



j
atmospheric concentration, i.e., yi,t
, pji,t , xjI,t , xjE,t , wts , wtu , Etj , rt , St t0 , such that, given

sequences of policies, all firms maximize profits, skilled and unskilled labor markets clear,
free entry conditions hold (with complementary slackness), consumers optimize dynamically, and atmospheric carbon evolves according to the carbon cycle model presented above
(i.e., Equation 3.5). To determine this dynamic time path we also have to keep track of the
distribution of sectors by technology gaps, tµn,t u8
n8 .

3.2.7

Prices and Profits

Given the aggregate production function in Equation 3.2, which implies unit elastic demand
for intermediates, the demand for intermediates at time t is

yi,t

r

 pYt , @i P r0, 1s ,

(3.6)

i,t

where Yrt

 Yt exp

γ St  S̄



is net aggregate output (net of environmental damage).

We now characterize equilibrium prices. As explained in the previous section, if the
j
leading technology for intermediate i at time t is qi,t
, another firm will have access to techj
nology qi,t
{λ for free. This clearly also applies to tax adjusted labor productivity, which is
j
what is relevant for production decisions: when the leading technology is qri,t
, there is alj
ways a follower with technology with qri,t
{λ. Thus, equilibrium markups can never exceed

λ. However, in equilibrium, there may not be any markup in some of the intermediates because of the competition between clean and dirty technologies. In particular, intermediate

P tc, du only if there qri,tj ¤ qri,tj . If qri,tj qri,tj , the
j  qrj , there will be zero markup. Therefore:
equilibrium markup will be λ, and if qri,t
i,t

i will be produced using technology j

pji,t

$
'
&

'
%

wtu
j
qri,t

if

λwtu
j
qri,t

if
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 qri,tj
j
qri,t
¡ qri,tj
j
qri,t

.

(3.7)

Now, combining Equation 3.6 and Equation 3.7, the output of intermediate i as a function
of tax-adjusted labor productivities output can be written as

j
yi,t

$
'
&

'
%

j
Yr qri,t
u
wt

j
Yr qri,t
λwtu

if
if

 qri,td
j
qri,t
¡ qri,tj
c
qri,t

.

(3.8)

Then, the equilibrium profits (gross of R&D expenditures), as a function of m and n, can
be expressed follows

 Yrt λλ 1
c
 0
πn,t
c
πn,t
 0

c
πn,t

3.2.8

 0
d
 Yrt λλ 1
πn,t
d
πn,t
 0
d
πn,t

if

n

m

if

n¡m .

if

nm

(3.9)

Innovation Incentives

We now characterize innovation incentives, which are the only forward-looking part of firm
behavior in our model. To simplify the exposition, we first assume that firms are myopic
and maximize instantaneous (one-step ahead profits) rather than discounted sum of profits.
This enables us to provide analytical expressions for R&D decisions, clarifying the basic
economic forces. We will then turn to forward-looking maximization by firms and show
that exactly the same expressions and intuitions apply, with the only exception that one
term will then be replaced by a solution to a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
rather than being explicitly given as in this subsection.
Not every successful innovation leads to profitable production for two reasons. First,
the innovation might be in technology j which is behind technology j, and thus may still
not be active even after the improvement in labor productivity. Second, even if it leads to
production, this might happen at zero markup if the tax-adjusted labor productivities are the
same with the two technologies. Clearly, innovation incentives will be determined by the
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probability of generating positive profits following innovation. We denote this probability
for innovation directed at sector j by Γjt
Γdt

P r0, 1s. For dirty sector, this is


¸

 p1  αq n¥m µn,t α Ipm¤0q

¸
¸
 n¥m µn,t α 1  n¥m µnt

Ipm¡0q

¸

¥ µn,t

n m

Ipm¤0q ,

where Ipm¤0q is the indicator function for the event m ¤ 0.
The interpretation of this expression is as follows: If the innovation is incremental
(which, conditional on successful innovation, has probability 1  α), then it will only be
profitable if it builds on an intermediate technology where the dirty sector is ahead or neck
and neck with the clean sector which, given uniform random draws from the set of all
intermediates, has probability

°

¥ µn,t . Alternatively, with probability α, the innovating

n m

firm will necessarily be at least one step ahead of the competing technology (either the
dirty sector is ahead or with the breakthrough technology, it leapfrogs the clean sector).
However, in this case, it may leapfrog the clean technology but still not compete with it
on the basis of tax-adjusted productivity because of the higher tax on dirty production (i.e.,
because of a “carbon tax”). In particular, if m

¤ 0 (so that Ipm¤0q  1), then there is no

carbon tax (if anything there might be a carbon subsidy), then it will certainly be at least
one step ahead of the clean technology and will be able to charge a markup. If, on the
other hand, m ¡ 0, then the innovation will be profitable only for intermediates where the
technology gap is already sufficiently large for the dirty sector to have higher tax-adjusted
technology, which is in the sectors with n ¥ m.
A similar reasoning leads to a probability of positive profit following clean innovation
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of

Γct



¸

 p1  αq n¤m µn,t α Ipm¥0q

¸
¸
 n¤m µn,t α 1  n¤m µn,t

Ipm 0q

¸

¤ µn,t

n m

Ipm¥0q .

(3.10)

Let us denote the expected value of a successful innovation in technology j by v̄tj . Since
in this subsection we are assuming myopic behavior on the sides of firms, this is equal to
the expected immediate (rather than discounted) profits from a successful innovation given
by

 Γt pλ λ 1q Yt .
r

j

v̄tj

(3.11)

Then, dropping the firm subscript i (in FI,i,t ), the maximization problem of a firm with the
leading-edge technology in uj intermediates in sector j
!

max

¥

j
XI,t
0

j j
XI,t
v̄t

 1

sjI,t



wts



H

P tc, du can be written as:

j
XI,t
, uj



)

j

IpX j ¡0q u FI,t
t

,

(3.12)



j
where H XI,t
, uj denotes the number of scientist hired by a firm that has uj product
j
lines and innovates at the rate XI,t
. In this expression, the indicator function allows us to

turn off the fixed costs of R&D when the firm chooses not to perform any R&D activities.
Dividing this objective function by uj , the maximization problem of a firm “per leadingedge technology” (i.e., Equation 3.12 divided by the number of products in which the firm
has the leading-edge technology in sector j) is
!

max
xjI,t v̄tj
j

¥

xI,t 0

where h xjI,t
xjI,t





H

j
XI,t
, uj



 1  sjI,t





wts h xjI,t



)

Ipxj ¡0q FI,t
I,t

.

(3.13)

{uj is defined as the average number of scientists hired and

j
XI,t
{uj is the average innovation intensity. Using the R&D production function
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defined in Equation 3.3, equilibrium innovation rate for j

xjI,t

 Ipx


j
I,t

¡0q

P tc, du can be expressed as

1
v̄tj ηθ η

sjI,t wts

1

η
1 η



.

(3.14)

A number of important conclusions follow from Equation 3.14:
1. Higher net output, higher markups and lower scientist wages increase research effort
as should be expected.
2. Subsidies to research increase research effort. This will be important in encouraging
clean innovation by means of research subsidies.
3. Through the Γjt ’s, carbon taxes increase clean research effort (and reduce dirty research effort). This can be seen by considering higher values of m in Equation 3.10,
which given the distribution of technology gaps, increases Γct , because production
shifts from dirty to clean technologies (and neck-and-neck sectors shift to positive
markups for clean technologies). This shows that just carbon taxes may be sufficient
to encourage clean innovation and thus a transition to clean technology. Whether
they will in fact be sufficient is an empirical and quantitative question we will try to
address below.
4. Again through the Γjt ’s, we can also see the path-dependent nature of innovation.
When there are large technology gaps between dirty and clean,

°

¤ µn,t will be

n m

very small, and thus Γct will be small (and Γdt will be high), discouraging clean innovation and encouraging dirty innovation. But if clean innovation can be maintained
for a while, then

°

c
d
¤ µnt will increase, and so will Γt (while Γt declines). Thus

n m

clean innovation will naturally self-reinforce over time. To the extent that
changes only slowly, this will also be a slow process.
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°

¤ µn,t

n m

3.2.9

Free Entry and Labor Market Clearing

The previous subsection characterized the R&D decisions of the incumbents (as a function
of the state of the economy and policies). The other component of R&D, creating demand
for scientists, is from entrants. With a similar reasoning to the profitability of the R&D of
incumbents, the free entry condition for entrants for technology j

max
xjE,t v̄tj
j

¥

xE,t 0

 1  sjE,t

with this condition holding as equality if Etj

xjE,t

 Ipx


j
E,t

¡0q





wts h xjE,t



FE

P tc, du can be written as

(

¤ 0,

(3.15)

¡ 0. Hence, the innovation rate by entrants is
η
1 η



1

v̄tj ηθ η

1  sjE,t wts

for j

P tc, du .

(3.16)

Inspection of Equation 3.15 establishes that at time t, there can be positive entry into
technology j only if the “policy-adjusted” value of innovation is higher in sector j than
in sector

j.

v̄tc { 1  scE,t



In other words, entrants will direct their R&D to the clean technology if

¡ v̄td{ 1  sdE,t



and to the dirty technology if the reverse inequality holds.

We also adopt the tiebreaking rule that if v̄tc { 1  scE,t



 v̄td{ 1  sdE,t



, then half of the

entrants will direct R&D to each sector. Therefore, denoting the total number (measure) of
entrants at time t by Et , we have that the number of entrants with technology directed to
sector j is given by

Etj

$
'
'
Et
'
'
&

'

0

if

'
'
'
% Et 2 if

{





¡ v̄tj { 1  sE,tj


j
v̄tj { 1  s
v̄tj { 1  sjE,t
E,t


j
j

j
j
v̄t { 1  sE,t  v̄t { 1  s
E,t

if v̄tj { 1  sjE,t

.

A comparison of Equation 3.14 and Equation 3.16 shows, conditional on entry an entrant’s
innovation rate (directed to sector j

P tc, du) will only be different from an incumbent’s in
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Equation 3.14 because of differential subsidies.
It is also useful to inspect the R&D to sales relationship implied by our model. Suppose

P tc, du . Conditional on
investing in R&D, xjI,t ¡ 0, the equilibrium R&D to sales ratio (for j P tc, du) would be:
that free entry condition holds for entry directed at technology k

j
R&Di,t
Salesji,t

 ηη p1  ηq1η λ λ 1 1  sk



p1ηq 

Γkt

θFE

E,t

Γjt
Γkt

1

1



skE,t

sjI,t





1
1 η

η

1η

FI,i,t  .

FE

Note that higher profitability of R&D in the sector for which the free entry condition holds
increases the R&D to sales ratio of that sector, but may reduce it in the other sector. The
impact of fixed cost requirements of incumbents on R&D to sales ratio result is positive.
However, the impact of the fixed cost of entry is ambiguous. On the one hand, it reduces the
equilibrium wage, and thus R&D expenditure. On the other, it increases labor requirements,
increasing R&D expenditures. The interplay of these two forces makes R&D to sales ratio
non-monotonic in the fixed cost for entrance. These different impacts of the fixed cost for
incumbents and entrants will enable us to identify both parameters in the estimation.
The labor market clearing condition for scientists can be written as


L

s




¸ 


j Ptc,du 



³1
0

v̄tj θη
sjE,t

p1 qw


Ipxj ¡0q
it





1
1 η

s
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v̄tj θη
1 sjE,t wts
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FE


Etj

1
1 η

FI,i,t di



.



(3.17)

This equation shows that the demand for scientists is decreasing in the skilled wage wts and
will be higher when R&D is more profitable and is subsidized more heavily.
We next characterize labor market clearing for production workers. From the equilib-
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rium production decision in Equation 3.8 the unskilled labor demand is
$
'
&

li,t

 qri,tj
j
if qri,t
 qri,tj

Yrt

j
if qri,t

p1 τ qw
Yr
p1 τ qλw

'

j
i

%

u
t

t
j
i

u
t

Substituting the optimal quantities from Equation 3.8 into the final good production function in Equation 3.2,
wtu

 Q̄tΛµt,

where
Q̄t

 exp

(3.18)

»

ln qrit di

is the quality index of active tax-adjusted labor productivities, and

Λµt

 λp1µ

m,t

q

is an inverse function of equilibrium markups (where µm,t refers to the fraction of product
lines where the lead of dirty is exactly equal to m steps, so that clean and dirty are neck
and neck in tax-adjusted productivity). In particular, Λµt takes the value λ1 when all

 0) and the value 1 when
no intermediates charger markup (which is the case when µm,t  1). The labor market
intermediates charge a markup (which is the case when µm,t

clearing for production workers can then be expressed as
1

Yrt
wtu

"

µm,t
2



1
1

1
τtd

1

1
λ

τtc

°
n m

1

µn,t
τtc

°

¡ µn,t

n m

1

τtd

*

.

This equation shows both the impact of taxes on labor demand (both types of taxes reduce
labor demand and thus wages) and the distribution of technology gaps (because these affect
markups). It also shows that if there were only one type of technology, an increase in the
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tax rate would have no impact on production, just reducing the unskilled wage rate. This is
no longer true, however, with two types of technologies, because a tax on dirty technology,
for example, would also change the prices of intermediates produced by dirty technology
relative to those produced by clean technology, thus impacting production.
This equation also enables us to express aggregate output as a function of the quality
index of active tax-adjusted labor productivities as follows

Yt

 exp γ

where
Ωµt



µm,t
2



St  S̄

1
1



Yrt


1
λ

1
τtd

1

τtc

Q̄t Λµt
 ,
Ωµt exp γ St  S̄
°
n m

1

µn,t
τtc

°

(3.19)

¡ µn,t

n m

1

τtd

is an adjustment for labor demand coming both from taxes and markups.

3.2.10

Dynamics and Equilibrium Redux

Equilibrium dynamics are determined by changes in the interest rate and the evolution
of technologies and technology gaps. Household maximization leads to the usual Euler
equation
gt

 rt  ρ,

(3.20)

where gt is the growth rate of consumption and rt is the interest rate at time t (and in
addition we impose the usual transversality condition).
The evolution of technology gaps µn,t can be derived as follows. Let us denote the
aggregate innovation rate in technology j as ztj
as zt

 ztd



1



Etj xjt and the total innovation rate

ztc . Then, the flow equations for the distribution of technology gap n ¡ 1 can

be expressed as
µ9 n¡1,t

 ztdµn1,t p1  αq ztcµn
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1,t

 ztµn,t.

The change in the share depends on the difference between inflows and outflows. There
will be inflows into state n from n  1 when a dirty innovation occurs and from n

1

when a clean innovation occurs without leapfrogging. On the other hand, an outflow will
1, n  1 or 1

happen with both clean or dirty innovation as it will bring the state into n

depending on the innovation type. We repeat the same reasoning for n ¤ 1 below:
µ9 1,t
µ9 0,t
µ9 1,t
µ9 n 1t

 ztdµ0,t p1  αq ztcµ2,t αzdµct  zµ1,t
 p1  αq zdµ1,t p1  αq ztcµ1,t  zµ0,t
¸
 zcµ0,t p1  αq ztdµ2,t αztc µn,t  zµ1,t


c

z µn

p1  α q

1,t
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Total dirty intermediate production at time t, Ytd , which creates pollution is given as
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where we break up the productivity aggregates by step size differential n defining (with a
slight abuse of notation where i P µn denotes intermediates where the technology gap is n
steps):
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We now summarize the dynamic equilibrium path using the equations we have derived
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in this section. For any given time path of policies τtj , sjI,t , sjE,t t0 , a dynamic equilibrium
path is characterized by time path of
8
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j
such that ris yi,t
and pji,t maximize profits as in Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.8; riis xjI,t

and xjE,t solve incumbent’s and entrant’s R&D decision as in Equation 3.14 and Equation
3.16; riiis wtu clears unskilled labor market as in Equation 3.18; riv s ws is determined from
the free entry condition Equation 3.15 when there is positive entry and from skilled labor
market clearing Equation 3.17 when there is no positive entry; rv s Etj is determined from
the skilled labor market clearing Equation 3.17 when there is positive entry; rvis technology
gap shares {µn,t u8
n8 satisfy the set of flow equations 3.21; rviis total productivity of the
sectors with n-step gap Qdn,t evolves according to the innovation rates in Equation 3.14 and
Equation 3.16, rviiis the growth rate is consistent with the innovation rates xjI,t and xjE,t ;
and rixs the interest rate satisfies the Euler equation Equation 3.20, and rxs St is given by
Equation 3.5.

3.2.11

Full Model

We now relax the assumption of myopic firms and assume that firms maximize their discounted profits (and this full model will be used in our quantitative analysis also).
Let ~nj







nj1 , ..., nju denote the vector of product lines where the firm in question holds

the leading-edge technology (a total of u  ujt of them for this firm) and nji the technology

j within the same product line.

Let ~nji denote the same
vector ~nj without its ith element nji . Then the value of a firm with a portfolio of products
gap compared to technology

given by ~nj then satisfies the HJB equation:
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The interpretation is straightforward. The right-hand side includes the profits generated
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from u product lines, which is given by the first term. In addition, at the flow rate rate ztj ,
each product line i will experience an innovation by another firm from the same technology
j in which case i is taken out of firm’s portfolio (so that the firm’s portfolio becomes ~nji ).
If instead production line i experiences an innovation from the alternative technology j,
which happens at the rate ztj , then there are two possibilities: either the innovation is

incremental (probability p1  αq) and the current incumbent will still continue with its
production in which case the technology gap will be narrowed by one step (so that nji
nji



 1q or the innovation might be drastic (probability α), in which case the firm will lose

this product line (again reducing its portfolio to ~nji ). Finally, the firm invests in R&D itself

 ujt xjt , and the option value of this R&D (inclusive of

and innovates at the flow rate Xtj

costs) is added as the second line of the right-hand side, with the integral taking care of the
fact that fixed costs are stochastic. (Note in particular that when it is successful, the firm
adds a new product line so that its portfolio becomes ~nj

Y tnju 1u).

The next lemma provides a convenient re-expression of this Bellman equation in per
product terms:
Lemma 7. Equation 3.23 can be re-expressed as V~njj ,t
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Proof of Theorem 7. Substituting Equation 3.24 into Equation 3.23, we obtain
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 gtYrt in the first line. Next, we eliminate Yrt throughout

 ρ, to establish the desired result.

An important implication is that incumbent innovation rates per product line will be
independent of the portfolio of the incumbent and given by
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which can be easily verified to be identical to Equation 3.14 except that now v̄tj is given as
a solution to Equation 3.24.
We can now describe the full dynamic equilibrium path of this economy, which will be
essentially identical to the equilibrium path with myopic firms, with v̄tj given as the solution
to the HJB equation 3.24.
8



For any given time path of policies τtj , sjI,t , sjE,t t0 , a dynamic equilibrium path is
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characterized by time path of
8
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j
j
 Eivnj ,t, and each vn,t
satisfies Equation 3.24. In addition: ris yi,t
and pji,t
maximize profits as in Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.8; riis xjI,t and xjE,t solve incumbent’s
and entrant’s R&D decision as in Equation 3.14 and Equation 3.16; riiis wtu clears unskilled
labor market as in Equation 3.18; riv s ws is determined from the free entry condition in

such that v̄tj

i

Equation 3.15 when there is positive entry and from skilled labor market clearing Equation
3.17 when there is no positive entry; rv s Etj is determined from the skilled labor market
clearing Equation 3.17 when there is positive entry; rvis technology gap shares {µn,t u8
n8

satisfy the set of flow equations in 3.21; rviis total productivity of the sectors with n-step

gap Qdn,t evolves according to the innovation rates in Equation 3.14 and Equation 3.16,

rviiis the growth rate is consistent with the innovation rates xjI,t and xjE,t; and rixs the
interest rate satisfies Equation 3.20, and rxs St is given by Equation 3.5.
3.3

Empirical Strategy and Data

Our model has 14 parameters/variables to be determined:
(

ρ, S̄, γ, ϕ, ϕ0 , ϕP , κ, Ls , α, η, θ, λ, FI , FE .

In addition, the initial distribution of technology gaps between clean and dirty technologies,

tµ0tu8n8, needs to be determined. It is useful to note that, as will become clearer below,
given tµnt u8
n8 , estimation of the remaining parameters can be done without knowledge
of taxes and subsidies, and also without any information on S̄, γ, ϕ, ϕ0 , and ϕP . These
become relevant only for our policy analysis. Nevertheless, here we specify our choices for
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all these parameters.
We proceed in four steps. First, we externally calibrate some of the parameters, in
particular the parameters of the carbon cycle and the discount rate. In all, the parameters
ρ, S̄, γ, ϕ, ϕ0 , ϕP , and κ are taken from external sources. Second, we directly estimate
Ls , α, and η from microdata. Third, we choose the initial distribution of technology gaps
to match the distribution of patents between firms innovating mostly with clean and mostly
with dirty technologies as we explain below. Finally, we estimate the remaining parameters
θ, λ, FI and FE using simulated method of moments, with moments being selected to model
the firm-level R&D behavior, growth rates, and entry/exit rates for the energy sector as we
describe below. The model performs well and is able to replicate these moments reasonably
closely.
Throughout our focus is on the energy sector, the behavior of which has motivated our
theoretical model. The energy sector is defined as firms involved in the sourcing, refinement and delivery of energy inputs for residential and industrial applications (e.g., oil and
gas, electricity), firms that provide complementary inputs and equipment into this energyproduction process (e.g., drilling equipment, power plant technologies), and firms that interface with the energy inputs for residential and industrial use (e.g., motor manufacturers).
As such, our group of 1576 firms that make up our sample includes oil and gas producers, mining and exploration firms, engine manufacturers, power companies building upon
multiple techniques, energy equipment manufacturers, and similar.9
The data we use for estimation comes from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business
Database and Economic Censuses, the National Science Foundation’s Survey of Industrial
Research and Development, and the NBER Patent Database. We design our sample around
innovative firms in the energy sector that are in operation during the 1975-2004 period.
9

We exclude approximately 50 non-profit research centers and similar entities to match our model’s focus
on profit-seeking firms. Our estimations below are robust to retaining these entities.
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3.3.1

External Calibration

We choose S̄, γ, ϕ, ϕ0 , ϕP , and κ to link our model to the carbon cycle and its impact on aggregate output following Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski
(2011) approach. This approach takes into account the current level of carbon stock and its
increase since pre-industrial times; the rate at which new emissions enter the atmosphere,
the terrestrial biosphere or shallow oceans, and the deep oceans; how that movement and
the various reservoirs of carbon influence the earth’s temperature; and how higher temperatures and environmental damage hurt the economy. This work builds upon prior work in
environmental economics (e.g., Nordhaus, William (2008), Nordhaus, William, and Joseph
Boyer (2000), but is more flexible in allowing non-linear absorption of atmospheric carbon,
but does not allow any delay on the impact of this carbon content on economic outcomes
and temperature changes (which result from different rates at which oceans change temperature, for example) and does not separately keep track of the dynamics of the atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2 ), methane (CH4 ) and nitrous oxide (N2 O).
Our value of the pre-industrial stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere S̄ is 581 GtC
(gigatons of carbon). To model how emission increases the atmospheric stock of CO2,
we define the three parameters ϕ, ϕ0 , and ϕP as follows. First, ϕP is the portion of new
emissions that will remain in the atmosphere for a very long time, likely for thousands of
years, and estimates of this parameter from Solomon, S. D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen,
M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and H.L. Miller (2007) and Archer, David (2005)
are about 20%. The other two parameters, ϕ and ϕ0 , govern the short- and medium-term
movement of the emitted carbon that will not become part of this very long duration stock in
the atmosphere. These emissions influence the earth’s temperature over short horizons, but
they are ultimately absorbed into the deep oceans. To identify these parameters, we utilize
the 30 year half-life of carbon and match the carbon stock evolution under emissions during
the 1900-2008 period. We use the following formula to determine the atmospheric carbon
151

concentration St in every year during 1900-2008 period

St



» t1900
0

p1  dl q Ktl dl

S1900 ,

(3.25)

where
dl



 p1  ϕP q 1  ϕ0eϕl



The emission data for tKt u2008
t1900 is shown in Figure 1 below.
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Figure 2 shows the fit of Equation 3.25 which yields ϕ

 0.0313 and ϕ0  0.7661.

The

dynamics implied by Equation 3.5 at these parameter values match the actual evolution of
atmospheric carbon over the past century very well as shown by the close correspondence
between the solid blue line representing the data and the dashed red line corresponding to
the model-implied atmospheric concentration in Figure 2.
Our damage function also follows Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and
Aleh Tsyvinski (2011) and we choose the γ parameter in our baseline policy analysis to be
the same as theirs, 5.3 x 105 GtC1 ,10 though this number may be too low, particularly
10
This approach provides a fairly good approximation of the damage function developed in Nordhaus,
William (2007), who incorporates a typical estimate that a doubling of the stock of atmospheric carbon leads
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because, in contrast to their paper, we are not allowing policy to adjust to new information
about damages as this becomes available, so the certainty equivalent average of estimates
rather than arithmetic average might be more appropriate. Section Section 3.6.1 provides
robustness checks with higher values of γ.
The κ parameter is chosen to link current emissions levels to the baseline output level
of the model. In doing so, we are making a simplifying assumption that the emission of our
economy can proxy for the emission of the entire US economy. As suggested in Golosov,
Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2011), the modeling of the carbon
cycle and its impact on production has the attractive feature that the social value of marginal
emissions is the same (relative to output). This implies that our results would be essentially
unchanged if we take a future path of emissions from the rest of the world, with the only
difference being that the implied temperature changes we depict below would no longer
apply (and we would need to talk about incremental temperature changes due to the US
energy sector). It is also worth noting that our model and this modeling strategy certainly
abstract from several important aspects of international cooperation or competition that
impact climate change outcomes (e.g., Hassler, John, and Per Krusell (2012).
Finally, we report all of our results for a single private discount rate ρ

 1% and two

 1%, which is close to
the 1.5% chosen by Nordhaus in his models, and the second is ρ  0.1% used by Stern,

values of the social discount rate 1% and 0.1%. The first is ρ

Nicholas (2007), on the basis that with a higher discount rate there is almost no weight put
on the welfare of future generations.
to a 3 C increase and then a proportional damage function of how global temperature increases affect the
economy. Golosov, Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2011) show a close correspondance of these functions over relevant temperature ranges.
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3.3.2

Sample Construction and Data Sources

We combine several datasets for this study. The NBER Patent Database and the NSF Survey
of Industrial Research and Development are the backbones for our study, with additional
information and details being collected from the Longitudinal Business Database and the
various Economic Censuses conducted by the Census Bureau. We introduce each dataset
as we describe the steps in our sample construction.

Patent Data for Energy Sector
Our first data source is the individual records of all patents granted by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from January 1975 to May 2009. This database was
first developed by the NBER and was subsequently extended by HBS Research to include
patenting in recent years. Each patent record provides information about the invention
and the inventors submitting the application. Hall, Bronwyn, Adam Jaffe, and Manuel
Trajtenberg (2001) provide extensive details about these data, and Griliches (1990) surveys
the use of patents as economic indicators of technology advancement. We collect from this
database the patents that are 1) filed by inventors living in the United States at the time of
the patent application, and 2) assigned to industrial firms. In a representative year, 1997,
this group comprised about 77 thousand patents (about 40% of the total USPTO patent
count in 1997).
We then identify patents that are related to the energy sector. This is a key step for our
study, and we outline our approach in detail. We use patent technology codes to identify
patents related to the energy sector. The technology codes are the most disaggregated
level of the USPTO’s classification scheme and number over 150,000. This is important as
energy-sector patents are spread out over multiple patent classes (the next higher level of
the classification system with about 450 groups). Two examples related to solar energy are
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“Power Plants/utilizing natural heat/Solar” and “Stoves and Furnaces/Solar heat collector”.
Moreover, we describe later how these patenting technologies are also used to classify
firms as being primarily clean- or dirty-energy firms. This separation can only be done
at the technology level as the patent class level includes both types (e.g., “Power Plants”
includes technologies for coal-powered plants too).
We identify relevant technology codes through four steps. First, we adopt the prior
classifications developed in a study of alternative energy by Popp, David (2002) and Popp,
David, and Richard Newell (2012). The work of Popp, David, and Richard Newell (2012)
is particularly helpful in that they provide classifications into various types of energy technologies that we discuss in greater detail below. Given this authoritative prior work, we
also report results below for our key parameters that just use their classification system.
We are interested, however, in several technologies (e.g., nuclear power) not considered by Popp, David, and Richard Newell (2012). We thus extend their list through three
additional steps. Our second step utilizes resources from the OECD’s work to identify
environment-related technologies. OECD Environment Directorate (2011) lists such technologies using the International Patent Classification (IPC) scheme, which some observers
believe is better designed to identify and group environment-related technologies than the
USPTO classification framework. We use concordances between the IPC and USPTO
framework to identify additional technologies to be included.
The third step utilizes information on energy-related R&D data from the NSF Survey
of Industrial Research and Development that we describe in greater detail next. For the
firms identified in this survey to be conducting energy-related R&D, we list their patent
technology codes and frequency. We then manually search the 600 most-frequent codes
to identify if they are energy related. In a related fourth step, we also manually search the
USPTO database using key words like “Coal” and “Solar” to determine relevant technologies. This identification process constructs a pool of patents related to the energy sector.
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As a representative year, 1997, our energy-related patents comprised 7.6% of the total US
patent count.11

Operating Data for Energy Sector
Our next step links our energy patent data to firm-level operating data collected by the US
Census Bureau. The Longitudinal Business Database is a business registry that contains
annual employment levels for every private-sector establishment in the United States with
payroll from 1976 onward. We also employ Economic Censuses that are conducted every
five years by sector of the economy; these censuses provide additional plant and firm operation data (e.g., sales). Sourced from US tax records and Census Bureau surveys, these
micro-records document the universe of establishments and firms, making them an unparalleled laboratory for studying our model of firm dynamics in the US energy sector.
We match the patent data to these operating data using firm-name and geographiclocation matching algorithms. The basic concept in these algorithms is to identify Census
Bureau firms that have similar names to USPTO patent assignees and that have establishments in the same geographic area as where inventors of the patents are located.12 This
linkage also accomplishes a related step of aggregating patent assignees to firms, as some
firms file patents through multiple patent assignee codes. This aggregation is due to the
Census Bureau’s establishment-firm hierarchy, as we observe establishment-level names
within multi-unit firms that help identify subsidiaries and major corporate restructurings
like mergers and acquisitions, and through the name-matching process that consolidates
11

Energy-related patents account for 5%-15% of US patents over our sample period, with a declining share
in recent years; in absolute terms, patent counts for the energy sector are stable or growing throughout the
period. The declining share is partly due to the sector not growing as fast as others, and partly due to external
changes over time to allow for patents to be made in sectors that traditionally did not patent, especially
software patents.
12
The algorithms are described in detail in an internal Census Bureau report by Ghosh, Kaushik, and
William Kerr (2010). This patent matching builds upon the prior work of Balasubramanian, Natarajan, and
Jagadeesh Sivadasan (2011) and Kerr, William, and Shihe Fu (2008).
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slight name variants over patent assignees.
We focus our sample on the years in which Economic Censuses are conducted, specifically every five years starting in 1977 and ending in 2002. We adopt this focus for several
reasons: 1) the operating data are often best measured around these years due to heightened Census Bureau resources, 2) some specific variables from the Economic Censuses are
only available at those five-year marks, and 3) our innovation data are most appropriately
considered over short time periods. The third rationale is due, for example, to lumpiness
in firm applications for patents; as we describe next, our R&D expenditures data are also
often collected biannually. We thus measure variables using the average of observed values
for firms in five-year windows surrounding these Economic Census years (e.g., 1985-1989
for the 1987-centered period). We have six time periods covering the 30 year interval of
1975-2004.

R&D Data for Energy Sector
We next utilize the Census Bureau’s internal linkages to collect information on R&D expenditures from the NSF’s Survey of Industrial Research and Development (R&D Survey).
The R&D Survey is the US government’s primary instrument for surveying the R&D expenditures and innovative efforts of US firms. This is an annual or biannual survey conducted jointly by the Census Bureau and NSF. The survey includes with certainty all public
and private firms, as well as foreign-owned firms, undertaking over a minimum threshold
of R&D expenditure in the United States. For most of our sample period, this expenditure
threshold is one million dollars of R&D within the US. The survey frame also sub-samples
firms conducting less than the certain expenditure threshold. These micro-records begin in
1972 and provide the most detailed statistics available on firm-level R&D efforts. In 1997,
3,741 firms reported positive R&D expenditures that sum to $158 billion. Foster, Lucia,
and Cheryl Grim (2010) and Akcigit and Kerr (2010) discuss these data in greater detail.
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The R&D Survey provides us with information on many firms’ R&D expenditures and
employments of science and engineering workers. We use the data, along with the patenting
of the firm, to calculate the innovation production function for the sector (e.g., the η and
α parameters). We describe these calculations below, and for these calculations we only
utilize firm observations for which we always observe reported data on R&D expenditures
or scientist counts—meaning that these calculations use only firms that conduct more than
the minimum threshold of one million dollars in R&D or are sub-sampled completely.
While this might present an issue for sectors like consumer internet start-ups, this is not
very restrictive for the supply side of the energy sector given the large amounts of R&D
expenditures required by many start-ups.
For our broader moments on firm dynamics, this minimum threshold creates a challenge, however, for the consistent calculation of the entry margin and growth rates. Our
model requires that firms be innovative from the start of their lives, and thus an innovative
firm that falls below threshold value in its first period would be inappropriately dropped if
we restricted the sample only to firms for which we always observe R&D expenditure. By
contrast, the patent data are universally observed. To ensure a complete distribution, we
thus use patents to impute R&D values for firms that are less than the certainty threshold
and not sub-sampled. Overall, our moments combine the R&D and patent data into a single
measure of innovation (in R&D terms) that accords with the model for the characterization
of firm dynamics in the energy sector. As the R&D expenditures in these sub-sampled
cases are low (by definition), this imputation choice versus treating unsurveyed R&D expenditures as zero expenditures conditional on patenting is not very important. The firm
does not need to conduct R&D or patent in every year of the initial five-year window, but
the firm must do one of the two activities at least once.13
13

In a small number of cases where we have scientists counts from the R&D Survey but lack R&D expenditures, we similarly use the scientist counts to impute R&D values for firms below the certainty threshold.
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To summarize, the key idea is that our sample requires that a firm either patent or have
measured R&D in the first period of its life. If the firm is an incumbent in the initial 19751979 period, it must have either a patent or measured R&D. Our sample does not condition
on innovative activity before 1975-1979. Thus, these incumbents may have had some point
in their past when they did not conduct R&D or patent. Our model allows for firms to transition out of R&D, and thus we include firms that quit being innovative. On the other hand,
we do not consider non-innovative incumbent firms starting to do innovation. As the probability that an existing, non-innovative firm commences R&D or patenting over the ensuing
five years (conditional on survival) is only about 1%, this exclusion is reasonable.14 As
one exception to this sample construction, we only estimate the key innovation production
function over firms that have continually observed R&D expenditures (so that imputation
procedures are not required).

Sample Inclusion Rules and Sample Size
These procedures define the base pool of innovative firms in the energy sector. To be
retained in our final sample, the firm must meet two additional requirements. The first is
that the firm has positive employment and obtains three or more patents in the energy sector
during the 1975-2004 period. These are not very high hurdles given our purpose, and we
thus exclude entities that only obtain one or two energy-related patents over their lifetime.
Second, and more important, we also require that 10% of the firm’s total patenting be in
energy-related fields. This is an important hurdle as it excludes innovative firms that are
not very active in the sector. The 10% bar is more substantial than it may initially appear
as we have been fairly conservative in terms of defining energy-sector patents.
14

Note that it would have been impossible to build a consistent sample that would also include incumbents
switching into innovation. To see why, consider keeping all of the past records for incumbent firms that
start conducting R&D in 1987. In the prior periods, this approach would induce a mismeasurement of exit
propensities and growth dynamics because a portion of the sample will include firms conditioned on survival
until 1987.

159

Thus, our compiled dataset includes innovative firms in the energy sector from 19752004. A record in our dataset is a firm-period observation that aggregates over the firm’s
different establishments. We have 6228 observations from 1576 firms. While focused on a
single sector, our firm panel contains 19% of all US R&D industrial expenditures during the
1975-2004 period. The panel accounts for about 70% of industrial patents for the energy
sector in the United States. Across all activity in the economy, our sample typically account
for 1% of establishments, 5% of employment, and 10% of sales. In the 1997 period, our
sample accounts for over a trillion dollars in sales, 3.9 million employees, and 25 billion
dollars in R&D expenditures, and the firms obtain 56 thousand patents during 1995-1999.
Our sample is very important for studying emissions in two ways. First, we account
for a substantial amount of activity in several of the main sectors responsible for emissions
(e.g., Mueller, Nicholas, Robert Mendelsohn, and William Nordhaus (2011)). In the 19921997 period, for example, we account for 59% of sales in industries related to coal and
oil extraction, refinement, and shipment; 33% of sales in industries related to electricity
production; and 21% of manufacturing sales. Among manufacturing industries, our sample contains higher shares in industries more closely linked with emissions (e.g., 64% in
petroleum refinement, 31% in primary metals). Second, while our sample does not include
many firms directly from two high-emission sectors, agriculture and transportation, our
sample does include many of the manufacturers of products that are key inputs to these
sectors.

Designation of Firms as Clean or Dirty Energy
Beyond the development of the firm panel, our leap-frogging calculations below require
us to identify whether patents are related to “dirty” or “clean” energy. We do so through
the field of patent technologies. We identify patents as related to dirty technologies if they
are connected to the extraction, refinement or use of fossil-fuel based energy, including oil,
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coal, natural gas, and shale technologies. We group into clean-energy patents fields that
are related to geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear, solar, and wind energy. We also include
in the clean-energy group identified patents for conservation and utilization of energy. The
results below are robust to reclassifications of border group types.
For our model’s initial conditions, we also need to identify whether firms are primarily
operating in dirty- or clean-energy applications. We do so through a simple rule that has
two steps. We first classify a firm-period observation as focused on clean energy if 25% or
more of its energy-sector patents are devoted to clean-energy fields; otherwise the firm is
classified as a dirty-energy firm in the period. We use the 25% threshold as our assignments
of clean-energy fields are conservative compared to dirty-energy fields. We then describe
the firm overall as a clean-energy firm if half or more of its time periods achieve this
clean-energy focus. The distribution between clean and dirty uses at the firm level is fairly
bimodal—96% of observations have 75% or more of their patents in one technology—
making the exact details of these procedures less important. In total, 11% of our firms
are classified in the clean-energy sub-sector; 14% of energy-sector patents are classified as
clean energy.
Several points are worth noting at this stage. First, we generally include technologies
that are designed to make fossil fuels cleaner in the dirty-energy group. In this one regard,
we deviate from the classifications developed by Popp, David, and Richard Newell (2012)
where coal liquefaction and gasification are included in alternative energy, for example.
When we directly use the technology scheme of Popp, David, and Richard Newell (2012)
as a robustness check, we classify the technologies as in their original work. Second, we
have not built our sample selection or grouping procedures around technologies related to
pollution abatement. We retain all patents for included firms, and thus they are part of our
overall technology description, but we only use energy-directed patents to classify patents
and firms into dirty- or clean-energy groups. Finally, we also use the more detailed in161

formation the R&D Survey collects from selected major R&D producers. We specifically
utilize information collected from about 100 firms on R&D expenditures related to specific
energy applications like coal or solar energy. We earlier identified one application of this
extra information in that we manually searched the major patenting technology codes from
these R&D entities to identify energy-sector patenting groups that we should be including. A second application is to verify our data development procedures, for example by
assigning firms based upon the types of R&D they conduct rather than observed patents.
This group from the R&D Survey also confirms the bimodal nature of our firm groupings.
While the group of firms asked these questions is too small and selected to serve as the
backbone of our sample, these checks are comforting. While Census Bureau disclosure
prevents us from listing firms, we overlap well with producers listed in Popp, David, and
Richard Newell (2012) as one example.

3.3.3

Estimation and Choice of Parameters from Microdata

We first estimate the η parameter from our innovation production function, Xf

puf q1η , which can be rewritten as lnpX {uf q  lnpθq

 θpHf qη

η  lnpH {uf q. We measure X by

the firm’s count of patents, H by the firm’s R&D expenditures or scientist counts, and u
by the number of four-digit SIC industries in which a firm is operating. We also check the
robustness of our results to using three-digit SIC industry counts, sales and establishment
counts as our proxies for firm size u. Our patent count measure is weighted by citations,
with citation counts normalized by the average citations achieved by other patents in the
same patent class and application year.
To estimate the η elasticity as accurately as possible, we use the panel nature of our
data and later return to estimating the θ parameter. As noted earlier, we only use for this
exercise firms that have a full panel of reported R&D data. To focus on higher quality data
for our differenced estimations, we also require that the firm be present in at least three
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periods. We first estimate a linear regression with year fixed effects δt , yielding
lnpP atents{productf,t q  δt

0.625 p0.043q  lnpR&D{productf,t q

f,t ,

(3.26)

with standard errors clustered by firm. We then extend the estimation to allow for firm fixed
effects, and we estimate the panel elasticity in a first-differenced format, yielding
∆ lnpP atents{productf,t q  δt

0.353 p0.057q  ∆ lnpR&D{productf,t q

f,t , (3.27)

The range of these point estimates is representative of a broader set of estimates for the η
parameter. Table 1a summarizes eight variants of the OLS levels regressions. The rows indicate four measures of firm size uf : SIC3 industry counts, SIC4 industry counts, sales, and
establishment counts. Column headers indicate whether R&D inputs are being measured
through expenditures or counts of scientists. The eight coefficients are from eight separate
estimations of the regression in Equation 3.26. The average of these eight estimations is
0.69, and the estimates are consistently within the range of 0.63-0.76.
TABLE 1 A . OLS L EVELS E STIMATES FOR η PARAMETER
R&D Input Measure Hf
Firm Size Measure uf :

R&D Expenditure

Scientist Counts

SIC3 Counts

0.632 p0.042q

0.653 p0.048q

SIC4 Counts

0.625 p0.043q

0.644 p0.048q

Sales

0.761 p0.053q

0.751 p0.048q

Establishments

0.714 p0.039q

0.732 p0.041q

Notes: Table presents eight variants of the regression in Equation 3.26.

Table 1b similarly summarizes eight estimation variants of the first-differenced regression
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from Equation 3.27. The average across these variants is lower at 0.37, with a wider range
from 0.29 to 0.51.
TABLE 1 B . OLS F IRST-D IFFERENCED E STIMATES FOR η PARAMETER
R&D Input Measure H
Firm Size Measure uf :

R&D Expenditure

Scientist Counts

SIC3 Counts

0.342 p0.056q

0.286 p0.052q

SIC4 Counts

0.353 p0.057q

0.296 p0.053q

Sales

0.405 p0.075q

0.348 p0.065q

Establishments

0.505 p0.058q

0.455 p0.054q

Notes: Table presents variants of the regression in Equation 3.27.

Our baseline value for η is 0.5, taking a mid point within the range of estimates in Tables
1A and 1B.
We also find comparable η parameters in robustness checks off of this sample platform. For example, restricting the sample to firms with energy patents as more than 30%
of their innovations yields levels and first-differences estimates of 0.744 (0.065) and 0.384
(0.100), respectively. Restricting our sample to firms that would have been defined for
the sector using codes from Popp, David, and Richard Newell (2012) yields levels and
first-differences estimates of 0.704 (0.049) and 0.301 (0.071), respectively. Relaxing our
requirement that the firm be present in three periods yields levels and first-differences estimates of 0.614 (0.043) and 0.338 (0.056), respectively. We likewise find similar outcomes
when incorporating industry-year fixed effects, using unweighted patent counts, or similar
adjustments. In addition, Acemoglu, Daron, Ufuk Akcigit, Nick Bloom, and William Kerr
(2012) describe a related instrumental variable elasticity of patenting to science and engineering workers of 0.694 (0.295) across the whole economy developed through H-1B visa
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reforms estimated by Kerr, William, and William Lincoln (2010).
Finally, Table 1C shows estimates from Poisson models that allow for zero patenting
outcomes. We report both random effects and fixed effects formats; to conserve space, we
only provide two choices of firm size that mostly bound the other variants. Standard errors
are bootstrapped. Using four-digit industry counts to measure size consistently delivers
elasticities around 0.33, while using establishment counts delivers elasticities around 0.57.
Our baseline estimate of η

 0.5 falls again within these ranges.

TABLE 1 C . P OISSON E STIMATES FOR η PARAMETER
R&D Input Measure Hf
Technique, Firm Size Measure uf :

R&D Expenditure

Scientist Counts

Random Effects, SIC4 Counts

0.326 p0.122q

0.361 p0.079q

Fixed Effects, SIC4 Counts

0.321 p0.106q

0.357 p0.089q

Random Effects, Establishments

0.567 p0.108q

0.584 p0.064q

Fixed Effects, Establishments

0.565 p0.103q

0.583 p0.076q

Notes: Table presents fixed and random effects Poisson estimates similar to Tables 1A and 1B.

We next turn to the α parameter, which in our model describes technology leap-frogging.
This process is challenging to model empirically, and we are unfortunately unable to identify exact races between clean and dirty technologies directly within the patent data. This
limitation is due to the extreme narrowness of the technology codes that are entirely clean
or dirty in application, while patent class divisions are too broad and few in number. We
thus instead identify the rate at which patents with exceptional quality emerge using patent
citations. We specifically quantify the rate at which patents enter and establish quickly high
levels of citations compared to their incumbent peers.
We start with our dataset of all energy-sector patents granted to US inventors during
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the post-1975 period. We calculate among these energy-sector patents the citation count
distribution among incumbent patents by year, excluding within-firm citations. Incumbent
patents are defined to be those that were applied for 5-10 years before the focal year; we
cap at 10 years prior so that we can have a stable window across a time period from 1985
onwards for analysis. Citations are coming from patents being applied for in the focal
year. By conditioning the citation distribution upon a patent receiving a citation in a given
year, we are effectively looking at technologies that are being actively used, with many
incumbent patents dropping out as no one is building on them.
We then calculate for new patents the citations they receive by year. We designate a
major entrant as any patent that has a citation count that exceeds the 90th percentile of the
incumbent distribution in any of its first three years. This evaluation approach is designed
to keep the incumbent groups (5-10 years earlier) separate from the entrant groups (max of
three years earlier). 4.2% of entrants achieve this level of major entrant. We find a slightly
lower estimate at 4.0% using Popp, David, and Richard Newell (2012) definitions, and a
rate of 4.1% when making the citation distributions specific to each patent class. Based
upon these findings, we set α  4%.
Finally, for Ls , which is the supply of scientists and engineers involved in R&D-type activities in the model (relative to production workers), we use 5.5%. We calculate this share
from Census IPUMS using the 2000 5% sample. We keep non-group quartered workers
who are aged 20-65 years old and working in industries closely related to the energy sector.
We also require 20 weeks worked within the year and a usual hours worked of 20 or more
during each week. 5.5% is the share of these workers with bachelor’s educations and higher
employed in occupations related to science and engineering.
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3.3.4

Initial Technology Gaps

To provide the initial distributions of the model, we develop estimates of the cumulative
stock of technologies invented by clean- and dirty-energy firms using three-digit SIC industries as approximations of product lines. We develop these distributions in three steps.
The first step is to calculate the sum of patents made by each firm during the 1975-2004
period and the firm’s distribution of employment across SIC3 industries in these sectors
over the same period. We then apportion the firm’s cumulative patent stock across SIC3
industries using the firm’s employment distributions. For each SIC3 industry, we finally
sum the apportioned patents made by clean- and dirty-energy firms. This sum of patents
across all firms, active or inactive, reflects the quality ladders structure of our model.
These calculations provide us over 400 estimates of comparative clean- and dirtyenergy stocks. Across these SIC3 industries, clean-energy firms are estimated to have a
higher cumulative patent stock in 13.1% of industries. For data quality and Census Bureau
disclosure restrictions, we focus on the upper half of the industry distribution in terms of
cumulative clean and dirty patent counts, which has 13.0% of industries being led by the
clean-energy stock; within manufacturing and energy production specifically, this share is
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12.5%. The following table summarizes some details of these lines:
TABLE 2. I NITIAL C ONDITION D ISTRIBUTIONS SIC3
Metric:

Clean Energy

Dirty Energy

Mean Patent Total

260

1029

Standard Deviation

515

1500

Share: [0,20]

37%

0%

Share: [21,100]

25%

6%

Share: [101,500]

22%

50%

Share: [500+]

16%

44%

The average gap to the frontier for dirty-patents stocks in the 13% of cases where clean
patents have the lead is 424 patents, or in relative terms, 39% of the total patenting in that
line to date. The average gap to the frontier for clean-patent stocks in the 87% of cases
where dirty patents have the lead is 947 patents and 76% in relative terms. To convert the
empirical gap into the units of the model, we use the following reasoning. In our model,
the annual patent flows of incumbents is 16.1% per product line (the sum of xc
and xd

 3.9%

 12.2%). In the data, the median annual flow of patents is approximately 17.1 per

line. Hence we divide the empirical patent distribution of clean and dirty (which consists
of patents registered between 1975-2004) by a conversion factor 17.1{0.161 and round it to
the closest integer. This gives us the initial number of improvements ndj,0 and ncj,0 . Then we
d
compute the initial productivities as qj,0

 λn

d
j,0

c
and qj,0

 λn

c
j,0

to provide the initialization

values. The following graph plots the density of this distribution with gaps between dirty
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and clean technologies on the horizontal axis:
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This graph shows that in most product lines the dirty technology is only a few steps ahead
of clean technology, but there is a long tail of product lines with a large gap between dirty
and clean, and a small set in which clean is ahead of dirty. The fraction of product lines
with a non-zero gap in terms of step sizes is 90%. Clean energy leads by one or more step
sizes in 9% of cases. Dirty energy has a lead of 20 and 50 steps sizes or more in 11% and
2% of technologies, respectively. We later consider an alternative initial distributions that
modifies several of the modelling choices made here.

3.3.5

Simulated Method of Moments

The remaining parameters θ, λ, FI and FE are estimated using simulated method of moments (SMM). McFadden, Daniel (1989), Pakes, Ariel, and David Pollard (1989), and
Gouriéroux, Christian, and Alain Monfort (1996) characterize the statistical properties of
the SMM estimator. This quantitative approach takes a set of key moments from our model,
and then chooses the parameter vector so as to minimize the distance between these mo169

ments as implied by our model and as computed from the Census Bureau data,

min

4
¸



|model piq  data piq| ,

i 1

where we index each moment by i. SMM iteratively searches repeatedly across sets of
parameter values for θ, λ, FI and FE in the model until the model’s moments are as close
as possible to the empirical moments (see Adda, Jerome, and Russell Cooper (2003) for
further details). We also choose the heterogeneity parameter, ξ, as 10% and verify that our
results are not sensitive to this parameter.
We use three moments from the microdata—firm entry rates, firm exit rates, and the
average R&D/sales ratio of firms—together with the growth rate of the sector to identify
these parameters. The entrant’s labor share and exit rates are calculated across the fiveyear intervals of our Census Bureau data and then transformed into annualized net rates
of 1.3% and 1.75%, respectively. We match the construction of these entry and exit rate
moments in the model. The weighted average R&D-to-sales ratio is 6.57%, using log sales
as weights and capping the R&D/sales ratio at 10x to reduce outliers (approximately the
99.8th percentile of the distribution). The aggregate annual sales growth per worker is
1.23% for the sector across the 1975-2004 period. After identifying these parameters in the
estimation section, we investigate the fit of the model by comparing the implications of the
model with a battery of other non-targeted moments from the microdata.

3.3.6

Computational Algorithm

Our theoretical analysis shows that microeconomic behavior is independent of climate dynamics. We therefore solve for value functions, innovation rates, and distributions first,
then use those to find the time path for the carbon stock, temperature and other variables of
interest.
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The solution algorithm for this model involves finding the transition dynamics as the
fixed point of a forward-backward iteration process, as in Conesa, Juan Carlos and Dirk
Krueger (1998). See Zangwill and Garcia (1981) for further references. If the state space
were of a more manageable size, one could simply solve the value function over this space
and characterize the dynamics given arbitrary initial conditions. However, in this case
the state space is the distribution of product lines over the technology gaps between the
clean and dirty technologies. For any reasonable approximation, this results in a very high
dimensional state space. Therefore, we solve each element of the model as a function of
time given the initial conditions from the patenting data. The value function in early periods
will thus depend on value functions in later periods. These later period value functions will
in turn depend on the later period product distribution, which depends on early period value
functions and innovation rates.
To solve for the fixed point of the sequence of value functions, we first discretize time
into N

 2048 steps and set a terminal period T  2000. Due to the symmetry between

technology types inherent in this model, when a single type of technology is dominant—
in the sense that the technology gap distribution is heavily skewed to either clean or dirty
j
technology—one can analytically characterize value functions vn,
8 and innovation rates
j
xj8 and z8
. We use these values as terminal conditions, though we do not know in advance

which technology (clean or dirty) will be dominant. In addition, we set large upper (100)
and lower (100) bounds on the step gap distribution space. The algorithm proceeds as
follows:
1. Posit an initial guess for the value function at time zero of the form
j
vn,t
p0q 

πnj
ρ

z̄

@t

where z̄ represents an estimated rate of creative destruction (we use z̄
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 0.15). In-

stantiate the technology gap distribution using the patent data with
µn,t p0q  µn,0

@t.

 0 to t  T by finding innovation rates xjt and ztj
j
given value function and product distributions guesses at time t 1, vn,t
1 pk q and
µn,t 1 pk q. Using these innovation rates, update the time t 1 product distribution
µn,t 1 pk 1q using discrete time versions of the flow equations in 3.21.

2. Iterate forward in time from t

3. Find the implied dominant technology at the terminal period by determining which
technology type has a higher aggregate innovation rate as some late stage period
T

 TP

(we use TP

j
update vn,T
pk



200). Use the corresponding terminal value functions to

j
1q  vn,
8.

j
4. Iterate backward in time from t  T to t  0 by updating value function vn,t
1 pk 1q

j
using vn,t
pkq and µn,tpkq according to a discretized version of the HJB equation in

Theorem 7, re-solving for innovation rates xjt and ztj in the process.
5. Repeat steps 2-4 until the convergence criterion


j
max vn,t
pk
n,t



j
1q  vn,t
pkq

ε

is met. We use ε  106 .
In order to avoid any instability, particularly when one is close a threshold where the
asymptotically dominant technology switches over, we also introduce heterogeneity in incumbent fixed costs as explained above.15
15
Our algorithm introduced a similar heterogeneity in entrant fixed costs, but at the end, entrants are never
in the region where this heterogeneity matters.
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Using up-to-date computer hardware, the equilibrium solver takes anywhere from five
seconds to two minutes, depending on the speed of convergence. The code is written mostly
in Python, with core routines written in C/C++.

Estimation To find the moments used in the SMM estimation, we simulate a panel
of 16384 firms using equilibrium variables from the above model solving routine. Each
firm has a portfolio of product lines with various technology gap values. We cap the maximum number of product lines a firm can have at 200. In order to determine the sales and
R&D activity of the firm, we must keep track of both the number of product lines it is currently operating in, as well as the knowledge stock of the firm, which can in general differ.
We simulate this panel of firms for 5 years to replicate the data generating process, and
discretize time to have 100 subperiods per year, so that the simulations have 500 periods.

Optimal Policy We compute optimal policies for both the constant and time-varying
cases. In the constant case, we use a straightforward grid search to find the optimum.
In the time-varying case, we parameterize policies using a three stage carbon tax and a
three stage research subsidy. Within each stage, whose boundaries are also parameterized
and optimized over, we have constant policy levels. We then search over this space of
functions using a combination of a simple simulated annealing algorithm (Kirkpatrick, S.
C.D. Gelatt, and M.P. Vecchi (1983)) and a Nelder-Mead (simplex) algorithm (Nelder and
Mead (1965)).

3.4

Estimation Results

In this section, we provide the results of the simulated method of moments estimation and
discuss the fit of our model to non-targeted moments. Finally, we show how atmospheric
173

carbon concentration, temperatures and aggregate output evolve given these parameters in
a laissez-faire equilibrium (with no policy intervention) starting from the observed distribution of technology gaps.

3.4.1

Parameter Estimates

Table 3 summarizes our parameter estimates.

TABLE 3. PARAMETER E STIMATES
Parameter

Description

Value

θ

Innovation productivity

0.500

λ

Innovation step size

1.075

FI

Fixed cost of incumbent R&D

0.002

FE

Fixed cost of entry

0.035

Our innovation productivity estimate implies that one unit of labor with a single product
line generates an innovation with probability of about 8% a year. We estimate the innovation step size as 1.075 which implies a gross profit margin 7%. Finally our model predicts a
sizable fixed cost advantage for incumbent firms. Their fixed cost of operation is equivalent
to 6% of the entrants’ fixed cost.

3.4.2

Goodness of Fit

Here we describe the goodness of fit of our model, first focusing on the four targeted moments, and then a range of diverse non-targeted moments.
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Targeted Moments
Table 4 shows the values of the four moments used for estimation in the data and the model
implications.
TABLE 4. M OMENT M ATCHING
Moments

Model

Data

Entry Share

0.013

0.013

Exit Rate

0.018

0.018

Average R&D/Sales

0.066

0.066

Aggregate Sales per Employee Growth

0.007

0.012

On the whole, there is a very good match between the model and the data. The entry share,
exit rate and R&D intensity are identical between the data and the model. Moreover the
aggregate sales per worker growth is also very close.

Non-targeted Moments
Our main method of evaluating the quantitative fit of our model is to look at a range of nontargeted moments, which are presented (together with the model implications) in Tables
5A-5C.
We choose the non-targeted moments to represent aspects of the firm size distribution
and its growth properties, which are quite different from the moments we targeted in our
estimation. Our first non-targeted moment compares the size ratio of the median entrant
to the median incumbent firm. Our targeted moments on entry/exit rates, overall sector
growth, and R&D intensity do not directly impose strong constraints on this size distribution. Table 5A contrasts the size ratios in the model and data with respect to employment,
sales, and sales per employee, and shows that our model implications match the data very
175

closely with respect to the latter two metrics, though not as well for employment.16
TABLE 5A. E NTRANT S IZE R ATIO TO I NCUMBENTS
Ratio of Median Sizes
Size Measure:

Model

Data

Employment

0.17

0.03

Sales

0.18

0.20

Sales per Employee

1.12

1.05

Notes: Table compares non-targeted moments in model and data.

Our next point of comparison is for the structure of the growth distribution. We first
calculate the unconditional growth rate of employment for each firm in the model and
data defined as pEmpt  Empt1 q{ppEmpt

Empt1 q{2q. This formula divides the em-

ployment change across the period by the average of the start and end values. As argued
by Davis, Steven, John Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh (1996), this approach has attractive
properties like a symmetric treatment of positive and negative growth and bounded values
that minimize outliers. We calculate growth over five-year intervals. We then calculate the
probability that firms experience substantial movements in either positive or negative directions. Comparing these movements in the model to the data is meaningful as it provides
insights into how well the innovation step sizes and associated firm dynamics mirror the
16

To pass Census Bureau disclosure restrictions, the empirical medians are “fuzzy” median estimates that
use the average values over the 45th to 55th percentiles.
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sector’s true performance. Table 5B summarizes this comparison:
TABLE 5B. C OMPARISON OF G ROWTH D ISTRIBUTION
Employment Growth Probability
Change over 5-Years:

Model

Data

Decrease 75% or more

0.17

0.11

Decrease 50% or more

0.20

0.15

Decrease 25% or more

0.27

0.26

Increase 25% or more

0.24

0.31

Increase 50% or more

0.17

0.20

Increase 75% or more

0.15

0.14

Increase 100% or more

0.08

0.11

Notes: Table compares non-targeted moments in model and data.

On this dimension, the model matches the data quite well. Compared to the data, the model
somewhat over-predicts major downward employment declines of 50% or more. Recall that
we matched the exit rate itself almost exactly, so this indicates an over-prediction of large
employment declines conditional on survival. On the other hand, the model matches the
data well for predicting employment decreases or increases of 25% or more. Likewise, the
model and data are in very close agreement on the relative probabilities and sizes of large
employment increases for firms.
Our final comparison is the variation in conditional growth rates for employment across
the firm size distribution, again over a five-year period. We divide firms into quantiles based
upon their initial size in each period. We then compute the growth rates using the above
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formula, and the following table provides the comparison:
TABLE 5C. C OMPARISON OF G ROWTH OVER S IZE D ISTRIBUTION
5-Year Conditional Growth Rates
Quantile of Sizes:

Model

Data

Smallest

18%

31%

2nd

25%

14%

3rd

18%

11%

4th

-5%

-1%

Largest

-0%

-10%

Notes: Table compares non-targeted moments in model and data.

The comparison is again reasonable. We match the general feature in the data that conditional growth rates are highest for small firms. The model’s employment distribution is
a little less fine-grained than the data, as about 50% of our firms have one product and
employment is partially proportional to product counts. In consequence, there is limited
variation across the smaller quantiles in the model compared to the more regular distribution in the data. The model and data then match quite well in identifying lack of growth
for the top two quantiles compared to the bottom three (though the model does not predict
employment declines in the largest firms that are present in the data).
Overall, our reading of the evidence is that for this range of diverse moments, which
we did not target in our estimation, the model performs reasonably well, and this bolsters
our confidence that our quantitative model is able to capture production and innovation
dynamics in the energy sector.
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3.4.3

Climate Dynamics in the Laissez-faire Economy

We next describe the implied future equilibrium and atmospheric carbon paths of the model
given our estimates with the case of no carbon taxes and research subsidies. Given the
initial distribution of technology gaps, dirty innovation is more productive and with no
policy intervention, most R&D is initially targeted to the dirty technology as shown in
Figure 4. Moreover, at these innovation rates, technology gaps and the profitability of dirty
technologies increases relative to those of clean technologies, and clean R&D converges
to zero. Consequently, in the long-run clean technologies disappear completely and dirty
technologies take over the whole economy.
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The obvious implication of this time path of innovations is a steady increase in dirty energy
production and carbon emissions. There are two ways of ascertaining the implications of
these growing carbon emissions from our economy estimated and calibrated to US data.
The first is to ignore emission growth from the rest of the world (i.e., keeping their emissions at a constant level). This is done in Figure 5A, which shows an increase in temperature
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of an additional 2.5 C in the next 200 years.17 The alternative is shown in Figure 5B and
assumes that emissions from the rest of the world will grow at the same rate as the US.
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The impact on global temperature is considerably exacerbated in view of the fact that we are
now showing the increase in global temperature resulting from growth in global emissions,
not just US emissions. It is important to recall that, as noted above, given the functional
form in Equation 3.2, the exact path of emissions from the rest of the world has no impact
on optimal policy (since the marginal damage created by US emissions are independent of
the level of global emissions). This is the reason why we did not have to take a position
on the time path of emissions in the rest of the world until this point (and now we are only
taking a position in order to translate its implied path of emissions into changes in global
temperatures).
17

We use the following formula to compute the temperature changes:
∆temperature 



λ ln St  ln S̄
.
ln 2
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3.5

Policy Analysis

In this section, we derive the policy sequence that maximizes discounted welfare. Throughout, we do not allow the social planner to correct for monopoly distortions, thus limiting
ourselves to the policy instruments discussed above—a carbon tax and subsidy to clean
research.18 In addition, our theoretical analysis makes it clear that what is relevant is the
differential tax and subsidy rates for clean vs. dirty energy, thus we just look at taxes on
dirty production, which we refer to as “carbon taxes,” and subsidies to clean innovation. Finally, we restrict the subsidies to entrants and incumbents to be the same, i.e., sEt

 sIt for

all t (based on early results which suggest that when both instruments are allowed to vary
they are often equal or very close to each other). Throughout, we consider a private discount rate of ρ
and ρsp

 1% and present results for two different social discount rates: ρsp  1%

 0.1%.19

In both cases, paths that involve no switch to clean technology will

lead to unbounded atmospheric carbon and temperature increases and consumption limiting to zero because of the economic distortions created by the unbounded increase in
atmospheric carbon (see Equation 3.2), and we assign minus infinite social welfare to such
paths, so that when feasible, a switch to clean technology is preferred.20 Finally, we first
focus on optimal constant policies (where carbon taxes and research subsidies are constant over time), which have several advantages: they are simpler and more transparent and
the optimal time-varying policies, which we also characterize below, are time-inconsistent,
raising some caveats about interpretation.
18

As mentioned above, in the one-sector version of our model (either with only dirty or only clean technology), taxes or subsidies to research would only affect relative wages of skilled workers (employed in the
research sector), and crucially not the aggregate rate of innovation. For this reason, subsidies to clean research
or taxes on dirty research are identical in our model.
19
The reasoning here is that, following Stern, Nicholas (2007), the social planner—society—may have a
lower discount rate than that implied by market interest rates. Thus 0.1% is what should be applied to the
welfare analysis of the social planner, while still keeping the discount rate that firms use in their decisions at
1%.
20
This is implied whenever the growth rate g is greater than ρsp , which is always satisfied when ρsp 
0.1%, but may or may not be satisfied when ρsp  1% depending on the growth rate.
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3.5.1

Optimal Constant Policies

Table 6 shows optimal constant policies for the two values of social discounting, ρsp
(high), ρsp

 1%

 0.1% (low).
TABLE 6. O PTIMAL C ONSTANT P OLICY
ρsp

 1%

ρsp

 0.1%

τ

16%

44%

s

61%

95%

In both cases, there is a very aggressive research subsidy for clean technology. With
ρsp

 1%, the carbon tax is fairly low, at 16%, while research directed at clean technologies

receives a 61% government subsidy (meaning that for every dollar of R&D spending, there
is a 61 cents subsidy). With the social discount rate of ρsp

 0.1%, carbon taxes are raised

to 44%, but now clean research subsidies are even more aggressive, at 95%.
The intuition for why optimal policy relies so much on subsidies to clean research is
instructive. The social planner would like to induce a switch from R&D directed at carbon intensive dirty technologies towards clean technologies. She can do so by choosing
a sufficiently high carbon tax rate today and in the future, because this would reduce the
profitability of production using dirty technologies and secure both a switch to clean production and, on the basis of this, to research directed at clean technologies. However, this is
socially costly because given the current state of technology, switching most production to
clean technology has a high consumption cost (because the marginal costs of production of
clean technologies are initially significantly higher than those of dirty technologies). Hence
it is a better strategy for the social planner to choose the carbon tax to only deal with the
carbon emission externality and rely on the research subsidy to induce the switch to clean
technologies in the long run. Figure 6 in fact shows that the social planner is able to do this,
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particularly with ρsp

 0.1%, where the optimal policy involves a very rapid ramp up of

clean innovation rates and the disappearance of all research directed to dirty technologies
in about 130 years. Interestingly, however, with ρsp

 1%, the social planner chooses not

to completely replace dirty research with clean research in the first several hundred years.
Instead, she subsidizes clean research just enough to make sure that clean research and thus
clean technologies also survive for a long time, but not so much that they overtake the dirty
sector completely. As a result, dirty innovation survives for several hundreds years (clean
innovation exceeds dirty innovation only around year 500), but throughout, innovation rates
in the clean technology are significantly higher than in the laissez-faire equilibrium shown
in Figure 4 where they converged to zero in about 25 years.
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Figure 7 depicts the implied path of temperature increases under the optimal policies, in the
same two ways as we have done in Figure 5—assuming either that emissions from the rest
of the world are constant or that they grow at the same rate as US emissions. In both cases,
global temperature increases less, and in fact significantly less with ρsp

183

 0.1%, than in

Figure 5.
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Optimal Time-Varying Policies

We now return to optimal time-varying policies and characterize the welfare gains from
using time-varying rather than constant policies. For computational reasons, we look for
policies that take a simple “step function form” with three endogenously determined switch
points.21
The resulting optimal policies are shown in Figure 8. A couple of features are worth
noting. First, the subsidy rate for clean research is very similar to the constant policies in
both cases. With a social discount rate of ρsp

 0.1%, this subsidy rate is roughly constant

(starting at 95% and declining to 93% at year 54).22 Moreover, in this case, the carbon tax
starts somewhat higher than with the optimal constant policy but then declines from 54%
to 34% at year 92). With ρsp

 1%, the pattern is different:

21

the subsidy rate starts and

For our baseline results, we experimented with increasing the number of switch points and with alternative formulations of time variation, with broadly similar results.
22
Note that research subsidies in the far future may not matter very much because early research subsidies
may have already induced a large reallocation of research from dirty to clean. Nevertheless, research subsidies
in the future are not undetermined because there is always some positive fraction of firms with a dirty portfolio
of product lines which will then have incentives to undertake research in the dirty technology (this fraction
declines to zero asymptotically in the optimal allocation with ρsp  0.1%).
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remains at 25%, again very close to its constant optimal policy value, but the carbon tax
starts at zero and stay there for quite a while, and then increases dramatically to 650% in
year 328.
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The patterns shown in Figure 8 result from the interplay of two counteracting forces.
First, all else equal, the social planner would like to delay as much as possible the consumption loss from switching to clean technologies.23 Second, carbon taxes early on are more
effective in both switching production and reducing emissions (given the long half life of
carbon in the atmosphere imposed in our model of the carbon cycle). With ρsp

 1%, the

first effect is dominant because with this relatively high social discount rate, high consumption during the early years is highly valued, encouraging the planner to delay the start of
high carbon taxes for quite a while. In consequence, in this case carbon taxes are sharply
backloaded, and in fact, as in the constant policy case, dirty innovation disappears only
very slowly—over several hundreds of years. With ρsp

 0.1%, the future is less heavily

discounted, strengthening the second effect and making carbon taxes frontloaded and the
complete switch to clean innovation much more rapid. In both cases, however, the average
23

This effect in part reflects the fact that the social planner is committing to a policy path and is not “time
consistent”.
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values of the carbon tax in the first 200 years is in the ballpark of the constant optimal
policies (16% with ρsp

 1% and 44% with ρsp  0.1%).

Table 7 shows that the welfare loss from using constant policies is quite small, 0.3%
with ρsp



0.1%, but sizable, about 16%, with ρsp



1%, which reflects the benefits

for social planner’s utility resulting from high consumption growth at the expense of high
emissions in the first 300 years. This pattern suggests that the results with the low social
discount rate, ρsp

 0.1%, are more plausible in a range of dimensions.24
TABLE 7. W ELFARE C OSTS
ρsp

 1%

ρsp

16%

3.5.3

 0.1%
0.3%

Counterfactual Policy Analysis

Our model enables us to investigate the welfare and climatic implications of a range of
counterfactual policies. Here we focus on two counterfactuals. The first is relying just
on a carbon tax (i.e., no research subsidy) as the policy tool, and the second is delaying
intervention for 50 years and then choosing the optimal policy from that point onwards.
We focus on time-varying optimal policies, which are shown for these two counterfactual
We have also verified that our main results with an intermediate social discount rate of ρsp  0.5%
are very similar to those with ρsp  0.1%, again making us trust these results more than the ones based on
ρsp  1%.
24
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policies in Figure 9.
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Optimal policies following the 50-year delay are more aggressive than the baseline optimal
policies, and when the only policy tool is the carbon tax, this tax also is typically higher.25
For example, in the carbon tax only counterfactual, this tax is higher because it is also
being used to redirect innovation towards clean technologies. As a result, with ρsp

 1%,

aggregate temperature increases less at long horizons under this constrained optimal policy
than our actual optimal policy, but this is at the expense of slower output growth, especially
early on. As a result, the cost of just relying on carbon tax for optimal policy, shown in
Table 8, is 4.2% with ρsp

 1% and 3.4% with ρsp  0.1%. Delaying the start of optimal

policies by 50 years leads to greater losses—a consumption equivalent welfare cost of
8% with ρsp

 1%, and 16.6% with ρsp  0.1%.

These numbers indicate that delaying

policy interventions to combat carbon emissions could have very significant welfare costs,
especially when the social discount rate is low. Moreover, just relying on carbon taxes—
When just relying on the carbon tax and with ρsp  0.1%, the carbon tax reaches zero earlier than in the
baseline shown in Figure 8. Nevertheless, it is effectively more aggressive than the baseline since it starts at a
higher level (66% instead of 54%) and remains at a higher level (54% instead of 34%) for the first 220 years,
and this induces both a much more rapid switch to clean production and also encourages a switch to clean
innovation despite the absence of research subsidies in this case.
25
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eschewing research subsidies—could also have sizable welfare costs.
TABLE 8. W ELFARE C OSTS
Carbon Tax Only
ρsp

 1%

4.2%

ρsp

50-year Delay

 0.1%

ρsp

3.4%

 1%

8.0%

ρsp

 0.1%

16.6 %

Finally, we also evaluate what the climatic and welfare implications of maintaining
current US policies (here interpreted for the whole world) would be relative to adopting an
optimal policy moving forward. For this purpose, we have tried to estimate the carbon taxes
implied by US policies and the current subsidies to clean innovation (relative to dirty R&D)
in our sample of firms. There is much uncertainty about what the carbon tax in the United
States will be moving forward. A cap-and-trade program is likely to be implemented, but it
is unclear what the implied carbon tax rate will be. On the other hand, Greenstone, Michael,
Elizabeth Kopits, and Anne Wolverton (2011) estimate a social cost of carbon equal to
about $21 in 2010, expressed in 2007 dollars, and this number is currently being used
for cost-benefit analysis by US agencies. This social cost estimate is the central tendency
across a number of models and scenarios considered. The social cost increases in real 2007
terms to $45 in 2050 as a consequence of future marginal emissions becoming ever more
harmful. We therefore use two values for the “business-as-usual” carbon tax, 0% consistent
with the current situation, and 24% (approximately implied by $45 social cost of carbon
in 2050, a relatively early point in the transition path).26 We estimate the current clean
26

In particular, US carbon emissions are 1.58 billion tons in 2002. One metric ton of carbon is equivalent
to 3.667 units of carbon dioxide. Our dirty firms have sales of approximately one trillion dollars in this
year. The $45 social cost is $39 in 2002 terms. These numbers imply a real tax rate in 2050 of about 23%
(p39  3.667  1.58  109 q{1012  0.23). We approximate this with an 24% tax rate (since our taxes
have to be multiples of λ). This carbon tax rate is much less than currently used in Sweden (see Golosov,
Mikhail, John Hassler, Per Krusell, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2011) and also less than the numbers suggest that
by Nordhaus, William (2008).
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research subsidy from our sample as follows: over our full 30 year period, 49% of all R&D
expenditures by our clean firms are federally funded, while the same number is 11% for
our dirty firms. This implies a 43% (p1  0.49q { p1  0.11q  1  0.43) subsidy for clean
R&D relative to dirty R&D.
The scenario with a zero carbon tax, regardless of the discount rate, involves 100%
welfare costs because, in this case, temperature increases rapidly and continues to grow
unboundedly. Essentially, 43% R&D subsidy for clean is insufficient to redirect technological change towards clean with no carbon tax. The resulting significant damage to the
environment leads to a disastrous welfare result. Interestingly, however, even with this less
than optimal subsidy to clean research, it turns out that the temperature increase can be
contained if there is a moderate carbon tax at 24%. As a result, with this moderate carbon
tax, the welfare costs are still sizable but limited as shown in Table 9.
TABLE 9. W ELFARE C OSTS

 24%, s  43%
ρsp  1% ρsp  0.1%

 0, s  43%
ρsp  1% ρsp  0.1%

τ

18%

3.6

τ

8%

100%

100%

Robustness and Extensions

In this section, we investigate how our estimation, optimal policy and counterfactual results are affected by a range of different modeling assumptions or variations on parameter
estimates. Throughout, to economize on space we only report the implied optimal policies
(even when the variation in question involves reestimating the parameters of the underlying
model).
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3.6.1

Alternative Damage Elasticity γ

As noted above, actual damages from atmospheric carbon may be greater than the estimates
commonly used in the economics literature. We now show the sensitivity of our results to
higher values of these damages, captured by the parameter γ, in our model. Table 10
depicts constant optimal policies for two cases, when γ is twice and 10 times as large as
our baseline value, γ

 5.3  105, and Figure 10 shows optimal time-varying policies for

the same two cases.

TABLE 10. O PTIMAL C ONSTANT P OLICIES
γ
ρsp

 2

 1%

ρsp

γ

 0.1%

ρsp

 10

 1%

ρsp

 0.1%

τ

16%

44%

τ

24%

54%

s

61%

95%

s

95%

95%

Overall, the results are remarkably similar to those in our baseline. Interestingly, with
ρsp

 1%, optimal constant policies are identical when γ is twice as large as the baseline.

This result, which at first appears counterintuitive, is because the optimal policy in this case
does not eliminate but chooses to contain carbon emissions (and does not even eliminate
the dirty sector). When γ is doubled, the social planner still prefers to maintain this containment strategy, making optimal policies very similar to the baseline. When γ is taken to
be much larger (10 times as large as the baseline), this is no longer optimal, and we now
see a more aggressive carbon tax and a much more aggressive research subsidy, utilized for
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eliminating the dirty sector.
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Optimal time-varying policies, which are shown in Figure 10, are also quite similar—
but not identical—to the baseline.
Overall, with the exception of the last case mentioned, the results suggest that the qualitative, and even quantitative, messages from our analysis are fairly robust to different
economic damages from atmospheric concentration.

3.6.2

Costly Research Subsidy

We next investigate the robustness of our results to assuming that R&D subsidies create
direct distortions. In particular, we assume that for every dollar of subsidy, 1

χ dollars

need to be spent, so that χ is a waste, which we subtract from consumption. We consider
two values of χ, 50% and 100%, both of which are very aggressive choices on the distortion
or implications of research subsidies. The results for constant policies are shown in Table
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11.
TABLE 11. O PTIMAL C ONSTANT P OLICIES
50% Consumption Cost
ρsp

 1%

ρsp

100% Consumption Cost

 0.1%

ρsp

 1%

ρsp

 0.1%

τ

16%

54%

τ

16%

66%

s

61%

53%

s

61%

0%

We find that except in one case, optimal policy still makes use of aggressive research
subsidies despite the significant waste that these create. The reason for this is that, as
implied by our discussion above, the carbon tax is a poor substitute for research subsidies;
it also encourages clean research but does so at the cost of creating more intra-temporal
distortions. In consequence, there is ample room for research subsidies even when they
are distortionary. In fact, Table 11 shows that with a discount rate of ρsp

 1%, optimal

constant policies are identical to the case without any distortions. Intuitively, the social
planner finds it optimal to leave the carbon tax unchanged (recall that the carbon tax can
only change in steps), and with unchanged carbon tax, the research subsidy also remains
constant. With the lower social discount rate, ρsp

 0.1%, the carbon tax becomes more

aggressive; in fact, with 100% distortions from research subsidies and this lower social
discount rate, the optimal constant policy increases the carbon tax significantly and ceases
to use research subsidies. However, Figure 11 shows that optimal time-varying policies in
this case still involve heavy use of positive research subsidies. Moreover, the qualitative
pattern of optimal time-varying policies is quite similar to the baseline, shown in Figure
8, and again involve backloading of carbon taxes for ρsp
taxes for ρsp





1%, frontloading of carbon

0.1%, and fairly aggressive use of research subsidies, especially in the

first few hundred years. The fact that research subsidies are now phased out entirely with
ρsp

 0.1% is also very intuitive: research subsidies early on are sufficient to switch most

innovation to clean, and start influencing only a few firms after a while (as most leading192

edge technologies are now clean); because they are costly and become largely unnecessary,
it is natural for the social planner to rely less on them. With ρsp

 1%, this does not happen

because the transition to clean technology is slower and research subsidies are still useful
for several hundreds of years.

Optimal Policies, ρ =1%

Optimal Policies, ρ =0.1%

sp

1.5

sp

1

τ, 50% c os t
s , 50% c os t
τ, 100% c os t
s , 100% c os t

0.8

1

0.6

τ, 50% c os t
s , 50% c os t
τ, 100% c os t
s , 100% c os t

0.4
0.5
0.2
0
0

500

1000

0
0

Number of Y ears

500

1000

Number of Y ears

F IGURE 11 A

F IGURE 11 B

Overall, we conclude that with reasonable values of distortions, and even with certain
extreme values of distortions, the broad pattern of optimal policies is quite similar to the
baseline case, and research subsidies are still an essential part of the portfolio of optimal
policies, even if they may be significantly distortionary.

3.6.3

Alternative R&D Elasticities η

Our baseline results are for η



0.45 which averaged across cross-sectional and first-

difference estimates. We now reestimate the model using first a value of η in the ballpark
of the cross-sectional estimates (η
difference estimates (η

 0.65) and then for a value corresponding to the first-

 0.35), and investigate the implications of this for the fit of the

model and for optimal policy. Overall, the fit of the model is not affected much by the
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change in η, and the implications for optimal constant policies are shown in Table 12 and
optimal time-varying policies are shown in Figure 12.
TABLE 12. O PTIMAL C ONSTANT P OLICY R ATES
η
ρsp

 0.35

 1%

ρsp

η

 0.1%

ρsp

 0.65

 1%

ρsp

 0.1%

τ

16%

34%

τ

24%

66%

s

0%

95%

s

84%

84%

When the elasticity of innovation to R&D effort is higher than in our baseline, at

 0.65, the results are also remarkably similar to the baseline both with constant and
time-varying policies. With the lower elasticity, η  0.35 and ρsp  0.1%, they are also
fairly similar. However, with η  0.35 and ρsp  1%, the optimal constant policy is quite
different. To understand the reason why, recall that in our baseline with ρsp  1%, the
η

optimal policy involves positive research effort directed both towards dirty and clean technologies. When the elasticity of innovation to R&D declines, the social planner, restricted
to a constant policy and with a reasonably high discount rate, finds it optimal to induce
a slow switch to clean technology, which can be achieved with just a carbon tax. This is
partly an artifact of constant policies; Figure 12 shows that optimal time-varying policies
still heavily rely on research subsidies in this case. We thus conclude that the main message
from our baseline results continue to apply with a fairly wideband of elasticities.
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Alternative Leapfrogging Probabilities α

3.6.4

We also investigate the implications of different values of α, in particular, focusing on a
lower and higher estimate of α (α

 0.03 and α  0.05). The results reported in Table 13

and Figure 13 are quite similar to the baseline results both quantitatively and qualitatively.
In particular, optimal constant policies are in the ballpark of our baseline with α

 0.04,

and optimal time-varying policies have the same backloading and frontloading properties
and similar values, though the exact switch points do differ.

TABLE 13. O PTIMAL C ONSTANT P OLICY R ATES
α  0.03
ρsp

 1%

ρsp

α  0.05

 0.1%

ρsp

 1%

ρsp

 0.1%

τ

24%

54%

τ

16%

44%

s

95%

95%

s

32%

95%
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Alternative Initial Technology Distribution

Finally, we also considered an initial technology gap distribution defined with several modifications from our baseline. First, rather than just sum patent counts, we weight patents
by the normalized citation counts the patent receives. Second, we consider four-digit industries rather than three-digit industries. And third, we only consider industries within the
manufacturing and energy sectors. Using these criteria, there are 332 SIC4 industries that
are of sufficient size in terms of innovative firm counts to pass Census Bureau disclosure
restrictions. Among these industries, 9.4% are led by the clean-energy stock. Table 14
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summarizes some moments of this distribution:
TABLE 14. I NITIAL C ONDITION D ISTRIBUTIONS SIC4
Metric:

Clean Energy

Dirty Energy

Mean Patent Total

140

663

Standard Deviation

401

1242

Share: [0,20]

53%

2%

Share: [21,100]

23%

18%

Share: [101,500]

17%

48%

Share: [500+]

6%

33%

The average gap to the frontier for dirty-patents stocks in the 9% of cases where clean
patents have the lead is 463 patents, or in relative terms, 33% of the total patenting in that
line to date. The average gap to the frontier for clean-patent stocks in the 91% of cases
where dirty patents have the lead is 624 patents and 82% in relative terms. The conversion
factor in this case is 12.6{0.161. The distribution graph has a broadly similar shape as
Figure 3 and we omit it to save space. The fraction of product lines with a non-zero gap in
terms of step sizes is 82%. Clean energy leads by one or more step sizes in 7% of cases.
Dirty energy has a lead of 20 and 50 steps sizes or more in 8% and 2% of technologies,
respectively.
TABLE 15. O PTIMAL C ONSTANT P OLICY R ATES
ρsp

 1%

ρsp

 0.1%

τ

16%

54%

s

74%

95%

Using this alternative distribution of initial technology gaps has fairly limited impact
on optimal constant and time-varying policies, which are shown in Table 15 and Figure

197

14. Both optimal constant and time-varying policies are remarkably similar to the baseline,
making us conclude that our qualitative and even quantitative results are fairly robust to
reasonable variations in the initial distribution of technology gaps.
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Conclusion

One of the central challenges facing the world economy is reducing carbon emissions,
which appears to be feasible only if a successful transition to clean technology can be
induced. This paper has investigated the nature of a transition to clean technology theoretically and empirically. We developed a microeconomic model where clean and dirty technologies compete in production and innovation. If dirty technologies are more advanced to
start with, the potential transition to clean technology can be difficult both because clean
research must climb several steps to catch up with dirty technology and because this gap
discourages research effort directed towards clean technologies. We characterized several
properties of the equilibrium in this model and then estimated its key parameters from microdata on production, employment, R&D, patents and entry and exit of firms in the US
energy sector, using regression analysis and simulated method of moments. Our model per-
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forms fairly well in matching a range of patterns in the data that were not directly targeted
in the estimation, giving us confidence that it is potentially useful for the analysis of the
transition to clean technology in the US energy sector.
Theoretically, carbon taxes and research subsidies encourage production and innovation in clean technologies. The key question we investigate using our estimated quantitative
model is whether optimal policy will indeed secure a transition to clean technology, and if
so how rapidly, and whether it will do so using carbon taxes or a combination of carbon
taxes and research subsidies. A naïve intuition would be that only carbon taxes should be
used because externalities are created by carbon (in the absence of these carbon externalities, the social planner would have no reason to interfere with or subsidize research).
In contrast to this intuition, we find that optimal policy heavily relies on research subsidies, and this result is fairly robust across a range of variations and for different damages
and social discount rates. We also use the model to evaluate the welfare consequences of a
range of alternative policy structures. For example, just relying on carbon taxes or delaying
intervention both have significant welfare costs.
Though, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to develop a microeconomic
model of the transition to clean technology and to quantitatively characterize optimal policy in such a setup, our paper has inevitably left several questions unanswered and taken a
number of shortcuts, all of which constitute interesting areas for future research and investigation. We list some of these we view as particularly important here:
1. Our damage function enabled us to abstract from emissions in the rest of the world.
Though very convenient, this approach left out several interesting considerations.
The first is the interaction between US and global emissions.
2. The second is the potential impact of US transition to clean technology on technology
choices in the rest of the world. In particular, to the extent that there is such an impact,
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optimal policy may be more aggressive (for reasons discussed in Acemoglu, Daron,
Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn, and David Hemous (2012)) because it might
have the power to also induce a switch to clean technology in the rest of the world
also.
3. These concerns naturally fit into another important topic: game-theoretic interactions
in emissions and technology choice across several countries in the global economy
(Harstad, Bard (2012), Dutta, Prajit K and Radner, Roy (2006)).
4. For reasons we have explained, we did not allow for nonlinear threshold effects in
the impact of atmospheric carbon on economic efficiency. Such nonlinearities are
likely to be important and their exact position might be uncertain. Incorporating
such nonlinearities, together with an explicit approach to uncertainty along the lines
of Weitzman, Martin (2009), would be an important area for future research. This
would also necessitate a much more detailed investigation of the interactions between
US emissions and the rest of the world.
5. Our optimal policies are characterized under the assumptions of commitment to the
policy sequence by the social planner. In the absence of such commitment, there will
be a time inconsistency problem. An obvious important next step is to characterize
time-consistent optimal policy.
6. Another interesting area is to investigate the interactions between international trade,
technology and emissions (see Hemous, David (2012)).
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Appendix A
Technological Interdependence
A.1

Data Construction

Name Matching The following procedure is used to match firm entities by name from
both the US patent data and Compustat balance sheet information
1. Remove non-corporate entities
2. Drop corporate name identifiers and common English words
3. Group and standardizing suspected acronyms
4. Construct a similarity score basic on token and positional information for each pair
of names
5. Group names by a given cutoff similarity score.
As noted by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), weighting tokens by their frequency
of appearance would enhance match. The fact that certain uncommon words (such as
“Samsung”) appear in so many patents may skew this process, so an iterative is needed.
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A.2

Two Type Model

I now introduce heterogeneity amongst firms in the form of persistent types in order to
explain trends regarding innovation, firm growth, and patent transfers between and amongst
large/small and young/old firms. Much of the previous derivations carry through here. The
production environment, in particular, is identical.
One major difference that arises when introducing firm-level heterogeneity is that the
indeterminacy in the direction of transfer is partially broken. When a high-type and lowtype firm have a sequential interaction (in either direction), the patents are ultimately operated entirely by the high-type firm. However, it is still the case that when two firms of
common type interact, the direction must be chosen arbitrarily. Moving to a model with
a continuum of firm types would entirely eliminate this indeterminacy, but at the cost of
tractability.

Equilibrium There are two types of firms: high-intensity and low-intensity innovators,
herein referred to as high and low type, that are differentiated by their R&D cost functions.
High type firms transition to non-adopting firms at flow rate ν. Being a low type firm is
an absorbing state. Denote a generic firm type with i

P tH, Lu.

There is a type-specific

innovation cost function ci pq for external innovation. The internal innovation technology
dpq is the same across types. An entrant firm starts as type H with probability ζ H and type
L with probability ζ L

 1  ζH.
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Successful innovation yields a present value Vs i . The per-product value of a firm is then
rpλq
δF V H pλq  V9 H pλq  π

ΩH
x

ΩH
z

ατ ppEV H pβλq  V H pλqq

p1  αqτ p0  V H pλqq
bpV0H  V H pλqq ν pV L pλq  V H pλqq
δF V L pλq  V L pλq  π
rpλq ΩL
ΩLz
x
ατ L ppEV L pβλq  V L pλqq ατ H ppEV H pβλq  V L pλqq
p1  αqτ p0  V Lpλqq bpV0L  V Lpλqq
9

where

pδF
pδF

τ qV0H

 V0H  ΩHx
τ qV0L  V0L  ΩLx
9

ΩH
0

9

ΩL0

ν pV0L  V0H q

and

Ωix

wc
r i pxi q

 max
x
i

Ωiz pλq  max
i
z

Ωi0

xi Vs i

r 1 dpz i q
wλ

r pz0i q
 max
wd
z
i
0

(

z0i pErV i pβλq  V0i q

As before, posit a linearly separable form

 B H λ1
V L pλq  AL  B L λ1

V H pλq  AH
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(

z i pErV i pβλq  V i pλqq
(

We then find for the high type

pδF
pδF

b
b

p1  αqτ qAH  AH  1 ΩHx bV0H ν
p1  αqτ qB H  B H  1  ΩHz  ατ p{p1
9

AL  AH

9

κ1 qB H



ν pB L  B H q

and for the low type

pδF
pδF

b
b

p1  αqτ qAL  AL  1 ΩLx bV0L ατ H ppAH  ALq
p1  αqτ qB L  B L  1  ΩLz  ατ Lp{p1 κ1qB L  ατ H ppB L  B H {λq
9

9

The option values of innovation be simplified to
r i p xi q
wc
 max
x

xi Vs i

Ωiz

r pz i q
 max
wd
z

z i B i {p1

Ωi0

r pz i q
wd
 max
z

z i pAi  B i {p1

i

i

i

Now it can be verified that B H
and z H

(

Ωix

 zH  z.

 B L  B.

κ1 q

(
(

κq  V0i q

As such we will also have ΩH
z

 ΩLz  Ωz

As high type firms have a superior innovation technology, they will

assume production in the case of sequential innovation. Between firms of a common type,
it is ambiguous. The expected gain from innovation is given by
Vs H

 rp1  αq
αp1  pq

Vs L

 rp1  αq
αp1  pq

αµ0 s EV H pβ q

» 8
1

pEV H pβλq  V H pλqqdµH pλq

αµ0 s EV L pβ q

» 8
1

pEV pβλq  V pλqqdµ pλq
H

L

H

204

»8
1

»8
1



pEV H pβλq  V LpλqqdµL pλq



pEV pβλq  V pλqqdµ pλq
L

L

L

These can then be simplified to

 rp1  αq
Vs L  rp1  αq

Vs H

αµ0 s pAH

 B H {p1
αµ0 s pAL  B H {p1



κqq

αp1  pq pµ Γ B H {p1

κqq

αp1  pq pµ Γ B H {p1



κ1 q

µ L p AH



 AL q

κ1 q µH pAH  AL q

Let there be a mass L of researchers. The labor market clearing condition is
1

Γ
r
w

p µH

eζ H qcpxH q

p µL

eζ L qcpxL q

H
µH
0 dpz0 q

µL0 dpz0L q

µ Γ dpz q

Steady State Imposing stationarity of values and state space elements, the firm value
functions simplify to

B

δ

F

b

p1  αqτ pατ p

1
z

δ τ b
δ τ



p1  1{ηqq{p1

κ1 q

and

AH

 δ1

F

ΩH
x
b

bV0H νAL
p1  αqτ ν

AL

 δ1

F

ΩLx
b

bV0L ατ H pAH
p1  αqτ ατ H p

The first part of Theorem 1 regarding the value of Γ still holds in the environment, however the technological lead distribution is no longer tractable. As before the overall inverse
technological lead is given by Γ  µ0

µ Γ .

The relevant product mass distributions have flow equations

 bµH  pτ z0H ν qµH0
µL0  bµL νµH
z0L qµL0
0  pτ
µH  τ H µ0 z0H µH
τ H µL  p1  αqτ L µH  νµH  bµH
0
µL  τ L µ0 z0L µL0 p1  αqτ L µH  τ H µL νµH  bµL

µ9 H
0
9

9

9
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The overall mass distributions by type are

 τ H p1  µH q  τ LµH0  p1  αqτ LµH  νµH
H L
µL  τ L µH
p1  αqτ LµH νµH
0 τ µ

µ9 H
9

A bit of algebra reveals that the mass of high type firms can be expressed as

µH

with µL





τH

τL

τH

b

p1αqpτ

z0H ν
b τ z0H ν

q



ν

 1  µH . The fractions of products that are expired conditional on type are then
µH
0
µL0









b
b

τ
b

b

z0H



ν

µH

νµH
0
µL
τ z0L

The average inverse technological lead for patent protected product lines resolves to

Γ

 p1 p1αqταqτb pκτpτ zqzµ0 bq

These can be used to determine the labor market clearing condition.
For simulations, we also need the conditional step distributions. For high type

 bµH  pb τ z0H ν qµH0
H
µH
ατ H µ0 z0H µH
τ
1  p1  αqτ
0  pb
H
µH
pατ L zqµHn1  pb τ
n  ατ µn1

µ9 H
0

z

9

9
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z

ν qµH
1
ν qµH
n

and for low type

 νµH0 bµL  pb τ z0LqµL0
µL1  νµH
p1  αqτ L τ Lµ0 z0LµL0  pb
1
µLn  νµH
pατ L zqµLn1  pb τ zqµLn
n
µ9 L0
9

τ

z qµL1

9

These can be solved for iteratively with foreknowledge of µH and µL .

A.3

Algorithm

Equilibrium The basic models without industry heterogeneity can be solved in a straightforward fashion by setting up systems of equations consisting of first order conditions and
the labor market clearing condition. These will depend on the aggregate innovation rates,
so as to allow for the direct computation of product distributions, and the wage rate.
Moving to a setting with industry heterogeneity, the algorithm can be split into two
levels. First, a wage rate is proposed, then each industry equilibrium is solved individually
as in the basic model. Finally, these solution vectors are aggregated to evaluate the overall
labor market clearing condition and the aggregate growth rate. Solving this system for
the wage rate and growth rate constitutes solving the equilibrium in its entirety. I use the
Powell’s hybrid method1 described in Powell (1970) to solve equations at both the industry
level and overall equilibrium level. For more information on solving nonlinear systems,
see Zangwill and Garcia (1981).

Simulations Simulating firms in an efficient manner involves a small amount of further
derivation. In particular, when a firm undertakes a successful innovation, with probability
α it must purchase rights to existing technology from the incumbent, assuming said incum1

The exact code used is from the MINPACK library through the Python wrapper in SciPy.
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bent’s product has patent protection. In this case, if the innovating firm assumes production
(i.e., with probability q is the untyped case), the step size of the product they receive can
be drawn from the steady state distribution. In addition there will be one further innovation
on top of that.
Interestingly, since the realization of the step size value for a given patent does not
affect future patenting dynamics, these two factors will be independent in steady state as
well. Assuming step increments are Pareto distributed, the distribution of the technological
lead for a product line with n patents will be
logpλq  Erlangpn, 1{κq
as the log of a Pareto random variable is exponentially distributed and the sum of i.i.d.
exponentials random variables is Erlang distributed. Note that the Erlang distribution is
simply the Gamma distribution with an integer curvature parameter.

Social Planner’s Problem The social planner’s problem in the model with industry heterogeneity can be simplified in a manner similar to that of cost minimization techniques
when dealing with multi-product firm problems. In the general setting, a social planner
must choose vector ~x of consisting of aggregate innovation rates for each industry, i.e.,
~x

 pτ1H , τ1L, z1, . . . , τMH , τML , zM q.

Use the notation xi1

 τiH , xi2  τiL, and xi3  zi.

Define the following maximization problem for each industry i
∆i pλL , λg q  max t∆i p~xi q  λL LR p~xi q
~
xi

λg g p~xi qu

where λL and λg represent the aggregate shadow values of labor and growth. Let the
maximands of the above be denoted ~xi pλL , λg q. Finally, let ~xpλL , λg q
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 r~xipλL, λg qsMi1

and ∆pλL , λg q 

±M

 ∆i pλL , λg q. Define the aggregate maximization

i 1

#

S

rδ pσ  1qgp~xpλL, λg qqs
 λmax
,λ



g

L

+

1  LR p~xpλL , λg qq
∆pλL , λg q

σ 1

It can be shown that any maximizer of the above problem is socially optimal. The above
formulation has the advantage of having computational complexity that scales linearly with
the number of industries, rather than quadratically.

A.4
Proof of Theorem 2.

Proofs

It is now necessary to specify a form for the R&D cost function.

As is common in the existing literature, I use a constant elasticity function with exponent η
cpxq  cxη
Using the first order condition for innovation intensity, we can find an expression relating
the option value of innovation and the expected return from successful innovation
Ω  p1  1{η qxVs





1  1{η
1 e

τ Vs

Then we can construct an equation characterizing the relationship between Vs and τ


Vs

where q0



q0

 p1  α q

1
δ b 1 α τ

p q



1  q0



1



1 κ

{

1 1 η
1 e



B
τ
δ τ

αp1  pq pΓ  µ0 q



κ
1 κ



B

δ b τ
δ b 1 α τ

p q

αµ0 is the probability of not having to purchase patent rights from

the existing incumbent upon a successful innovation. This expression can be shown to be
well-defined and positive for any τ

¥ 0. Call this function Vs pτ q. The first order condition
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for innovation be rearranged to

LR

 cp1

eq1η τ η

s

 ηΓτ V τ Vs

Notice the value on the left is the share of resources devoted to research and the value on
the right is strictly less than one, so we are guaranteed to find such a τ satisfying the above
equation that results in a mixture of production and research labor. Showing uniqueness,
which can be assured with the concavity of Vs pq, is a more difficult matter. However, this
can be easily verified for particular sets of parameters.
Proof of Theorem 3. Using the expression for logp∆q in Equation 1.8, we can derive

B logp∆q  
Bτ
bp1
b



τ z0

mq τ z0
bp1 mq τ z0

1
mb
τ z0
2
τ z0 pb τ z0 q
b τ z0
1



1
Bm
Bτ

1
m

Bm
Bτ

Equation 1.7 implies that m increases with both τ and α. Further, we can derive

Bm  κ  αb  p1  αqz 
Bτ
pb p 1  α qτ q2
which implies

B  Bm  ¡ 0
Bα Bτ
The above expression simplifies to

B logp∆q 
Bτ
pb



m
τ z0 q2 bm
Bm  τ z0
Bτ b τ z0

bm
b τ





z0
1

1
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m



bp1

τ z0
mq τ

z0

which can be seen to be increasing in α. As τ and z0 enter into the above expression in the
exact same manner, the same logic applies for z0 as well. However, z0 does not affect m,
the resulting expression is simply

B logp∆q 
Bz0
pb

m
τ z0 q2



bm

bm
b τ

z0

Conversely, z affects m positively but does not change the composition between expired
and unexpired product lines, meaning we find

B logp∆q  Bm  τ
Bz
Bz b τ

z0
z0







1
1

m

bp1

τ z0
mq τ

z0

Varying z and z0 simultaneously would yield an expression equivalent to that for τ , where
both terms are present.
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Appendix B
Back to Basics
B.1

Theoretical Proofs

As the downstream production technology is unchanged in the generalized model and we
continue to impose symmetry across the industries. This implies that

Pi

 P  M1

Yi

and

 Y  Z.

(B.1)

Henceforth, we can drop the industry index i. The perfectly competitive firm that produces
midstream good Yi takes equilibrium prices P and pj as given while maximizing its profit
#

» 1

max P
yj



ε 1
ε

yj

dj

 εε 1

0



+

»1

pj yj dj

.

0

This maximization leads to the following inverse demand for upstream good j

pj

P



Y
yj
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1
ε

.

Monopolist in product line j, j has productivity qj . The firm takes the demand function for
its product as given and solves the following maximization problem

πj

 max
y
j

"





ε 1
ε

1
ε

P Y yj

w
yj
qj

*

This delivers the following optimal quantity

yj





1
M



ε1
ε

q

ε
j

Z

w

Plugging this into the production function for midstream goods, we find a relationship
between wage w and aggregated productivity q̄

w



1
M



³




qjε1 dj ε1

ε1
ε

1

q̄

(B.2)

With this, we can greatly simplify the expression of the firm’s quantity and price choices
as a function of its normalized productivity qpj

yj

 qpjεZ

 qj {q̄
pj

and

 M1qp

j

Denote variables normalized by Z {M with a “”. Then the normalized profit and labor
are given by
rj
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r
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r is the normalized wage. Note that by construction qpjε1 dj
where w

(B.3)

 1. As a result, we

integrate B.3 over j to find profit share and production labor share as
M

³1

πj dj
Z

0

 1ε

and
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wLP
Z

 ε ε 1 .

(B.4)

Finally, we combine B.2 and B.4 to find the final output as a function of aggregate productivity q̄ and total production labor LP :

Z
Proof of Lemma 4

 q̄LP {M.

Let FH p, tq and FC p, tq be the aggregate product cumulative mea-

sures by type (hot or hold) at time t. For a small time step ∆, hot distribution FH p, tq will
satisfy
FH pqp, t

∆q FH pqp{p1

∆g q, tq  ∆τ rFH pqp{p1

∆τbe FC pqp{p1

∆g q, tq  FH pqp{p1

∆g q  η, tq  ∆ζFH pqp{p1

∆g q, tq

∆g q  η, tqs
∆τbd FC pqp{p1

∆g q, tq

Similarly, the cold distribution FC p, tq will satisfy
FC pqp, t

∆q FC pqp{p1

∆g q, tq  ∆τa rFC pqp{p1

 ∆τb FC pqp{p1

∆g q, tq

∆g q, tq  FC pqp{p1

∆ζFH pqp{p1

∆g q  λ, tqs

∆g q, tq

Finally, for i P tH, C u, calculating
F9 i pqpq 

Fi pqp, t

∆q  Fi pqp, tq
∆

and taking the limit as ∆ Ñ 0 yields the desired flow equations. Note that for this we use
Fi pqp{p1

∆g q, tq  Fi pqp, tq
∆

 gqprBFipqpq{Bqps

Proof of Proposition 5. Let F p, tq be the distribution over q at time t. Similarly, let FH p, tq
and FC p, tq be the product type (hot/cold) conditional distributions. Thus, we will have
F pq, tq  αFH pq, tq

p1  αqFC pq, tq. The evolution of the aggregated productivity index
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q̄ is then given by
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and the normalized differential is
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Finally, the growth can be expressed compactly as
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This can also be rearranged into
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Proof of Proposition 6. The firm value, in general form, can be expressed as
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This completes the proof.

Derivation of Multi-industry Distribution Γm,n . We assume that when a firm loses its last
product in a particular industry, it maintains a foothold there, in the sense that it still receives
buy-out offers and can still directly use basic research relevant to that industry. When a firm
loses all of its products or receives a destructive shock, it ceases to exist. We wish to find
the joint distribution over the number of industries a firm is in and how many product lines
it owns. For notational convenience, let us denote the basic research flow from m-industry
firms by pbm

 Bpφmqbm. Let us also denote the expansion rate of a firm into a new industry

by em . Here the expansion rate comes purely from buy-out offers by entrants. So given a
per firm buy-out offer rate of x, a firm in m industries will expand at rate
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Then the flow equation for firms in m industries with n products is
O UTFLOW




a1






am



n am





n am

κ
τ

em

κ

p
bm

em

κ

 Γ1,1



ae



2τ Γm,2

em1 Γm1,1 for m

$ 
& am

p
bm 1

2τ Γ1,2



p
bm

em


τ

e1

p
bm

I NFLOW



p
b1

κ

 Γm,1


τ

κ

 Γm,2

κ





τ
κ

κ

 Γm,n



%
$
'
'
'
&
'
'
'
%
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The first line equates the

outflows from pm  1, n  1q that happen once the firm loses its product at the rate τ

κ,

acquires a new product line at the rate κ, innovates a new good at the rate a1 pb1 on average
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or expands into a new industry at the rate e1 . On the other hand, inflow happens from
outsiders at the rate ae and from the firms with 2 products that lose one of their products at
the rate 2τ . Similar reasoning applies to the subsequent lines.
Using values for the Γm,n distribution gives us the mass of firms in a given pm, nq state.
The total mass of firms is then F

 °Mm1 °8n1 Γm,n.

We ultimately want the mass of

products in given industry state m. To get this we simply evaluate

µm



8̧


n  Γm,n
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B.2

Data & Data Organization

Empirical investigation of the relationship between R&D investment and multi-market activity of a firm requires reliable and extensive information not only on product markets and
on R&D characteristics of individual firms, but also on firm ownership status. The latter
allows us to identify the product markets to which the firm is linked via its business group.
We obtain this information from three different data sets.

R&D Information

Information about R&D investment comes from the annual R&D Sur-

vey conducted by the French Ministry of Research. The R&D survey is available in annual
waves of cross-sectional data, where the same firms are not necessarily sampled year after
year (Mairesse and Mohnen (2010)). The survey covers a representative sample of French
firms of more than 20 employees investing in R&D. However firms with less than .8 million
euros of R&D investment fill out a shorter and simplified survey. The survey includes extensive information about the financing of R&D. It not only breaks down R&D investment
according to the source of the funds but also provides its allocation to different types of
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R&D. More specifically, all firms are asked to report their R&D investment as either basic
or applied research.

Multi-Market Activity The identification of business group structures is based on a
yearly survey by INSEE called “Enquete Liaisons Financieres” (LIFI). It covers all economic activities but restricts its attention to firms that either employ more than 500 employees or generate more than 60 million euros in revenue, or hold more than 1.2 million
euros of traded shares. However, since 1998 the survey is cross-referenced with information from Bureau Van Dijk and thus covers almost the whole economy. The LIFI survey
contains information that makes it a unique data set for studying the relationship between
multi-market activity and investment in basic research. Besides providing information on
direct financial links between firms, it also accounts for indirect stakes and cross-ownership
when identifying the head of the group. This is important as it allows us to precisely reconstruct the group structure even in the presence of pyramids. This feature allows us to
obtain a reliable account of the structure of business groups in the French economy and, as
a consequence, reliable measures of our key variable, the multi-market presence of business
groups.
Since each firm can be active in several markets, we cross-reference the data set with an
extensive yearly survey by the Ministry of Industry (“Enquete Annuelle des Entreprises”).
The survey is filled out by French firms with more than 20 workers and contains information
not only on the different markets in which a firm operates but also information on market
dedicated sales for each segment. The data cover the vast majority of French firms and
span the period 2000-2006.

Balance-Sheet Information We use the firm- and industry-level data sets based on accounting data extracted again from the EAE files. The data also include unique firm iden-
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tifiers allowing us to match them to the R&D and LIFI data.

Data Organization
We first identify the ownership status of each firm in the economy and the head of the
group with which the firm is affiliated. Indeed, our data source (LIFI) defines a group as a
set of firms controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same entity (the head of the group). We
rely on a formal definition of control, requiring that a firm holds directly or through crossownership at least 50% of the voting rights in another firm’s general assembly. We do not
expect this to be a major source of bias in our sample as most French firms are private and
ownership concentration is strong even among listed firms.1 Firms that do not conform to
this definition are classified as stand-alone firms.
We then match the ownership information to our balance-sheet data and to our survey on
lines of business within firms. We drop firms that appear in the ownership data but for which
we cannot find balance-sheet information. We also delete as outliers firm-year observations
whose ROA falls outside a multiple of five of the interquartile range and firms that report
0 employment or which have negative sales. Based on our two sources of information we
identify the main line of business from the balance sheets and the different segments of the
firm from the survey on lines of business. For computational convenience we create a new
firm-group identifier that allows us to aggregate at the same time business groups, business
groups with multi-divisional firms, exclusively multi-divisional firms and true stand-alone
firms. We then define four measures of multi-market activity. The first measure counts
each market in which the firm-group is present either via its ownership links or its multi1
In their overview of ownership structures and voting power in France, Bloch and Kremp (1999) show
that ownership concentration is pervasive: for non-listed companies with more than 500 employees the main
shareholder’s ownership stake is 88%. The degree of ownership concentration is slightly lower for listed
companies but still above 50% in most cases.
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divisional structure. The second measure counts each market in which the firm-group is
present with at least 9 employees via its ownership links or its multi-divisional structure.
The third measure counts each market in which the firm-group is present exclusively via its
ownership links. The final measure counts each market in which the firm-group is present
exclusively via its ownership links and excluding financial activities.
We then define firm characteristics from balance-sheet data. There are three possible
organizational types and comparison issues might arise. Taking the firm as the economic
unit of interest has the advantage of simplicity since information is directly available in the
balance sheets. However, this method has the disadvantage of not being comparable across
organizational types. Indeed, most information for multi-divisional firms is aggregated
across lines of segment, whereas firms belonging to business groups have market-specific
information. Similar to existing studies by the Ministry of Research (Dhont-Peltrault and
Pfister (2011)), we decided to aggregate the information to the economic unit at the highest
level of control: the firm level for stand-alone and multi-divisional firms, and the business
group level for firms affiliated through majority ownership.2
In a final step we match the firms’ balance-sheet and patent information to information
contained in the R&D Survey. We focus on firms for which we have R&D information.
Again we aggregate at the highest level of control. As before, one has to be cautious in
aggregating on the basis of variables that might be prone to double-counting. When constructing information on the basic R&D intensity of a firm this is not the case as we are
focusing exclusively on “internal” research expenditures. Therefore, if a member of the
group contracts out research with another member of the group, then one will be counted
as “external” research expenditures and the other one as “internal” expenditures. To correct
for outliers in the dependent variable, we drop firm-year observations whose basic research
2

In addition to the economic rationale for constructing the data at the highest level of control there is also
a legal argument. Indeed most public administrations and tribunals define the eligibility of firms for subsidy
programs with respect to the business groups to which they belong.
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intensity, conditional on positive basic research, falls outside a multiple of five of the interquartile range. In addition we exclude firm-year observations whose total R&D to sales
ratio falls outside a multiple of five of the interquartile range.3

Policy Environment
It is useful to describe the policy environment in France during the period of our data. As
shown in Figure 2.1, the share of GDP devoted R&D expenditures in France was on average
2.2% between 2000 and 2006. The public sector, including public universities, accounted
for 0.8% of total research and development expenditures to GDP, while firms accounted for
the remaining 1.4% of research and development expenditures. Innovation policy during
the sample period featured a mix of measures to support R&D investment of firms through
public financing. The main instrument to stimulate private innovation activity during that
period consisted of approximately 2.5 billion euros of yearly subsidies allocated to firms
either through ministries or government agencies such as OSEO-ANVAR. Note that our
R&D survey allows us to directly measure this form of public financing in our sample.
Finally, the R&D tax credit system was seen by the government as a secondary policy
measure until a major reform in 2008 that increased the base and the rate of the the tax
credit.

Variable List
All variables are organized and computed according to the method set out in the previous
section. To summarize, we decided to aggregate the information to the economic unit at
the highest level of control: the firm level for stand-alone and multi-divisional firms, and
Alternatively, we exclude firm-year observations whose basic to applied R&D ratio falls above the 99th
percentile of the distribution. The results are qualitatively similar.
3

222

the business group level for firms affiliated through majority ownership. In the remainder
of the document we will, for the sake of notational convenience, refer generically to firms.
• Basic Research Intensity: total basic research by firm i in year t divided by total
applied research of firm i in year t. The formulation of the survey questions related
to the type of research undertaken is directly derived from the definitions provided
by the Frascati Manual;
• # of Industries: sum of all distinct SIC codes within firm i in year t irrespective
of organizational form (business group or multi-divisional structure). Industries are
successively defined at the 4-,3-,2- and 1-digit SIC levels;
• # of Industries - Weighted Sum: weighted sum of all distinct bilateral 1-digit SIC
links within firm i in year t. Weights are computed on the basis of the empirical
frequency of each bilateral SIC link in each year t;
• # of Patent Classes Applied: sum of cumulated distinct patent-class applications
within firm i in year t. Cumulated patent-class applications are computed for the
period leading from 1993 to year t. Patent classes are successively defined at the
5,4,3,2 and 1-digit levels (EPO Classification);
• # of Patent Classes Granted: sum of cumulated distinct patent-class grants within
firm i in year t. Cumulated patent-class grants are computed for the period leading
from 1993 to year t. Patent classes are successively defined at the 5-,4-,3-,2- and
1-digit levels (EPO Classification);
• Financial Int.: binary indicator equal to 1 if firm i in year t is present in a financial
industry, 0 otherwise;
• Foreign HQ: binary indicator equal to 1 if the headquarters of firm i in year t are
located outside France, 0 otherwise;
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• Market Share: weighted average of total sales of firm i, year t in industry k divided
by total industry sales in year t. Weights are computed on the basis of the industry
share of employment within firm i in year t;
• Outsourcing to Univ.: binary indicator equal to 1 if firm i in year t has outsourced
R&D to French universities, 0 otherwise;
• Profitability - ROA: weighted average of EBIDTA divided by total fixed assets of
all subsidiaries within firm i in year t. Weights are computed on the basis of the
subsidiaries’ share of employment within firm i in year t;
• Profitability - ROS: weighted average of EBIDTA divided by total sales of all subsidiaries within firm i in year t. Weights are computed on the basis of the subsidiaries’ share of employment within firm i in year t;
• Public R&D Funds: binary indicator equal to 1 if firm i in year t has received French
public funds, 0 otherwise;
• Research Area: weighted average of the share of respectively biotech / software /
environmental research in research expenditures in firm i in year t. Weights are
computed on the basis of the subsidiaries’ share of total R&D within firm i in year t;
• Total Employment: total employment of firm i in year t;
• IV - State Present in 1986: binary indicator equal to 1 if the French state had a
non-zero equity stake in firm i in 1986;
• IV - SOE in 1986: binary indicator equal to 1 if the French state had a controlling
equity stake in firm i in 1986.
Table B.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the key variables.
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TABLE B.1: D ESCRIPTIVE S TATISTICS
25th
75th
Standard
Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min

Variable

Max

N

R&D Investment
R&D To Sales
0.11
0.01
0.04
0.14
0.17
0.00
0.86
13708
Basic Research Intensity
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.19
0.00
1.57
13708
Number of Industries
1-Digit SIC
2.21
1
2
3
1.48
1
10
13708
4-Digit SIC
4.97
1
2
5
8.87
1
130
13708
Balance Sheet
Total Employment
1497.88
24
93
506
8445.93
1
195746
13708
Return on Sales
0.032
0.02
0.07
0.13
0.63
-39.39 7.36
13708
Age
21.17
8.79
18.92
30.55
14.97
0
86
13708
Ownership Structure
Financial Intermediary
0.05
0
0
0
0.22
0
1
13708
Foreign HQ
0.23
0
0
0
0.41
0
1
13708
Public and Private R&D
Public Subsidy to Private Investment 0.09
0
0
0.04
0.4
0
30.9
13708
Collaboration with Universities
.15
0
0
0
0.36
0
1
13708
Note: Pooled data for the period 2000-2006. R&D To Sales is defined as the ratio of total firm research and development
expernditures to total firm sales. Basic Research Intensity is defined as the ratio of total firm investment in basic research to
total firm investment in applied research. Number of Industries is the sum of all distinct SIC codes within the firm. Return on
Sales is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to total firm sales. Total Employment total
employment of the firm. Age is the difference between the current year and the year of the firm’s incorporation. Financial
Intermediary binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm is present in a financial industry, 0 otherwise. Foreign HQ: binary indicator
equal to 1 if the headquarters of the firm are located outside France, 0 otherwise. Public Subsidy to Private Investment binary
indicator equal to 1 if the firm has received French public funds for innovation
0 otherwise. Collaboration with
Akcigit,expenditures,
Hanley, and Serrano-Velarde
Universities binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm has received French public funds for innovation expenditures, 0 otherwise.
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Figure 11 provides a graphical intuition for the computation of the citation information.
11: Computing the Cooling Down Rate
Figure B.1 provides a graphicalFigure
intuition
for the computation of the citation information.
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F IGURE B.1: C OMPUTING THE C OOL -D OWN R ATE
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Granted 78
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3
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Age 3:
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by B & C

Patent B:
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1

4

Cited

8
Cited

Cited
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Cited

Cited
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Patent A is granted in 1978. In 1981, when patent A is 3 years old, it receives citations
from both patent B and patent C which applied in 1981. Patent B in the following 10 years was
cited by patents V, W and X, whereas patent C was only cited by patents Y and Z. The average
citation of citing patents for patent A at age 3 is therefore 2.5. The timing of the computation
implies that we need to be cautious with respect to possible truncation. We therefore compute
our measure for patents between 1975 and 1985. This implies that, inclusive of the 10 year
forward lag, we can observe without truncation all our patents until the age of 10.
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Robustness Checks Figure 12 provides robustness checks for the estimates on the cooling
down rate of patents originating from basic and applied research. The left panel of the figure
measures Average Citations of Citing Patents computing the 5 year forward citations of the
citing patents and is measured for patents granted in the period 1975-1985. The right panel
re-classifies university patents which were defined as private depositors. In both cases results
are unchanged with a citation difference between public and private patents that becomes
statistically non-significant at year 8. Indeed in France most of the academic patents are
accounted for in the “public” category. French universities generally manage their patents

u

10

u

10

Patent A is granted in 1978. In 1981, when patent A is 3 years old, it receives citations
from both patent B and patent C, which was applied for in 1981. Patent B in the following
10 years was cited by patents V, W and X, whereas patent C was only cited by patents Y and
Z. The average citation of citing patents for patent A at age 3 is therefore 2.5. The timing
of the computation implies that we need to be cautious with respect to possible truncation.
We therefore compute our measure for patents between 1975 and 1985. This implies that,
inclusive of the 10-years-forward lag, we can observe without truncation all our patents
until the age of 10.

Robustness Checks Figure B.2 provides robustness checks for the estimates on the cooldown rate of patents originating from basic and applied research. The left panel of the
figure measures Average Citations of Citing Patents computing the 5-years-forward citations of the citing patents and is measured for patents granted in the period 1975-1985. The
right panel re-classifies university patents that were defined as private depositors. In both
cases results are unchanged, with a citation difference between public and private patents
that becomes statistically non-significant at year 8. Indeed, in France, most of the academic
patents are accounted for in the “public” category. French universities generally manage
their patents through public research institutions with which academics are typically affiliated, one example being the CNRS.

B.4

Robustness Checks on Reduced-Form Results

In this section we provide further robustness checks on the correlation between a firm’s
basic research incentives and its multi-industry presence. Our baseline specification is
related to the number of distinct 1-digit SIC activities in which a firm operates but extends
to finer SIC classifications. All results are presented in Table B.2.
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F IGURE B.2: C ITATION PATTERNS FOR F RENCH P UBLIC AND P RIVATE PATENTS

C ITATION D IFFERENCES FOR F RENCH P UBLIC AND P RIVATE PATENTS
Age

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

5-Yr-Forward Citations

.15**
(0.07)

.16**
(0.07)

.28***
(0.08)

.16**
(0.06)

.22**
(0.07)

.15**
(0.07)

.33***
(0.11)

.08
(0.08)

.18
(0.11)

.15
(0.12)

10-Yr-Forward Citations
Including Univ.

.3**
(0.15)

.3**
(0.15)

.62***
(0.17)

.28**
(0.14)

.42**
(0.18)

.23
(0.17)

.71***
(0.25)

.08
(0.16)

.39
(0.25)

.15
(0.24)

Note:The figures separately plot Average Citations of Citing Patents for French public patents (blue line) and French private
patents (red line) across patent age. The left panel computes Average Citations of Citing Patents computing the 5-yearsforward citations of the citing patents and is measured for patents granted in the period 1975-1985. The bottom panel
computes Average Citations of Citing Patents computing the 5-years-forward citations of the citing patents and re-classifying
university patents as public patents. The table reports differences in citation patterns using two sample t-tests with unequal
variances. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance at the 5% level, and three stars denote
significance at the 1% level

Confounding Factors Columns (1) and (2) check robustness of the results with respect
to confounding factors. Column (1) estimates the model only allowing for year and organization fixed effects, whereas column (2) includes a set of potential confounding factors.
Results in column (1) suggest that presence in an additional industry, not accounting for
other variables such as size, is associated on average with a 1.4 percentage-point higher basic research intensity of firms. In column (2) the set of regressors includes controls for size,
profitability and headquarter localization. The impact of multi-industry presence is slightly
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lower but remains statistically significant.4 Estimates on the localization of headquarters
are also statistically significant at the 5% level. Total employment and profitability on the
other hand are not.

Measures of Multi-Industry Presence Columns (3) and (4) provide alternative measures for the multi-industry presence of firms. Column (3) defines multi-industry presence
on the basis of a firm’s technological spectrum. To do so we use EPO patent data for French
applicants. We define as the number of technology classes in which a firm is present as the
cumulative distinct patent classes granted to the firm between 1993 and t. The coefficient
is very similar in magnitude and precision to the one obtained using distinct 1-digit SIC
industries. Column (4) measures multi-industry presence as a weighted sum of all distinct
bilateral 1-digit SIC links within firm i in year t considering only distinct legal entities
linked by majority ownership. Weights are computed on the basis of the empirical frequency of each bilateral SIC link in each year t. Intuitively, if a given bilateral industry link
is rare, then industries are more likely to be very different. Multi-industry presence is still
positively related to basic research intensity, the different point estimate being linked to the
different support of the weighted industry variable.

Causality and Instrumental Variables

Columns (5) and (6) address the potential con-

cern of reverse causality, i.e. basic research leading to a larger economic scope of firms.
We exploit historical ownership structures that affected a firm’s multi-industry presence as
instrumental variables. The two instruments are defined as State Ownership 1985-1987 and
State Owned between 1985-1987.
The rationale behind our identification strategy is as follows. In 1981 Francois Mitterrand was elected president of the Republic and implemented a vast nationalization pro4

Further checks on control variables included market shares, R&D subsidies, collaborations with universities, the presence of financial intermediaries, state in the capital of the firm, industry fixed effects and the
use of a mean patent scaling method.
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gram across industries. Even before that period the tradition of French state intervention
resulted in a significant fraction of the economy being under state control. Consistent with
Colbertist policies, the state also modified the economic scope of its firms by merging unrelated firms into large conglomerates of national champions. In 1987, however, Jacques
Chirac was elected prime minister on a liberal platform and this marked the beginning of
privatizations, which continued into the 90s. The embedded exclusion restriction therefore
requires that state control in the 80 be associated today with a greater basic research intensity of firms only because of politically motivated mergers. The implicit assumption is that
when these firms became private they adjusted their research spending from the social to
the private optimum but did not adjust their multi-industry presence. First-stage estimates
show that state ownership in the 80s is associated on average with 1.2 more industry links
for firms between 2000 and 2006. The associated F-test are well above the critical levels
related to weak instruments tables.5 Columns 5 and 6 present the instrumented LATE coefficients related to multi-industry presence of the second stage. The coefficients are nearly
twice as large in magnitude with respect to the non-instrumented coefficients of columns 1
and 2.

Estimation Columns (7) and (8) use alternative estimation methods for the baseline
model with covariates. Column (7) presents estimates of the Heckman selection model,
whereas column (8) presents estimates from a negative binomial model. In both cases
estimates suggest a positive and statistically significant relation between basic research intensity and multi-industry presence.
5

The tables are available upon request.
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B.5

Target Moments and Identification

In this section we explain the moments that are used to identify our parameters. For convenience, define expressions for the per product line R&D employment

hm
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 ξbaνm
b

and

h̄m
b



 Eφ pξbbνm
b

φq  1pφ φm q



for applied and basic research, respectively. Note that these are functions of m, the number
of industries a firm has working knowledge in.
Below, expectations are assumed to be over the distribution of firm characteristics

pm, n, qpq.

p denotes the number of industries in which a firm has one or
Note that here m

more products, rather than the number of industries in which the firm has working knowledge. Since the latter is unobservable, we must compute the former to in order to match
the data.

Basic Research Intensity by Number of Industries We define basic research intensity
as the ratio of spending on basic research to spending on applied research. Since the effect
of multi-industry presence on this quantity is of critical importance to our model, we have
p P t1, . . . , M u. Given a set of parameters and an equilibrium of the
one moment for each m
p is
model, this moment’s value for a given m
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 10. However, in the data there are only a handful of firms
p ¡ 8, so we have one moment for each m
p P t1, . . . , 7u and a final moment which is
with m
p P t8, 9, 10u. The way in which this moment increases with m
p identifies
averaged over m
In our estimation, we use M

the cross-industry spillover parameter p in our model. Additionally, it provides us with
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some identification power for the basic research cost parameters pξb ,νb q .
Extensive Margin of Basic Research Investment by Number of Industries

We use the

p to identify the mean µ and variance
share of positive basic research spending by each m

σ 2 of the fixed cost distribution basic research. This is simply the probability that the
p
idiosyncratic fixed cost draw is less than the cutoff for a certain m






p .
Λp9  16q  Em,φ 1pφ φm q  m
p the mean and
Distribution of m We track two moments relating to the distribution of m,

mean squared. They are given by
Λp17q  Emp rm
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These moments identify the merger probability parameter governing the rate of expansion
z as well as the mass of potential outside entrants pE q. Together, these factors determine
the equilibrium distribution of multi-industry presence.

Profitability Firm profitability is defined as the ratio of profits to sales. For a given panel
of firms, this moment is given by
Λp19q 
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Notice that there is one fixed component from static production side that yields information
on the value of ε and another from dynamic R&D expenditures that yields information on
R&D cost and step size parameters.
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Exit Rate

As exit occurs when firms either receive the exogenous destruction shock or

lose their last product, the predicted exit rate will be
Λp20q  κ

τ



¸

Γm,1

m

However, for consistency, we simply use the value from the simulated firm sample. This
moment serves primarily to determine the value of the rate of exogenous destruction κ, as
well as the mass of outside entrants E, since the size of the pool of entrants affects the rate
creative destruction and hence the exit rate of single-product firms.

Total Research Intensity

We have two moments to track levels of R&D: the ratio of total

research labor expenditures spending to total production labor expenditures. Since research
spending is proportional to n, R&D expenditures per product will be the same across firms
with the same m, while employment will be a function of the portfolio of product qualities.
Because the wage is common to both types of labor, this will simply be the ratio of R&D
employment to production employment given by
Λp21q  Em,n,qp
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Conditional on innovation rates, this moment give us information on the research production function parameters.

Firm Growth

We have a moment for employment growth amongst firms. This is calcu-

lated conditional on the firm not exiting, since we do not observe the last period’s growth
rate for exiting firms. The moment is calculated by looking at the one-year growth rate of
total employment by a firm. It is labeled Λp22q. The employment growth primarily informs
on the rate of exogenous destruction κ and the R&D cost function parameters.
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Aggregate Growth

The growth rate gives information on the effectiveness of research

spending absent effects coming from the distribution of firm size and its relation to firm
growth, particularly on innovation step sizes. This is moment Λp23q.
Spillover Differential In order to quantify the spillovers associated with basic research,
we turn to patent citation data. The model predicts that innovations that build off of previous basic research should have a larger step size on average. If we take citations as a proxy
for step size, then patents that cite basic research should themselves have more citations.
This effect will diminish with the age of the patent due to product line cooldown. Thus
the average time after which a public innovation is indistinguishable from a private innovation should be
Λp24q 

1  τa
ζ τ

This yields direct information on the value of the cooldown rate ζ.

Firm Age Firm age is highly correlated with firm size. We track the average age of firms
for those above and below the median firm size. This yields information entry and exit
patterns, as well as on the rate of creative destruction. Moment Λp25q is the average age of
firms below the median firm size, while moment Λp26q is the average age for those firms
above it.
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YES

0.014***
(0.00)

YES

0.011***
(0.00)
0.002
(0.00)
-0.010**
(0.01)
0.006
(0.00)

(2)
Yes

YES

0.012***
(0.00)
0.003
(0.00)
-0.010
(0.01)
0.016
(0.01)

(3)
Patent
Based

YES

0.028***
(0.01)
0.018***
(0.01)
-0.048**
(0.02)
0.005
(0.01)

(4)
Weighted
Links

Alternative Measures

YES

0.023***
(0.01)
-0.003
(0.00)
-0.004
(0.01)
0.005
(0.00)

(5)
State Present
in 1986

YES

0.020**
(0.01)
-0.002
(0.00)
-0.005
(0.01)
0.005
(0.00)

(6)
SOE
in 1986

Instrumental Variables

YES

0.045***
(0.01)
0.012***
(0.00)
-0.041***
(0.01)
0.025**
(0.01)

(7)
Heckman

YES

0.007***
(0.00)
-0.001
(0.00)
-0.006
(0.00)
0.005
(0.00)

(8)
Negative
Binomial

Estimation

N
13708
13706
3709
14823
13707
13707
13707
13707
Notes: Pooled data for the period 2000-2006. Basic Research Intensity is defined as the ratio of total firm investment in basic research divided by
total firm investment in applied research. Columns 1 and 2 re-estimate the Tobit model with different sets of regressors. Columns 3 and 4 modify the
measure of a firm’s multi-industry presence. Column 3 uses patent applications of French firms to the European patent office (1993-2003) to count the
number of distinct technological fields in which they are present (1-digit IPC classification). Column 4 weights each bilateral industry link of a firm by
the empirical frequency of this link in the French economy, thus giving more weight to less related industries. Columns 5 and 6 re-estimate the model
by instrumenting contemporary multi-industry presence by historical ownership structures. More specifically, we exploit the nationalization wave of
the Mitterrand era that preceded the privatization of the 90s. The idea is that state ownership effectively increased the scope of a firm’s economic
activities. Column 5 uses state participation in the capital of a firm in 1986 as an instrument. Column 6 uses state ownership of a company in 1986
as an instrument. Both instruments accurately predict an increased multi-industry presence nowadays. Columns 7 and 8 estimate the relationship
between multi-industry presence and basic research intensity by using a Heckman model and a negative binomial model. Tobit estimates relate to
the marginal effect of the regressors with respect to the uncensored variable mean and are evaluated at the sample mean of covariates (except for
categorical variables evaluated for firms that are present in 1 industry, non-foreign owned, in 2002). Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level
in parentheses. See Appendix B.2 for the definition of variables.

Year & Organization FE

Profitability

Foreign HQ

Log Employment

# of Industries

(1)
No

Covariates

TABLE B.2: BASIC R ESEARCH I NTENSITY AND M ULTI -M ARKET ACTIVITY, ROBUSTNESS C HECKS
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